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To my friends in the King’s Philosophy Department,
2006–2016
They have inspired and influenced my thinking more than anything else
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Proper names are poetry in the raw. Like all poetry they are untranslatable.
—W.H. Auden
And we must at all costs avoid over-simplification, which one might be tempted to
call the occupational disease of philosophers if it were not their occupation.
—J.L. Austin
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Abstract
I argue, in this thesis, that proper name reference is a wholly pragmatic
phenomenon. The reference of a proper name is neither constitutive of,
nor determined by, the semantic content of that name, but is determined,
on an occasion of use, by pragmatic factors. The majority of views
in the literature on proper name reference claim that reference is in
some way determined by the semantics of the name, either because their
reference simply constitutes their semantics (which generally requires a
very fine-grained individuation of names), or because names have an
indexical-like semantics that returns a referent given certain specific
contextual parameters. I discuss and criticize these views in detail,
arguing, essentially, in both cases, that there can be no determinate criteria
for reference determination—a claim required by both types of semantic
view. I also consider a less common view on proper name reference: that
it is determined wholly by speakers’ intentions. I argue that the most
plausible version of this view—a strong neo-Gricean position whereby
all utterance content is determined by the communicative intentions of
the speaker—is implausible in light of psychological data. In the positive
part of my thesis, I develop a pragmatic view of proper name reference
that is influenced primarily by the work of Charles Travis. I argue that
the reference of proper names can only be satisfactorily accounted for
by claiming that reference occurs not at the level of word meaning, but
at the pragmatic level, on an occasion of utterance. I claim that the
contextual mechanisms that determine the reference of a name on an
occasion are the same kinds of thing that determine the truth-values of
utterances according to Travis. Thus, names are, effectively, occasion-
sensitive in the way that Travis claims predicates and sentences (amongst
other expressions) are. Finally, I discuss how further research might
address how my pragmatic view of reference affects traditional issues
in the literature on names, and the consequences of the view for the
semantics of names.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
He telleth the number of the stars :
and calleth them all by their names
Psalm 147:4
Ursula le Guin’s Earthsea books describe a world in which people,animals, and other things have true names—proper names in thecase of people and dragons, common names in the cases of other
things—that they bear naturally, and which are hidden from most language
users, the names belonging to an ancient language. Knowledge of the true
name of an object enables manipulation of the object through magic. The
idea that names are innate, and shed light on the true nature of things is also
discussed in Plato’s Cratylus. In reality, there are no true names, proper or
common. Language does not have magical properties. There are no magical
ties between words and the world. The meanings of words do not effect the
world, except in virtue of what speakers do with them, and they only have
those meanings in virtue of how they are used. Proper names, in particular,
are not borne by what bears them essentially, and they do not refer to what
they do essentially. They refer to what they are used to refer to. This thesis
will be concerned with elaborating on the idea of proper name reference,
and arguing that it neither requires, nor constitutes, any special connection
between word and object.
Wittgenstein begins the Investigations (1953) with a quotation from Au-
gustine that he takes to capture a particular view about how words connect
to the world: that the meanings of words are objects for which the words
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stand (Wittgenstein 1953, § 1).1 Proper names are sometimes thought of as
being paradigmatic of the kind of view that Wittgenstein objects to: we give
objects proper names, and, it appears, those names now name those objects
such that using the name automatically summons the object into whatever
thought is being composed. Names, so thought of, are somewhat like labels
on strings attached to the objects that bear them and that they refer to (ibid.,
§ 26). Of course, there is something to this thought: we do, in fact, give things
proper names—make them bearers of those names—in large part so that we
can then use those names to refer to them with relative ease. This is one use
of the verb ‘to name’: to give something a name. Another use being to refer
to something using a particular name, or to speak of something by its name,
as in ‘she named Lucy as her successor’. However, it is, I claim, a mistake to
think that simply by giving something a name one can thereby refer to it with
that name. Just as for other kinds of words, the circumstances in which one
uses a name, which may include the fact that one or more objects have been
given that name in the past, will affect what one can do with it. Something
akin to the view that all that is required for a name to refer is that it has been
given as a label to a particular object has been popular at least since Kripke
(1981), in the form of the view I call ‘causal-homophonism’.
Opposition to the idea that proper names are simply labels of objects, that
reference is an aspect of that labeling, and that, in order to refer to an object
using a proper name, one just needs to utter a name that refers to or labels
that object, is a major theme of this work. And, indeed, a motivating theme.
To generalize these ideas, my main thesis is that it is not essential to any
proper name that it refers to, or can be used to refer to, what it is used to refer
to. That is, the meanings of proper names do not determine, or constitute,
what they refer to. Rather, though it may be part of the meaning of names
that they refer in some manner to some thing, upon a use, their reference
is determined at the point of use, by the context of the occasion of use, in
a way that is not specified by their meaning. One might, therefore, say that
if proper names do label objects, they label them only at the time that they
are being used. Of course, the fact that something has been given a name
in the past, might well provide both good reason to use that name to refer
to that thing, and (for the same reason) good evidence that that is what it is
being used to refer to, but other factors will also play a rôle. Indeed, they
must, given that many objects bear the same names. Evidence that names
function in the way I have just suggested can be found through consideration
1Travis (2006b) argues that it is not in fact Augustine’s claims, which amount to banality, that
Wittgenstein objects to, but rather the misinterpretation and misapplication of such banalities
(pp. 10–11).
15
of the way that they are, in fact, used in natural languages, by speakers of
those languages. However, these vagaries of use are frequently overlooked
or downplayed by proponents of accounts of proper name reference. My
position on proper name reference attempts to address such vagaries, rather
than gloss over them or idealize the use of names. As will become clear, I
am heavily influenced in the development of this position by the work of J.L.
Austin and the later Wittgenstein, in particular, via Charles Travis’s criticisms
of the project of mainstream truth-conditional semantics (see, e.g., Travis
2006b, 2008). Travis put forward the beginnings of a view on reference that
incorporates his broader views on language and semantics in relatively early
papers such as his (1980) and (1981a). My view draws on these papers, but
significantly builds on the picture Travis presents in them, developing it with
regard to proper names in particular, and in order to address contemporary
literature on reference.
Travis’s general position, discussed at length in §2.3, is that the meanings of
words and sentences radically under-determine what it is that is expressed—
the truth-evaluable content—of utterances of those words and sentences.
Knowledge of the meanings of words is in no way sufficient to interpret
what speakers use them to say. Domain-general knowledge of the world—
and in particular of the broad circumstances of an utterance—is required
for interpretation. In this thesis, I show how this view applies to proper
name reference as much as for any other phenomenon that contributes to the
truth-evaluability of utterances. The failure of existing accounts of proper
name reference to consider either the general problems of truth-conditional
semantics, or the particular complexities of name use, is typified in the
following quotation from Sainsbury (2005), in which he is specifically talking
about the views of Travis:
A specific version of this view is that the ordinary ‘meaning’ of expressions
falls short of what is required to determine truth-conditions (even when
indexicality and other well-recognized forms of contextual effect are
bracketed). Identifying truth-conditions is part of what is involved in
interpretation. So if the completeness of semantics is to be tested by
the provision of sufficient information to permit interpretation, there
may be no complete semantics. I know of no general arguments against
such views. One has simply to examine the examples case by case. Yet
even if semantics falls short of truth-conditions, the truth-conditional
approach constitutes a useful idealization, and the kind of phenomenon
that might make one think it inadequate in general have no role to play
in the discussions of this book. Even if a conception of meaning closely
tied to the demands of interpretation turns out to require the exercise of
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general skills, rather than only language-specific ones, I think the issues
to be discussed here will not be affected. (Sainsbury 2005, pp. 50–51)
It is my view that, for the most part, the truth-conditional approach to
semantics does not provide a useful semantics, but rather, results in a dismal
failure to account for the relations between meaning, use, communication,
content, and truth. Furthermore, I disagree that these issues do not affect the
view of reference put forward by Sainsbury, or any other proponent of views
about proper name reference. In this thesis, my account of proper names is
initially developed through consideration of existing accounts that maintain
(in general) that reference is determined by the semantics of names. These
views fail, or are inadequate, for exactly the kinds of reasons just discussed.
In chapter 2, I provide some methodological and philosophical background
to my project. I briefly discuss what it is that I mean by proper name reference,
attempting to capture a relatively intuitive notion, and observing its relation
to truth. I explain that my purpose is to account for what it is that determines
proper name reference: to explain what makes it such that a name, or use of a
name, or a speaker using a name, refers to what it does when it does. I then
go on to consider at length what it is that could count as data for the purposes
of testing and comparing accounts. Assuming that those investigating name
reference are primarily interested in the way that names are used to refer by
language-users, or what names do in virtue of how they are generally used,
I consider two possible sources of data: corpus data, and the judgements of
language-users about cases. I argue that corpus data—transcripts, recordings,
or other documentation of actual language use—is of little use with regard
to assessing the reference of proper names, but that in order to interpret
it, we must appeal to the judgements of other language-users, so we must
anyway appeal to such data. I further divide the category of data from
speaker judgements into that from the judgements of experts, and that from
the judgements of ordinary speakers. I consider a large amount of literature
on the value of each category, and conclude that any faith we should put
in the judgements of experts stems simply from the fact that they are also
ordinary speakers. I conclude that, if there is significant data by which to judge
accounts of proper name reference, it probably comes from the judgements of
ordinary speakers about cases of proper name use.
§2.3 lays out my conception of the semantics/pragmatics divide, whereby
semantics constitutes the meaning of words that is context-insensitive, and
everything to do with content and interpretation that is context-sensitive—
the way the world at large effects what we do and can do with language—is
pragmatic. I explain this distinction in the context of the work of Charles Travis,
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spending some time expounding the important features of Travis’s views of
language and truth, and explaining how they will effect my view of proper
name reference. In the final section of chapter 2, I discuss communication and
its relevance to language, truth, and reference. I claim that communication is
key to understanding why we are able to say what we do with our words, and,
in particular, why we can and do refer to what we do when we use names. I
posit a view of reference whereby what can be communicated with a use of a
name is key to what it refers to, regardless of what a speaker intends to refer
to.
Part II introduces the class of views that are opposed to my conception of
proper name reference. I call these ‘semantic views’, in contrast to my pragmatic
view. I introduce a range of theories and accounts of proper names in the
introduction to the part, sectioning off two types of semantic view that I
will discuss and criticize in detail—causal-homophonism and indexicalism—both
of which claim that the reference of a proper name is determined in some
manner by its semantics. I also identify a third type of view which is not
properly a semantic view, but includes accounts of how proper name reference
is determined that are at odds with mine. These are intention-based accounts.
I begin my criticism of views existing in the literature in chapter 3, attacking
causal-homophonist accounts of name reference. These accounts have in
common the idea that the semantics of a name is simply constituted by its
reference, and so determines it in virtue of being it. In order that this view be
at all plausible, given the existence of apparent shared names, it is claimed that
names must be individuated in such a way that each name can only have one
referent (at a time), and that any instances of apparently shared names are in
fact examples of homonymy or homophony. Each name, then, has its referent,
which it refers to tout court. Names gain their reference through the baptism
or dubbing of objects with the name, and maintain their reference, and(/or)
their identity, via causal chains linking each use back to the baptism. I attack
this view through four separate arguments: that it does not account effectively
for shared names; that it does not account effectively for communication
using proper names; that it does not account effectively for the use of family
names; and that it does not account for the apparent pluralism of proper
name reference. I do not take these arguments to refute causal-homophonism
definitively, but, rather, to show that it strains to account properly for the way
that proper names are actually used, and must be excessively complicated to
do so.
In chapter 4, I turn my attention to indexicalism: the view, or family of
views, that proper names are, properly speaking, a variety of indexical, or at
least bear strong resemblances to indexicals in important ways. This amounts
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to the claim that names are context-sensitive with regard to their reference, and
have a semantics that specifies how they interact with context in order to refer.
My general argument against indexicalism, influenced by Travis, is essentially
the claim that, for any way that it is claimed the context of utterance fixes
the reference of a name, it will either be too general, and so will not specify
a particular way that the context must be to determine an extension—and
so fail to provide truth-conditions—or it will be wrong, and the specified
contextual parameters can be held constant whilst the reference of the name
can be varied. I consider three particular indexical views proposed in the
literature, observing particular problems with each, and then go on to discuss
general issues with indexicalism. Firstly, I discuss the problem of proposing
particular contextual parameters to determine reference generally, and then
I consider the idea that name/bearer relations are contextual factors that
can play a primary rôle in reference determination, presenting a number of
problems for it.
Chapter 5 addresses intention-based accounts of proper name reference. I
consider two different forms of such an account: constraint-based intentional-
ism, which I associate in particular with Michaelson (2013); and a strong neo-
Gricean approach to reference, which I associate most closely with Stephen
Neale (2004, ms.). I argue against constraint-based intentionalism on the
grounds that it fails to account properly for the vagaries of proper name
reference. I then take a somewhat different approach to neo-Gricean views,
proposing that the kind of strong general position that would be required to
support the view that it is speakers’ referential intentions alone that determine
reference is untenable given particular data from experimental psychology.
In part III of the thesis, I introduce my own pragmatic view of proper
name reference, already discussed above, which, I claim, is better able to deal
with the vagaries of language use that presented problems for the positions
I discuss in part II. I begin by presenting seven principles that provide the
key points of the view, which can be summarized as follows: the reference
of an utterance of a name is determined by the circumstances of utterance—
pragmatic factors of the context—in a way that is not specified in advance by
the semantics of the term. In the rest of the chapter I go into much greater
detail, discussing various important aspects of the view, including reference,
truth, context-sensitivity, semantics, necessary and sufficient conditions, and
bearers. I then consider the way that my position on proper names relates
to Travis’s account of occasion-sensitivity more generally, and finally how I
can address two potential criticisms of my view: that it is unable to make
predictions about reference, and that necessary and sufficient conditions
are required for there to be proper name reference at all. I consider this
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second potential objection further in chapter 7. In this chapter, I discuss at
length referential uses of familial terms such as ‘mum’, and conclude that the
only way to account for the range of these uses is by maintaining that their
reference is fixed wholly pragmatically, and is not determined or significantly
constrained by their semantics. I take this conclusion to add plausibility to
the claim as it applies to proper names.
In chapter 8, which concludes the thesis, I offer a summary of what has
gone before, laying out what I have established. I then go on to consider some
of the lose ends and topics for further research. I briefly address what the
semantics of names might have to look like, in order to accommodate my
view of their reference. I suggest that two existing accounts might plausibly
be adapted to fit with my view. Finally, I consider how my pragmatic view
of proper name reference deals with some of the classic issues and problems
associated with names: rigidity, reference shift, puzzles about belief, and
fiction and empty names, suggesting how my view can address these issues,
and how I might need to develop it in light of them.
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Chapter 2
Methodological and Philosophical
Preliminaries
That what we ordinarily say and mean may have a direct
and deep control over what we can philosophically say and
mean is an idea which many philosophers find oppressive.
S. Cavell, ‘Must We Mean What We Say?’
2.1 Reference
What are philosophers and semanticists talking about when theytalk about reference? It is generally accepted that there is a phe-nomenon of reference. At the very least, within ordinary language,
(uses of) proper names and other types of expression are spoken about as
referring to things or being about them. For example, if a speaker says, in a
very ordinary type of situation, ‘Lucy is dead’, or ‘This soup is disgusting’,
or ‘I met the Queen once’, they are likely to be taken to have said something
about an object or entity in each case: ‘Lucy is dead’ is likely to say of some
(previously) animate object, probably bearing the name ‘Lucy’, that it is dead;
‘This soup is disgusting’ is likely to say of some demonstrated or salient soup
(or soup-like substance) that it is disgusting; and ‘I met the Queen once’ is
likely to say of some particular, contextually-determined queen (or queen-like
object) that the speaker once met them. In each utterance, it is a particular
expression—‘Lucy’; ‘this soup’; ‘the Queen’—that tells us what object or
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entity the utterance is about. It appears that the truth of an utterance which
contains such an expression—that is about a particular object—turns on how
the particular object in question is.1 If I say ‘Lucy is dead’, and succeed in
expressing something truth-evaluable, then I’ve said something true if and
only if the object the utterance is about can correctly be described as being
dead. It is this relation of (an utterance or use of) a word or expression
connecting to some object or entity (or connecting that object or entity to what
an utterance is about) that I call reference, or, more specifically, singular reference.
It is also the relation that I believe other philosophers and semanticists are
talking about when they talk about singular reference, even though I have
couched my description of it in language with which not all other theorists
would be happy.
Given this account of what kind of thing we mean by ‘reference’, what
is it that philosophers and semanticists are doing when they theorize about
reference? One ongoing programme, at least within philosophy of language,
is to explain what makes it such that various kinds of referring expression, for
example, indexicals, demonstratives, proper names, and, probably, definite
descriptions, refer to what they do, when they do, either by providing one
unified story for all such terms, or by offering different stories for different
types of term. The purpose of this thesis is to address this question as applied
to proper names, and suggest an answer (of sorts) to it.
2.1.1 Proper Names
Thus far, I have been talking about proper names, but have said nothing
about what they are. Clearly, taking too detailed or precise a position on
exactly what counts as a proper name risks assuming strong theoretical claims
about them, for example about how their reference is determined, before
any discussion or argument takes place. However, most examples of proper
names are largely uncontroversial, and it is these that I will focus on in the
course of this thesis. The most paradigmatic examples of proper names
seem to be the names of people, such as ‘Edwina Currie’; ‘Lucy Campbell’;
‘Muhammad Ali’; and ‘César Chávez’; followed by the names of places, such
as ‘Walthamstow’; ‘Antarctica’; ‘Kiribati’; and ‘Abuja’. The paradigmatic
form for names in English, then, seems to be that of a bare referential term,
(without an apparent determiner beforehand), spelt with a capital letter at
the beginning. There is debate over whether some expressions that resemble
(definite) descriptions are in fact proper names, particularly examples such
1That is, of course, if the utterance is a truth-apt kind of utterance. If the utterance is apt for
another kind of correctness, then that turns on how the object in question is.
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as ‘The Holy Roman Empire’, the name for something neither holy, Roman,
nor an empire (Kripke 1981, p. 26), or ‘Coffee Hour’, the name used in the
University of Chicago Philosophy Department for a regular gathering on
Friday afternoons that involves no coffee, and lasts substantially longer than
an hour. In these examples, the apparent descriptive content not only is not
satisfied by the referent, but seemingly plays no rôle (any longer, perhaps) in
fixing the referent. As observed by Ziff (1977), however, at least in English,
there are a range of uncontroversial examples of names that do not conform
to the paradigm, beginning with a definite article, or otherwise diverging. For
example, pub names, band names, company names, and various others: ‘The
Jerusalem Tavern’; ‘The Chequers’; ‘The Be Good Tanyas’; ‘The E Street Band’;
‘Ben Folds Five’; ‘The White Company’; ‘It Takes a Nation of Millions to Hold
Us Back’. In general, it appears that we give names to specific and particular
things that are significant in some manner, and that we want to be able to
identify and re-identify with some ease.
2.2 Data on Reference
In order to address the question of what names refer to when they refer to it,
which I generally express more succinctly as ‘what determines the reference
of proper names?’, there need to be some data about what names or other
expressions refer to, such that any proffered answer can be deemed to be
adequate or not. I take it that these are questions about how names are used
by speakers, or, perhaps less controversially, one or more of: what names
do when they are used; what referential utterances of names do; or what
speakers are doing when they utter names referentially. Whether one thinks
that names have referential content inherently, given the way in which they
are introduced into a language, or whether one thinks that only uses of names,
or the speakers using them, are capable of reference, one must presumably
think that this reference is grounded in, or exemplified by, the practice of
language users. It is this practice of referring on which data is required.
There are at least three potential sources for such data: linguistic corpora,
the judgement of ordinary speakers, and the judgements of experts. I will
argue, however, that these do not really represent three distinct sources, but
that the use of corpora breaks down into appeal to the judgements of either
experts or ordinary speakers, and the judgements of experts provide no more
or better data than the judgements of ordinary speakers.
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2.2.1 Corpus Data
A linguistic corpus is a structured collection of examples of uses of (a
particular) language, collected from real-world occurrences, such as recorded
conversations of different kinds, newspapers, books, and academic texts.
Corpora are frequently tagged for parts-of-speech, which would enable one
to search for occurrences of proper names, and observe how those names are
being used in a wider linguistic context. However, whilst this might provide
one with some interesting and illuminating examples of the use of names, it is
unclear whether it would provide much data on proper name reference. This
is because, whilst we might assume that many of the occurrences of names
in a corpus refer, the corpus will rarely provide information useful to the
researcher about what is being referred to. Consider the following entry in
the British National Corpus, which is taken from a recording of an orchestral
society committee meeting. The minutes of a previous meeting are being read:
Present secra– chairman, secretary, Julia, Judith. Apologies were received
from Phil, Malcolm, John and Pauline. Er minutes of the meeting held on
the tenth of January were read and approved. [BNC:F7V]
Numerous names are used in this snippet of dialogue. All presumably referred
to something when they were used, and their use seems very typical of name
use. But, whilst any account of proper name reference will presumably have a
story to tell about how those names refer or referred to whom they do or did,
there is very little provided by the corpus data that would lead us to prefer
one account over another. Whilst it seems very likely that ‘Julia’, ‘Judith’,
‘Phil’, ‘Malcolm’, ‘John’ and ‘Pauline’ all referred to members of the committee
bearing those names, we have no means of knowing who those people were,
such that we could judge, on any basis, whether theoretical predictions about
reference are correct.
Certain corpus extracts may provide more information, for example by
showing apparently unusual uses of names, or cases in which the reference of
a name appears to be at issue within the dialogue, such as the following:
A: Now look, I think, I think he’s got another brother called Carl
B: A younger brother, yes
A: Oh
B: Gavin’s is older, er is, second oldest
A: yeah and Thomas is the other one
B: Yeah but the littlest one
A: yeah, but she got off with him
B: Clare he’s only about five (laugh)
A: (laugh) Oh who’s Carl then? I
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B: (unclear)
A: I reckon it’s one of those boys from the army camp, remember (pause) I
heard her talking about a Carl from the army camp (pause) yes (BNC:KBN)
Whilst it may be enlightening to consider what is going on with the name
‘Carl’ in this dialogue, any conclusions we draw must be based on our own
judgements about what the speakers are doing, informed by our competence
as speakers of the language, or as experts in some relevant field, familiar with
the kinds of thing the dialogue’s participants appear to be doing.
2.2.2 Data from Judgements
Any use of corpus data looks, then, like it will reduce to use of one of the
second and third potential sources of data about the reference of proper
names: the judgements of ordinary speakers, and the judgements of experts.
These both involve considering scenarios—which could be hypothetical or
real—in which a proper name is used by a speaker, and making judgements
about what has been referred to. For example, the man with the martini and
Jones’s killer in Donnellan (1966) (though, of course, these involve definite
descriptions rather than names); Smith and Jones and the leaf-raking in Kripke
(1977); and Gödel and Schmidt in Kripke (1981). Whilst there may be many
worries about the set-up and use of these kinds of cases in philosophy of
language, some of which I will address below, it is unclear whether anything
other than the judgements they are designed to elicit, whether they be from
ordinary speakers or experts, could ever constitute data of the kind under
discussion.
There has been much discussion in recent years about the rôle intuitions
play in philosophy, and whether they should or should not play that rôle,2
some of it on the topic of judgements about reference.3,4 But, when the
object of study is language itself, regarding word meanings, or reference, or
truth-conditions, for example, intuitions or judgements about the meanings
of words, the reference of expressions, or the truth-values of sentences or
utterances appear to be all there is to go on. This point was borne out by
my consideration of the use of corpus data; when attempting to establish
the reference of a use or occurrence of a referential term, there is no natural
indicator or test that will reveal the referent. Instead, although what we
are interested in is how names are used referentially, we must rely on the
2For example, Cappelen (2013); De Cruz (2015); Malmgren (2011); Nagel (2012); Weinberg
et al. (2010); Williamson (2007).
3For example, Deutsch (2009); Machery et al. (2004); Mallon et al. (2009); Martí (2009).
4Note that by using the term ‘judgement’, I am intending something broader than is usually
intended by ‘intuition’, particularly with regard to the judgement of experts. I will return to this
below.
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judgements of the interlocutors involved in the discourse, if they are available,
or of experts or speakers who are familiar with the details of the case. Even
Mallon et al. (2009), who deny that intuitions are a viable source of evidence
for choosing between theories of reference, state, with regard to intuitions
about reference:
[W]e have no idea what other considerations philosophers of language
might appeal to. Thus, in the absence of concrete suggestions, we remain
skeptical of the proposal to downplay the role of intuitions in choosing a
theory of reference.5 (ibid., p. 343)
We might draw a distinction here with other kinds of empirical investi-
gation, for which there are other methods of data collection. If we wanted
to investigate the precise dynamics of spade-use in undertakers, it might
not be fruitful to collect merely the judgements of undertakers. Although
they presumably do have some insight into the way they move their spades,
much of their practice might be learned merely through digging, without any
intellectual reflection upon it. Thus, asking the undertakers to talk about their
practice may result in very little detail, or even in incorrect, data. Fortunately
for the spade-dynamics enthusiast, since spade use is an observable, external
phenomenon, there will be ways of recording, in great detail, the subtle three-
dimensional movements of a spade as it digs a grave. This is not so with
reference. In observing someone utter the words ‘Lucy is dead’, there are no
external measurements or observations we can make that will inform us of
the reference of ‘Lucy’. We must rely on the capacity of language-users with
the right kind of access to the utterance.
The Judgements of Ordinary Speakers
The second source of data about proper name reference that I will consider is
the judgements of ordinary speakers. Specifically, the judgements of ordinary,
competent speakers of the language6 about what object or entity a particular
expression referred to, if it referred to anything, on an occasion of utterance.
Such judgements might be collected either by asking direct questions about
what was referred to, or by formulating questions about whether utterances
of certain sentences would be true or false under certain circumstances. The
choice of questions would, of course, require careful consideration. ‘Ordinary’
should be taken to mean that the speaker is making judgements based on
5Mallon et al. are in fact talking specifically about the intuitions of competent speakers of
the language, rather than the broader range of judgements I am discussing, but a fortiori, they
support my point.
6Since all the utterances I will dealing with will be in English, ordinary speakers should be
taken to be ordinary English speakers.
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the knowledge they have just in virtue of being a competent speaker, not in
virtue of having theory-laden beliefs about how their language functions, held
independently of their being a speaker of the language. There are at least two
different approaches to the collection and use of ordinary speaker judgements.
One assumes that the judgements of all ordinary speakers, perhaps within a
linguistic community, will be similar enough that surveying the judgements
of a very small number of speakers—perhaps just one—is sufficient to form a
conclusion about what has been referred to. The other assumes that a more
rigorous method of data collection is required, including larger sample sizes,
if one’s conclusions are to be trusted. The latter approach, as it applies to
singular reference, has not obviously ever been practiced with the aim of
producing positive results in the philosophy of language. However it has
been used recently in attempts to demonstrate the shortcomings of the former
approach by experimental philosophers such as Machery et al. (2004) and Mallon
et al. (2009). I will address experimental philosophy in detail from p. 34
onwards.
The Judgements of Experts
The view that the judgements of ordinary speakers about the kinds of cases
discussed above is a major source, or the sole source, of data about reference
is contrasted with the view that the judgements of experts, our third source
of data, are a significant source. This view tends to take the form of the
assertion that philosophers, and perhaps linguists, have, through their study,
achieved expertise in the mechanisms and functions of language and reference.
Thus, they are better placed to make judgements about the truth-values, truth-
conditions, or reference of linguistic expressions than are competent speakers
who do not have a background in linguistic research. Such a view, about the
significance of the judgement of experts, can take two forms that are inter-
related. One is the view that the intuitions elicited in an expert by exposure
to cases or scenarios of the kind discussed above are more reliable than those
of non-expert speakers. The experts are thus better at correctly identifying the
referent of a term. The second form of the view is that, because experts are
well-informed about language in general, they are able to see how reference
must be in order to be consistent with their well-informed picture of language
in general, and so make informed judgements.7 For example, if a theorist
deems some version of truth-conditional semantics to be true, that may entail
that reference must be a certain way, and so the theorist will make judgements
7 On this view, the judgements being made are not, in the standard sense, intuitions, which
is one reason I distinguished judgements from intuitions in n. 4, p. 25.
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about cases of reference accordingly.8
I claim that the two forms of the expert judgement view are inter-related
because it is hard to see how expert intuitions could be superior to pre-
theoretic intuitions, except by being informed by the theoretical commitments
they have taken on. There is little in philosophy of language or semantics
that is agreed upon across the board, so, in studying and researching in these
areas, although one may develop a good knowledge of the whole field, any
particular single view or theory to which one is avowed will be contentious.
Two experts avowed to very different semantic theories seem unlikely to have
matching intuitions about a referential case if the intuition is inconsistent with
one of their semantic theories. If it is, they will likely be moved either to
adapt their theory, or to renounce their intuition. It may be that developing
an expertise in philosophy or linguistics improves one’s intuitions in other
ways, for example by sharpening one’s capacity to spot inconsistency, or for
appreciating the subtlety of a scenario. But, in the cases and scenarios that are
relevant to judgements about reference, it is unclear how these skills would
aid one, if not by helping one to see how the cases are affected by one’s
theoretical commitments.
2.2.3 Judgements in Practice
Despite the very different methodological approaches they represent, it
appears that the view that ordinary speaker judgements should be the primary
source of data about proper name reference, and the view that the judgements
of experts should be, are often not properly discriminated. In many texts
on proper names (particularly, perhaps, prior to the advent of experimental
philosophy) cases bearing on reference are presented with an answer to the
question of what is referred to. The cases are designed to demonstrate how
a particular philosopher’s account of reference deals with a particular kind
of situation, or how, even though one’s account appears to make predictions
at odds with the apparent answer, the account can be adapted to allow for
deviations. Presumably, the answers in these cases are those provided by
the judgement of the author, but, often, it appears to be assumed that the
reader will share that judgement, or at least will be easily persuaded of its
correctness. This approach is found in the works by Donnellan and Kripke
already cited, and also in Evans (1973), Fara (2015), Kaplan (1989b), King
8A third view on experts is that they are better than ordinary speakers at distinguishing
relevant from irrelevant cases, and thus relevant from irrelevant judgements, without explicitly
consulting theory. However, this is not a view about the value of experts’ first-order judgements
about reference, but rather of their judgements about which kinds of cases they are interested
in. This is more obviously the purview of the expert, even if they are not good at judging who
should be making the first-order judgements, nor at collecting that data.
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(2014), Jeshion (2015), and Sainsbury (2005), amongst others. But if this is the
case, it is unclear whether the judgements are supposed to be in accordance
with those of ordinary speakers, or whether the author is presenting some
form of expert opinion.
Let us take, as an example, Kripke’s Gödel/Schmidt case. Kripke presents
the case as a counter-example to the view that the name ‘Gödel’ is semantically
equivalent to, and so, for Kripke, necessarily co-referential with, the definite
description ‘the man who discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic’.
Suppose that Gödel was not in fact the author of [the incompleteness]
theorem. A man named ‘Schmidt’, whose body was found in Vienna
under mysterious circumstances many years ago, actually did the work in
question. His friend Gödel somehow got hold of the manuscript and it was
thereafter attributed to Gödel. On the view in question, then, when our
ordinary man uses the name ‘Gödel’, he really means to refer to Schmidt,
because Schmidt is the unique person satisfying the description, ‘the man
who discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic’.[. . . ] So, since the man
who discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic is in fact Schmidt, we,
when we talk about ‘Gödel’, are in fact always referring to Schmidt. But
it seems to me that we are not. We simply are not. (Kripke 1981,
pp. 83–84. My emphasis)
Kripke is emphatic in his judgement about the reference of ‘Gödel’ in the
case he provides, although he acknowledges it to be how things seem to
him. He does not state that his expertise led him to this conclusion, although
he has clearly thought at length about the issue. But neither does he assert
that he expects any ordinary speakers to share his judgement, although if a
significant portion of his audience or readers were to demur, it does seem
likely that his conclusions would be less convincing. As it happens, it appears
that many philosophers were, and continue to be, fairly convinced by Kripke’s
judgements about his cases.
Mallon et al. (2009) assume that, with regard to the Gödel/Schmidt case,
Kripke is appealing to the judgements or intuitions of ordinary speakers.
Indeed, they take the general tradition I have been discussing, of using cases
and scenarios to elicit judgements about reference, to be designed to engage
with the general, and perhaps universal, judgements or intuitions of ordinary
speakers. They label it ‘the method of cases’:
The method of cases: The correct theory of reference for a class of terms T
is the theory which is best supported by the intuitions competent users
of T have about the reference of members of T across actual and possible
cases. (ibid., p. 338)
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Given this interpretation of Kripke’s method, Mallon et al. argue that his
case fails to demonstrate his conclusion by appealling to data reported in
their previous paper, Machery et al. (2004). They allege that this data shows
there is significant cross-cultural variation amongst ordinary English speakers
in their judgements about Gödel/Schmidt-type cases, and even that intra-
culturally, there is limited consensus. More broadly, Mallon et al. claim that
any argument that appeals to a position about reference supported by the
method of cases is undermined in the same way.
Deutsch (2009) challenges the conclusions of Mallon et al. by claiming that
Kripke is not appealing to the judgements or intuitions of ordinary speakers
in the Gödel/Schmidt case, but rather is appealing to something more like
the judgement of experts:
Competent speakers can get it wrong, however. Competence in a language
does not bestow philosophical insight.
At worst, surveys of competent speakers will record judgements about
merely pragmatic implicatures, instead of semantic contents, and so their
results will not qualify as evidence that different groups of people have
genuinely different intuitions about what counts as a case of referring to
Gödel, or an intentionally produced side effect.
We saw that, in the case of Kripke’s argument against descriptivism,
it need not be assumed—and is not assumed by Kripke himself—that
Kripke’s judgement about the Gödel/Schmidt case is shared by all, or
even most, competent speakers of English. What matters is whether the
judgement is true. And whether one is justified in supposing that it is
true will depend on the quality of the arguments for its truth, not on how
many people intuit that it is true. (ibid., pp. 464–5)
Deutsch claims both that the judgements of ordinary speakers are unreliable,
and that Kripke’s argument is not effected by whether or not any number
of competent speakers agree with his judgements about the case. There is,
then, a very clear disagreement between Deutsch and Mallon et al. about
whether Kripke, and presumably other philosophers who appear to use a
similar method, are appealing to the judgements of ordinary speakers, or
experts, or something other than judgements altogether. I will argue that,
whether or not philosophers take themselves to be putting forward expert or
argued opinion when making judgements about reference, only their status
as ordinary speakers is relevant with regard to the value of their judgements.
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2.2.4 Against Expert Judgements
I will press Deutsch (2009)’s response to Mallon et al. (2009) further, as it
illuminates some of the major problems with the use of expert judgements.
Deutsch claims that the worst possible outcome of Mallon et al.’s experimental
methodology is that, in surveying ordinary speakers, they will “record judge-
ments about merely pragmatic implicatures, instead of semantic contents”,
which is problematic since he clearly thinks that “what counts as a case of
referring to Gödel” is an issue of semantic content (Deutsch 2009, pp. 464–
5). Since the aim of this thesis is to argue that proper name reference is a
pragmatic, rather than a semantic, phenomenon, Deutsch’s objection gives
me the strong impression that his defense of Kripke rests on theory-laden
ground: If the judgements of ordinary speakers were sensitive to pragmatic
effects, rather than semantic content, and reference were a pragmatic effect,
those judgements would be good evidence regarding reference. As I have
already stated, the view that the judgements of experts are a reliable source
of data on reference appears to assume that judgements consistent with a
particular theory of reference or language more broadly are a good thing. But
to criticize Mallon et al. in this manner is not to attack them on their own
terms. To do so is to assume the expert judgements view. Deutsch’s view
appears to be that there is a fact of the matter about what referential terms
refer to that is independent of the judgements of users of the language, and
possibly independent even of how they use the language, and that working
out what this fact of the matter is requires ‘philosophical insight’ rather than
linguistic competence.
However, Deutsch also claims that Kripke presents arguments for his
conclusions regarding the nature of proper name reference, illustrated by his
claims about the Gödel/Schmidt case, rather than relying on his judgements
about the case to support or motivate those conclusions. So, not only is Kripke
not appealing to the intuitions of ordinary speakers, he is not making use of
his own intuitions. I observed in n. 4, p. 25 and n. 7, p. 27 that a distinction can
be drawn between judgements and intuitions on the grounds that judgements
may be made about cases in order to accord with theoretical commitments
in spite of contrary pre-theoretic intuitions. The arguments Deutsch claims
Kripke uses for his conclusions (ibid., pp. 451–2) are not arguments from
universally agreeable premises, but instead rely on one or more of the
following: intuitions about other cases; significant theoretical assumptions
about reference and names; or an assumption of the correctness of the causal-
historical account of proper name reference with which Kripke proposes to
replace the descriptivist picture that the Gödel/Schmidt case is supposed to
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be a counter-example to. Thus, even given Deutsch’s interpretation, Kripke is
certainly relying on his judgements about the Gödel/Schmidt case in drawing
conclusions about it, even if he is not merely relying on his direct intuitions
about it.
When I introduced the view that the judgements of experts are a significant
source of data about reference, I claimed that the view could take two inter-
related forms: that experts simply have better intuitions than ordinary speak-
ers, in virtue of their expertise; and that experts make better judgements than
ordinary speakers because they are able to make judgements about reference
in accordance with broader theories they believe to have good standing.
Deutsch’s defense of Kripke, once we have probed it, is predominantly an
example of the latter form. Judgements of experts of this sort will not provide
reliable evidence about reference of the kind we want if our aim is to compare
rival accounts of proper name reference. If the approach is to tell us anything
about reference as a genuine phenomenon of language—the phenomenon I
discussed at the beginning of §2.1, that determines what objects utterances
containing names are about, such that the truth of those utterances (if they
are truth-evaluable) turns on how those objects are—it relies on the accuracy
and correctness of the theoretical commitments in accordance with which
the judgements about reference are being made. And this accuracy and
correctness must also be measured against language as it is used. It cannot be
based on idealizations and abstractions which spawn nice theory but do not
describe any real phenomena.
Papineau (1996) argues for the kind of approach that places theoretical
commitments ahead of intuitions, though not specifically with regard to
language and reference. He claims that it is not grounds for dismissing
an a posteriori theory that some of its consequences are at odds with the
intuitions of ordinary speakers or thinkers, since the theory is not intended
as merely an analysis of everyday notions (p. 130). However, it is doubtful
that the kind of a posteriori theory Papineau has in mind, that does not aim
to explicate the everyday notions of speakers, is the kind of theory that is
of interest to semanticists and philosophers of language who are aiming to
describe how speakers use language. As I discussed at the beginning of §2.1,
the phenomenon of proper name reference I am interested in is the kind of
thing that can be identified by questions such as ‘Who was Katharine talking
about when she said “Lucy is dead”?’ or ‘Who did you mean when you said
“Lucy”?’. This seems to be a very ordinary kind of phenomenon utilized very
frequently by speakers in saying the things they do, and whilst speakers need
not be reflective about their practice, they generally do know what they’re
doing, at least to the extent that they know—to some degree—what objects
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they’re talking about. Investigating the judgements of speakers about their
referential practice is not an a priori activity that merely surveys people’s
existing notions, it is at least an attempt at collecting empirical data. If a
broader theory about semantics, pragmatics, or some other aspect of language
were to entail an account of reference as I am conceiving it, it would itself
need to be informed by the practice of speakers. Moreover, the account of
reference entailed by such a theory would presumably, as much as possible,
be in accord with the judgements of users of the language about reference.
With regard to the idea that expert judgements are a good source of data
about proper name reference, the justification that experts’s judgements will
be made in accordance with well motivated theoretical considerations looks
decidedly shaky, given the notion of reference we are interested in. It looks
even less justified in light of the fact that the whole point of looking for data
on reference, at least as I introduced it, was to be able to make discriminations
and choices between rival accounts and theories of reference. Knowing that
one account of reference fits better with a broader theory will not help choose
between rival accounts if those accounts are being proposed by theorists who
espouse different broader theories.
As I argued above, the first form of the expert judgement view, that experts
simply have better intuitions than ordinary speakers, is closely related to the
second form just dismissed, because it is unclear why experts could have
better intuitions except by being informed by their theories. To the extent
that this is true, the first form will be subject to the same shortcomings and
criticisms as the second. However, an alternative interpretation of the first
form of the view bears consideration since it appears, at least superficially, to
be independent of the second form. This interpretation of the view is stated
by Weinberg et al. (2010, p. 333) in the following way:
[P]hilosophers’ intuitions are sufficiently less susceptible to the kinds of
unreliability that seems to afflict the folk intuitions studied by experimen-
tal philosophers. (Emphasis supressed)
Weinberg et al. associate this view with Hales (2006), Ludwig (2007), and
Williamson (2007). The statement of this interpretation in terms of reliability
and unreliabilty appears to separate it from my interpretation on which so-
called philosophical expertise just grants one a capacity to see how a case
relates to one’s theoretical commitments.
Inherent in the idea that intuitions can be more or less reliable is the idea
that there is some fact of the matter independent from those intuitions. When
it comes to proper name reference, this idea is rather complicated. I do not
deny that, with regard to any particular occasion of use of a proper name,
33
2.2. Data on Reference
there can be a fact of the matter about what was referred to (though there
needn’t be), but, to the extent that there is, it is facilitated by the ways in
which speakers use proper names. The kind of phenomenon I am interested
in cannot be divorced from what users of the language actually do. Therefore,
there cannot be facts of the matter about what names refer to such that users
of the language systematically use names wrongly. Since this is primarily a
matter of how names are used, it is consistent with a critique of reliance on
intuitions which says that speakers, whilst perfectly capable of using names
and other referential terms correctly, are bad at reflecting on this practice, and
so will be unreliable judges when asked to make judgements about scenarios
in which they are not themselves involved. However, whilst this critique
might bring one to question the use of the judgements of ordinary speakers
as a source of data on reference (as it does for Mallon et al.), it certainly
should not lead one to think that the judgements of experts are a good source.
The kinds of analytical and subject-specific skills that seem to be involved in
philosophical expertise are not obviously skills that better attune one to the
ways in which names are used, at least not more so than any other careful
language-user.
Weinberg et al. (2010, p. 334) suggest that philosophical training typically
brings “a mastery of relevant literatures[. . . ], and even specific technical skills
such as argument evaluation and construction”. They survey a range of
psychological literature on expertise and roundly reject the claim that there
is reason to think that philosophical expertise would be likely to improve
judgements or intuitions of the kind at issue. Three hypotheses are considered
with regard to how philosophical expertise might improve one’s judgement,
and all three are found implausible on the basis of existing psychological
literature. They are that philosophers have ‘superior conceptual schemata’;
that they ‘deploy more sophisticated theories’ (the kind of hypothesis I have
already discussed); and that they ‘possess a more finely-tuned set of cognitive
skills’ (ibid., p. 336).
In light of the various arguments and considerations I have offered here, I
conclude that any sensible judgements that experts make in cases designed
to elicit judgements about the reference of proper names are sensible just as
a result of the experts being competent speakers of the language, and not in
virtue of any further expertise they might possess.
2.2.5 Ordinary Speakers’ Judgements Again
If the judgements philosophers and other reference theorists make about the
cases they present are simply the judgements of competent speakers, then
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we must ask whether these judgements count as a good source of data about
reference, and if not, whether the judgements of competent, ordinary speakers
can ever count as a good source of data.
As we have already begun to see, there are significant problems with
the way in which philosophers have generally used ordinary, or at least
competent, language intuitions and speaker judgements about reference.
Just as I have claimed Kripke does, philosophers frequently present their
own intuitions—often highly informed by their theoretical interests and
upbringing—as self-evident. This is particularly problematic since there is a
well-known demographic problem in analytic philosophy,9 so the intuitions
being recorded, taught and reproduced tend to be those of a very limited range
of English (or otherwise) speakers, i.e. well-educated, affluent, white cis men
from North America or Western Europe. Kripke (1981) is the prime example
of this kind of use of intuitions, and, since Naming and Necessity has become
so influential and widely-taught in analytic philosophy departments, those
intuitions have largely become orthodoxy. Kripke’s stated judgements about,
for example, the Gödel/Schmidt case, have become the received judgements,
and anyone wishing to develop a contemporary descriptivist account of proper
name reference must account for such cases in line with these judgements
(e.g. Jackson 1998). However, as I have already alluded, Machery et al. (2004)
claim to show that there is not a consensus amongst English speakers upon
Kripke’s judgements.
Some philosophers, being more self-aware in their use of judgements, may
attempt, in various ways, to collect judgements about reference from a wider
range of speakers, perhaps even non-philosophers.10 Whilst such activities
may produce more reliable data about the use of referential terms than pure
introspection, the results may not be as reliable or as rigorous as they could be.
Linguists who collect speaker-judgements in order to investigate, for example,
the acceptability or grammaticality of a sentence, aim for as rigorous a method
of data-collection as possible, including large and diverse sample size, and
thorough, informed consideration of the questions being asked. Of course,
philosophers frequently lack the training in experimental methods and the
resources necessary to carry out rigorous studies into speaker-judgements,
but it certainly appears that, if speaker judgements are significant to us, such
methods should be what is aimed at when making claims about what an
expression refers to on an occasion. As already discussed, experimental
9See, e.g., APA (2013); Beebee (2013); Beebee and Saul (2011); Gines (2011); Haslanger (2008);
Healey (2011).
10Although he doesn’t mention it in the text, Michaelson (2013) claims to have informally
solicited judgements from a variety of speakers with regard to his sneaky reference cases (pp. 88–
93).
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philosophers do aim at utilizing rigorous experimental methods in order
to collect judgements from non-philosophers. With regard to reference, the
findings of experimental philosophers must be preferred over data gathered
less rigorously, given all that I have said. However, the results of Machery et al.
(2004), who carried out experiments on groups of English-speaking Hong
Kong Chinese and American students to test their referential intuitions, do not
in fact give reference theorists the kind of exciting data that they would like.
As mentioned in the preceding paragraph, these experimental philosophers
claim that there is significant diversity of judgement about cases similar to
the Gödel/Schmidt case, both within and between distinct English-speaking
cultural groups.
I have argued that the only serious contender for being a source of data
about reference is ordinary speakers’ judgements about cases and scenarios
involving referential terms. If the kind of rigorous collection of ordinary
speaker judgements about reference I appear to have been championing
suggests that speakers frequently do not make the same judgements about
cases, then we may have a serious methodological problem. There are at
least two ways to go in the face of this claim. One is to question the veracity
of the claim by challenging the experimental methodology of Machery et al.
(ibid.) and highlighting general problems with the collection of such data.
This view would also be consistent with accepting that speakers’ judgements
about referential cases differ significantly, but put this down to problems with
language users’ awareness of their own practice. The second way to go is to
accept the claim, and use it to argue that there is no consensus in judgement
because there is in fact no consistency in the practice of reference. Something
akin to this second way is indicated by the hypothetical position introduced
by Mallon et al. (2009, pp. 343–47) called ‘referential pluralism’. This position
essentially maintains that the judgements made by a particular speaker in
response to referential cases are evidence for their general referential practice.
Thus, there may be groups of English speakers for whom the reference of
proper names is determined descriptively, and distinct groups for whom it
is determined in the causal-historical manner outlined by Kripke (1981). As
a result, large numbers of speakers may end up talking past one another.
Referential pluralism, as presented by Mallon et al., is clearly unworkable,
and is presented merely as a reductio of attempts to appeal to ordinary speaker
judgements in spite of Machery et al.’s claims about lack of consensus. In fact,
in chapter 6, I will endorse a form of pluralism concerning the mechanisms
that determine the reference of names. However, the position is significantly
different to that outlined by Mallon et al. Most significantly, I do not claim
that referential mechanisms are relativized to different linguistic groups,
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identified only by the ways their judgements turn. Rather, I claim that
different mechanisms may come into play according to contextual variation,
such that, on any particular occasion, different mechanisms can determine
reference, but speakers do not each have their own mechanisms.
As Mallon et al. (2009) indicate with their reductio of referential pluralism, it
is not plausible that every speaker judgement about a hypothetical referential
case is a strong indicator of that speaker’s referential practice. This eliminates
the second way of going in reaction to the claims of Machery et al. (2004).
What, then, of the first? This involves questioning the veracity of the claims,
and observing general problems with the project. This is the route taken
by Martí (2009). Martí argues that the questions asked by Machery et al.
in their study were inadequate. In the study, subjects are presented with
written scenarios in which there is tension between the origin of a name and
the information frequently associated with it, just as in the Gödel/Schmidt
case, and Kripke’s Jonah case (Kripke 1981, pp. 66-67). The subjects are then
asked counterfactual meta-linguistic questions about what the name would
refer to, given the situation. Martí claims that these questions do not test
the subjects’ intuitions about how names are used, but rather, they test their
intuitions about meta-linguistic theories of reference. That is, the questions
addressed how the subjects think names work, not how they use names. Martí
is appealing to the idea that speakers may not be fully aware of their own
practice. She points to the fact that Mill and Russell differed radically in their
claims about how (or if) names refer, but presumably did not differ in the way
they used names.
Martí goes so far as to claim that “the experiment does not provide any
evidence at all about name use” (Martí 2009, p. 46). It should be noted
that neither Machery et al. (2004) nor Mallon et al. (2009) actually claim
that their results suggest that different communities of English speakers use
names differently, or that reference functions differently for different speakers.
Strictly speaking, they do not aim to provide any evidence about name
use. Their claim is that ordinary speaker judgements are frequently used as
evidence for how names are used, and that this methodology is undermined
by showing that there is variation and lack of consensus in ordinary speaker
judgements. That we could infer from this variation in judgements that there
is variation in referential practice is the position assigned to the referential
pluralist, and rejected. Martí’s argument must then be that it is possible for
speaker judgements to provide evidence about name use (Martí 2009, p. 47),
but that Machery et al.’s experiments fail to do so because they do not ask the
right kinds of questions and do not elicit the right kinds of judgements.
Although I think there is something to Martí’s criticism of Machery et al.’s
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methodology, her claim that the study can tell us nothing about name use
seems to go too far. I have argued that speaker’s judgements about referential
cases are the only genuine source of data about reference. Whilst there will
certainly be occasions on which speaker’s judgements are out of step with
their actual practice, particularly if the situation in which their judgement is
solicited is sub-prime, language-users are clearly, in general, aware of what
they and those around them are referring to when they use names. If they
weren’t, then something very strange would be going on. It may well be that
Machery et al.’s scenarios were too complex, and the questions they asked
too theoretical to elicit judgements closely tied to the subjects’ own name-
using practice. But, since Martí believes that Kripke’s causal-historical picture
of reference is in fact correct, her claim that the experiments tell us nothing
about the way the subjects use names leaves her in the uncomfortable position
of claiming that the Hong Kong Chinese subjects of the experiment have
statistically significantly poorer insight into their referential practice than their
non-Chinese US counterparts.
For her own part, Martí does not dismiss the idea of collecting judgements
about reference from larger numbers of ordinary speakers, and suggests a way
of asking questions about Machery et al.’s scenarios that relies more on the
subjects’ referential practice than their meta-linguistic views. She suggests that
the questions about the Gödel/Schmidt case be something like the following:
One day, the fraud is exposed, and John exclaims: ‘Today is a sad day: we
have found out that Gödel was a thief and a liar’.
What do you think about John’s reaction? (Martí 2009, p. 47)
Martí claims that a speaker who really used and understood names in the
descriptivist manner would interpret John’s use of ‘Gödel’ as referring to
the actual discoverer of the incompleteness theorem (i.e. Schmidt), and so
feel that John was being extremely unfair. Whilst a causal-historical-type
speaker would deem the utterance to be fair, or at least would understand
John’s feelings. This general approach seems promising since it does indeed
ask for a judgement that more closely involves the way the subject takes
the name in question to be used. And, indeed, it appears that this question
would show whether a strong form of descriptivism, according to which the
reference of a name is always fixed by the same descriptive content, makes
the wrong prediction. However, I don’t think that this particular question
would be effective at showing either that the causal picture of reference is
correct, or that more nuanced versions of descriptivism might be correct. For
reasons that will become clear in chapters 3, 4, & 6, I take the view that only
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uses of names, or, rather, speakers using names, refer. Furthermore, what a
speaker refers to with a name is closely connected to what they are able to
communicate on the occasion of use, given the way that hearers are likely to
interpret them. This means that linguistic context (as well as other aspects of
context) can affect reference (cf. Wettstein 1984, n. 31, p. 82). Thus, I would
predict that John’s utterance ‘We have found out that Gödel was a thief and a
liar’ is likely to incline an audience, in this case the experimental subjects, to
take John to have referred to the theorem-usurping friend of Schmidt. This is
also the prediction of the causal-historical picture, but I make it for different
reasons. The prediction might also be made by a descriptivist who claimed
that relevant descriptions culled from context can determine reference, or one
who claimed, much like causal theorists often do (see chapter 3), that whilst
pragmatic factors could affect what language users take the reference of a use
of a name to be, the true reference is still determined by a description.
A better form of questioning to follow Machery et al.’s Gödel/Schmidt
scenario might attempt to discover how the subjects themselves would expect
to use the name ‘Gödel’ in light of the scenario. Perhaps simply something
like:
Did Gödel discover the incompleteness of arithmetic?
or
Would you say that Gödel discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic?
However, these questions may themselves run into problems because the name
‘Gödel’ has already been used to refer in a particular way in the description of
the scenario, and this may lead the subject towards a particular judgement.
There are also concerns, identified by Martí (n. 5, p. 47), about whether
the scenario is to be interpreted as counterfactual, or pretend actual, and
how much background knowledge the subjects have. All of these might
affect the results and should be carefully considered in the design of similar
experiments.
There are, then, problems with the methodology of Machery et al. (2004).
This might lead us to doubt the force of their claims that ordinary speaker
judgements about reference accord with different theories of reference in
different communities, and that, therefore, such judgements cannot be evi-
dence for name using practice. The view of proper name reference I will put
forward in chapter 6 maintains that the reference of an utterance of a name is
highly context-sensitive. This means that, in order to appreciate either what
will be referred to when one uses a name, or what a speaker is referring to
with a name, one must be attuned to various aspects of the context. This, in
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turn, means that in order to construct scenarios that accurately test speakers’
referential judgements, sufficient contextual information must be provided
about the case. The precise details and quantity of context provided is likely
to affect judgements. Therefore, I would argue, great care must be taken in
designing rigorous studies of speakers’ referential judgements. We might also
be concerned that Machery et al.’s study (two studies, in fact—they ran a
pilot study with similar findings) is the only study to have investigated inter-
or intra-cultural variation in judgements about the kinds of referential cases
appealed to by philosophers of language.
2.2.6 Without Judgements
It is possible that, even with the greatest care in experimental methodology,
the judgements of ordinary speakers about constructed referential cases are
simply hopelessly lacking in consistency. If this were the case, I would have
to admit that the value of appealing to speaker judgements as data about
reference, or of using referential cases and examples as a way of motivating
or illustrating theoretical points, would be extremely limited. Whilst I will
write this thesis assuming that there is at least some value in these activities11
it is instructive to consider the alternative. As it is, I am extremely suspicious
of the conception of reference as an objective, metaphysical relation that
connects names and objects in a string-like fashion. This conception is, I
think, present in much of the work on names in the causal-historical tradition
that followed Kripke (1981), and possibly much of the thought about proper
names that preceded it. I prefer to think of referring as something that people
(are able to) do with names (and other referential terms) in order to talk to
other people about specific things in a dynamic and circumstance-specific way.
The idea of the referent of a name, or even of a use or utterance of a name,
that we can point to as its objective content becomes problematic on this way
of thinking about things. It would be particularly problematic if there were
no consensus available about what reasonable and competent users of the
language took the reference of a (use of a) name to be. Lack of consistency of
judgement amongst speakers about the kinds of referential cases discussed
above would not, of course, entail that there would be eternal confusion about
what is being referred to any time a name is used. However, it does call into
question the plausibility of a theoretical device that can be useful to reference
theorists. In cases in which there is disagreement between a speaker and
their audience about what has been referred to with a name, something like a
11Indeed, given my lack of capacity for collecting data in any kind of rigorous manner, I
tend simply to provide cases that I find convincing, and that I have found others to be similarly
convinced by.
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partially-idealized reasonable, competent language-user might be appealed
to to play the part of theoretical adjudicator (see, e.g. Cohen 1980; King 2014;
Neale 2004). Deciding what is ideal or reasonable, if there is no consensus
amongst real language-users, is a problem.
In a situation in which there is no broad consensus on referential judge-
ments or idealized language-use, there seem to be two things left that we can
appeal to when it comes to proper name reference. One is what the speaker
was trying to refer to when they used a name. In most cases, it seems that
a speaker is trying to refer to something, even if they have only the haziest
idea of what it is. The second is what the hearer took the speaker to have
referred to. Again, this can be a very hazy notion, and need amount only
to the hearer’s recognition that the speaker referred to something and their
being willing to engage on that basis. The hearer can also fail to appreciate
anything having been referred to, and request clarification or revision. These
two aspects of reference can be thought of as what the speaker wants to refer
to (we might also say ‘intends’ or ‘means to refer to’, though these terms come
with more theoretical baggage), and what referential information actually gets
communicated to an audience. When all goes right—and presumably much
or most of the time this is the case—a speaker succeeds in communicating
what they wanted to their audience. In such cases it is easy to say what has
been referred to: it is what speaker and audience agree upon.12
In cases in which a speaker does not succeed in communicating about
the thing they wanted to, we might generally want to ask, was this the fault
of the speaker or the audience, or was it beyond the control of either? One
interlocutor might be at fault because they failed to fully appreciate the
context of utterance, which might include appreciating certain things about
their interlocutor that they could be expected to appreciate, such as their
communicative interests (see also, §2.4). However, without the notion of what
it is reasonable to take the reference of a name to have been, given the context,
it is difficult to motivate the idea that one party or the other is at fault. Given
all this, I suggest that, if it were to turn out that there is widespread lack
of consistency amongst speakers of a language in their judgements about
the reference of proper names, as is suggested by Machery et al. (2004), and
this lack of consistency extended beyond philosopher’s hypothetical thought-
experiments into real life cases, then we would likely have to give up on the
idea of objective reference in the case in which there is no agreement between
speaker and hearer about what is being referred to.
12Note that neither using a name referentially, nor accepting a speaker’s referential use of a
name seem to entail being able to provide further information about the referent, so agreement
upon reference may simply consist in deferring to one’s interlocutor.
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2.3 Semantics and Pragmatics
In this thesis, I will lean heavily on the distinction between semantics and prag-
matics. In part II, I will argue against what I call semantic views of reference,
and in part III, I argue in favour of a pragmatic view. The terms ‘semantics’ and
‘pragmatics’ are used in very different ways by different theorists, and whilst
I recognize that at least some debate about the semantics/pragmatics divide
may rest merely on terminological differences, I consider my usage to capture
a significant distinction that can easily be recognized by most linguists and
philosophers of language, whether or not they recognize it as the distinction
between semantics and pragmatics, and whether or not they believe it to play
the rôle that I claim that it does.
My use of the term ‘pragmatic’ should be distinguished from a common
use of that term, perhaps associable primarily now with minimal semantics
(Borg 2004; Cappelen and Lepore 2005), whereby pragmatics is what goes on
in linguistic practice beyond what words and sentences (literally) say or mean,
and it is assumed that this is constituted or determined by truth-conditional
(semantic) content that is independent of particular uses. It should be still
further distinguished from the sense whereby it refers to those phenomena
affected by a speaker’s intentions, and from the sense in which it is used by
Neale (2004), such that pragmatics deals with the ways in which audiences
interpret speakers utterances, but not with what determines what they express.
I consider to be pragmatic all those features of language that go beyond the
context-independent contribution that words make to an utterance, i.e. what-
ever is context-dependent. So, whatever the context-independent contribution
that words make to an utterance is, according to my terminological dichotomy,
semantic. It may be informative to consider how this dichotomy relates to, for
example, the classical Kaplanian picture of indexicals. On this picture, part of
the meaning of an indexical is a rule stating that certain features of the context
affect the reference in a specified way, for example, that the speaker or the
addressee is the referent. The reference of indexicals is, therefore, dependent
on context. But, given my conception of pragmatics, it might be considered
both pragmatic and semantic, because there is a context-insensitive rule that
determines the reference given a specified aspect of context. Moreover, the
conception of context on the Kaplanian picture is extremely limited: context
is thought of just as a tuple of a few elements of immediate context, such
as speaker, addressee, time, place, and elements constituting the tuple are
specified by the semantic framework. In this thesis I employ a rich and varied
conception of context as the circumstances of an utterance, constituted by any
number of pragmatic factors and mechanisms.
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My conception of pragmatics might appear to have much in common
with other conceptions, particularly the first conception, that I associated
with minimal semantics, but it comes drastically apart from them when it
is observed that the context-independent properties of words and sentences
do not provide truth-conditions, but in fact, their truth-evaluable content
varies from utterance to utterance, depending upon the occasion, and is
not determined by speakers’ intentions. Such a position, most prominently
propounded by Travis (e.g. 1978, 1985, 1996, 1997, 2006a), remains highly
controversial. Travis’s general thesis is that predicates, as well as other types
of sub-sentential expression, and therefore sentences, are occasion-sensitive—
their truth-conditions depend upon pragmatic factors in such a way that they
cannot be determinately encoded into a fixed lexical meaning, either as content
or as Kaplanian-style character. Other philosophers and linguists have also
proposed that semantics, or lexical meaning, (more or less) radically under-
determines the truth-evaluable content of utterances, for example Carston
(2002, 2013); Recanati (2004, 2010); Sperber and Wilson (1986). However, these
other radical contextualists differ significantly from Travis in various respects,
most notably with respect to two claims made by the other contextualists:
Firstly that, at least in many cases, words have a core or standing meaning
that is capable of contributing truth-conditional content, but which can be
modulated and altered by context to give a different content. Secondly, that
there is a determinate, fully truth-conditional language of thought, or something
similar, such that utterances of natural language expressions can, on particular
occasions of utterance, be translated into expressions of that language that
can only be satisfied by one particular way for the world to be. Travis rejects
both of these claims (see §6.7, particularly with regard to the second claim).
The phenomenon I have identified as semantics may fall into the scope of
both compositional semantics and lexical semantics, as they are traditionally
conceived. Given the Travis-influenced picture of the rôle of pragmatics
mentioned in the previous paragraph, lexical semantics, dealing as it does
with word meaning, is tasked not with providing truth-conditional content,
but with specifying what kind of context-insensitive content words need to
provide to a compositional structure (whose construction procedures are
presumably the remit of compositional semantics), such that pragmatics can
act upon it to give truth-evaluable content. In this thesis, I will provide very
little by way of a positive account of semantics. In chapter 6, I will argue that
proper name reference is a pragmatic, rather than a semantic phenomenon,
and, as the thesis is primarily concerned with reference, I will largely leave
the question of the semantics of names open. However, in §8.2, I will briefly
consider what the semantics of names could and could not be like in order
43
2.3. Semantics and Pragmatics
to be consistent with my account of their reference, suggesting avenues for
further research.
With regard to this thesis, the position of Travis that I am most interested
in, mentioned above, is that predicates and sentences, and various other types
of expression, are occasion-sensitive. That is, they are ubiquitously context-
sensitive in such a way that the meanings of words and sentences—their
semantics, in the sense I have characterized—radically under-determines the
truth-evaluable content of (or what is said or expressed by) utterances of those
words and sentences, and that content is determined by pragmatic mechanisms
in a way dictated by the occasion, rather than by semantics. I will not argue
at any length for the occasion sensitivity of predicates and sentences, beyond
presenting the bare bones of Travis’s own arguments. Whilst my arguments
for the pragmatic view of reference do not assume the correctness of Travis’s
general position, and I motivate my position independently, it will benefit the
reader to know where my broader philosophical and linguistic commitments
lie. The rest of this section will be devoted to exposition and expository
discussion of Travis’s thesis regarding occasion-sensitivity.
2.3.1 Occasion Sensitivity and Travis Cases
Travis maintains that words can only be said to express anything truth-
evaluable (or in some way evaluable for correctness or appropriateness) on
an occasion of utterance, upon which they can be correctly understood to
be saying that things are a certain way. Thus, he treats utterances as the
primary linguistic bearers of truth-values—as has presumably become clear, I
follow him in this respect—but he is reticent to suggest anything resembling
contextual parameters or criteria that fix what is expressed by an utterance, or
what an utterance’s truth-value is. The certain ways that particular words or
sentences can describe things as being, given certain understandings of them,
are not, according to Travis, the kinds of things that can be determinately
individuated in discrete ways, as it is often thought propositions can be
(Travis 2008, p. 7). Nor is there anything like a determinate set of factors that
determine how one ought to understand an utterance on an occasion, or how
things need to be for an utterance to be true given how it is to be understood.
Travis offers some insight into when utterances are true, making use of
the locution ‘counts as being’. In response to the question of what sometimes
makes it true to say of given leaves that they are green, and sometimes that
they are not, he says:
What could make the given words ‘The leaves are green’ true, other than
the presumed ‘fact that the leaves are green’, is the fact that the leaves
44
2.3. Semantics and Pragmatics
counted as green on the occasion of that speaking. Since what sometimes
counts as green may sometimes not, that may still be something to make
other [token] words ‘The leaves are green’ false, namely, that on the
occasion of their speaking, those leaves (at that time) did not count as
green. (Travis 1997, p. 125)
This locution does not itself tell us much more about what it is about the
contextual circumstances of an occasion of utterance that determine whether
or not the utterance is true, since we are left to ask what might make a leaf
count as green. Travis will again respond, correctly, I think, that there are no
determinate kinds of general criteria to be offered that would answer such a
question. However, examples Travis provides throughout his work do offer
insight into the kinds of pragmatic factors that, on particular occasions, appear
to be relevant to whether something counts as being so described. Travis (1996)
discusses several cases in which the purposes or the interests of interlocutors
appear to affect whether things count as being correctly described. In other
cases it appears that there is a certain kind of charity at play in finding the
‘truth near to mind that could be so expressed’ (Travis 2008, p. 9).
This positive view of truth and utterance content represents one aspect of
occasion-sensitivity. It arises in parallel to, and is made more perspicuous by,
another aspect, which is Travis’s negative position about what the meaning of
words and sentence cannot be. This aspect, and to some extent the positive
aspect, is motivated, at least in part, by consideration of examples of discourse,
known as Travis cases, that demonstrate the complexity and volatility of truth-
value judgements, and the pervasive rôle of context in such judgements. Travis
cases, and other arguments for occasion-sensitivity, can be found throughout
Travis’s work in various forms.13
I will give three examples of Travis cases, before going on to address what
it is that they purport to show, and, in doing so, present a characterization of
them. A well known case from Travis (1996) involves whether a ball is round:
A game of squash is in progress, and two groups of people are watching
from the viewing gallery. One of the groups contains a viewer who has never
come across squash before. He asks one of his group what shape the ball
is, since it is moving around the court too fast to see, and she replies ‘The
ball is round’, and, in so doing, speaks a truth. The other group viewing the
game are engineers interested in squash ball dynamics, who are monitoring
the shape of the ball during play. Just as the ball hits the wall, one of the
engineers asks what shape the ball is, and her colleague replies ‘The ball
13Travis (1985, pp. 199–203); Travis (1989, pp. 18–20) Travis (1996, p. 97); Travis (1997, pp. 111–
113); Travis (2000, pp. 3–4); Travis (2006a, pp. 152–153); Travis (2006b, pp. 21–24); and Travis (2008,
p. 2).
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is round’, coincidentally, at the very same time as the member of the other
group. However, this time the reply is false, because at that moment, the ball
has been squashed into a very non-round shape. It is plausible to suppose
the meaning of the sentence ‘The ball is round’ is not different in its two
utterances—in both cases the same ball is being referred to, and there seems
to be no variation in the meaning of the predicate being applied to it. There
is not even a variation in the standards of roundness being applied to the
ball. But despite the constancy of the meanings of the utterances, they cannot
have the same truth-conditions, since they have different truth-values, despite
being spoken at the same time with reference to the same object.
Another example of a Travis case comes from Travis (1985). Here, Travis
presents two separate but parallel stories, that are equivalent to the two
separate groups of interlocutors in the squash ball case.
Story I: Smith is quite proud of the results of the rigorous diet he has
followed. He has lost easily 15 kg. Stepping on the scales one morning,
he notes with satisfaction that they register a thick hair or two below 80
kilos. At the office, he proudly announces, ‘I now weigh 80 kilos’ But the
tiresome Melvin replies, ‘What! In that heavy tweed suit? Not very likely’
and, pulling a bathroom scale out of his bottom desk drawer and pushing
Smith on to it, notes with satisfaction, ‘Look. 83 and a bit.’ (For good
measure, let us suppose Smith not yet to have taken off his overcoat, so
that the scale actually reads 86.) Of course, we would say, what Melvin has
demonstrated does not count against what Smith said. (Contrasting) Story
II: Smith, dressed in the last way, is about to step into a crowded elevator.
‘Wait a minute.’, someone says, ‘This elevator is really very delicate. We
can only take 80 more kilos.’ ‘Coincidentally, that’s exactly what I weigh.’,
replies Smith. In he steps, and down they plummet. So it appears that
what Smith said this time is false. (ibid., pp. 199–200)
In this case, nothing changes about the way Smith is, but the situations he
finds himself in shift the truth of whether or not he weighs 80kg.
A third example, in which Travis contrasts different ways of understanding
a situation, rather than comparing different utterances, comes from Travis
(2011):
Returning from the market, Sid crosses the white rug, heading for the
kitchen. As he does so, the bottom of his recycled-paper bag breaks, and
the kidneys he has bought for the mixed grill fall in their butcher paper
to the rug. Is there, now, red meat on the white rug? One question is
whether kidneys count as meat. Though one would not offer them to
vegetarians, their usual rubric (at any rate, in Sid’s parts) is offal. Meat,
on one understanding of the term, is flesh. And flesh, as one typically
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would understand that, is muscle. Thinking in this way, one should say
that, however unenviable the condition of the rug, it does not, at any
rate, have meat on it. On the other hand, what Sid dropped is, in fact,
the meat course for Sunday brunch. So meat can be understood to be
something which those kidneys are. Then there is the matter of being
on the rug. The meat is still wrapped in its butcher paper. So, on one
way of understanding things, it is (so far) only the paper that is on the
rug. On the other hand, if Sid, now missing the kidneys, asks where they
are, telling him, ‘On the rug’, may be saying no less than where they are.
(Travis 2011, pp. 243–244)
Travis’s Target(s)
What Travis aims to show in investigating Travis cases is expressed, in simple
terms, in the following quotation:
. . . it would seem that the meanings of sentences are not to be explained in
terms of truth-conditions, sentences bearing the former but not the latter,
and mutatis mutandis for sentence parts. (Travis 1985, p. 188)
The alledged gap between meaning and truth-conditions is the key issue. But
exactly what this amounts to is unclear, since ‘meaning’ is used, both in
ordinary language and by philosophers and linguists, in a variety of ways.
It seems that the best way to understand what Travis means by ‘meaning’
is that which is held constant between uses of sentences and sub-sentential
expressions. Davies (2014) has this to say about Travis on meaning:
Meaning here is defined so that it is an open question what the relation
between meaning and satisfaction and truth and reference may be—
something that could be investigated by seeing what else stays constant
across a word’s uses when its meaning, in this sense, is held constant. This
is something upon which Travis (1981b, p. 3, pp. 9-10) lays a particularly
heavy emphasis. (Davies 2014, p. 502)
Davies discusses the target of Travis cases in the context of arguing that
many attempts at addressing Travis’s work on language are off target. He
claims that many of Travis’s alleged opponents take Travis to be attacking the
compositionality of sentence meaning, i.e. that the meaning of a sentence
is a function of the meanings of its parts. In fact, Travis leaves such a
compositionality principle untouched, and instead is attacking positions
that hold that meanings (either sentential or sub-sentential) determine (in a
systematic way) the content of utterances, or, put in other ways, that meanings
are either contents or characters,14 or that meanings are truth-conditions. This
14In the Kaplanian senses: content being a complete (though not necessarily wholly
determinate), truth-evaluable proposition or thought (at least for assertoric utterances), and character
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confusion stems from an ambiguity between two semantic projects that are
both thought of as truth-conditional. There is a ‘compositional project of
identifying properties that words may have which combine to form the truth-
conditions of the sentences the words can be used to construct [. . . and there
is] a reductive project of showing that the meanings of linguistic expressions
are either contents or characters’ (Davies 2014, p. 501). Compositional projects
may look as if they’re providing truth-conditions for sentences by providing
biconditionals of the form pS is true iff Pq, but, according to Travis, they
only do so in a problematic way if what occurs on the right-hand-side is
determinate, or should be, according to the project. If the right-hand-side
of a putative biconditional does not aim to be determinate, then it does not
provide truth-conditions in the sense we are interested in.15 Projects of the
reductive persuasion—what I called ‘lexical semantics’ above—may often
not explicitly provide biconditionals with a determinate right-hand-side, but
rather, suppose that such conditions could, in principle, be provided, i.e.
they suggest that, given a sentence, or a sentence and a determinate set of
contextual parameters, there is a determinate way the world must be to make
the sentence true.
Meanings as Contents
Davies separates out two forms of reductive lexical semantics. One aims to
show that meanings are contents, and the other aims to show that they are
characters. The two projects require somewhat different responses. Most
Travis cases appear to target the view that meanings are contents, and are
used as part of arguments with the following form:
1. The meaning of an expression is its content only if: the meaning
changes if and only if the content changes.
2. The content of an expression can change even though the meaning
does not change.
3. The meaning of an expression is not its content (from 1., 2., and
modus tollens).
(ibid., p. 506)
Travis cases are intended to demonstrate premise 2. They do this by providing
convincing examples in which multiple utterances of a sentence vary in
being a rule of use modelled as a relation between words and contents: an n-place function (or,
possibly, relation) which, given n determinate contextual parameters as arguments, will return a
content.
15This is not to say that all compositional projects are wholly innocent in truth-conditional
terms.
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the truth-evaluable content they express—usually evidenced by varying
truth-values in different situations—whilst their meaning does not appear to
vary. Consider Travis’s example, borrowed from Grice, of a table covered in
butter (Travis 1991, pp. 67–69). The sentence ‘The table is covered in butter’
can, without any variation of meaning (given a certain understanding of
‘meaning’—see the following paragraph for discussion), be satisfied in at least
two different ways: the table could be spread with a layer of butter, or there
could be a layer of foil-covered butter pats on the table top. One can imagine
a scenario in which an utterance of ‘Is the table covered in butter?’ can be
answered affirmatively if and only if a particular one of these satisfaction-
conditions is met. Imagine a disreputable butter sculptor who cheats at her
work by covering non-butter items, rather than sculpting directly from blocks
of butter. She might leave her assistant to smother a table whilst she works on
something more complicated. If she says to the assistant ‘Is the table covered
in butter?’, the assistant cannot correctly answer ‘Yes’ if the otherwise bare
table is scattered liberally with packets of Anchor.
Judgements both about the truth-value of an utterance in a particular
situation, and about whether or not the meaning of the words has shifted, is
left to the intuitions of speakers of the language in question. Such speakers
should be expected to be reasonable judges of the truth-values of utterances in
their language about fairly mundane occurrences. If they were not, it would
seem that there was a serious problem with the language. Of course, there
may be disagreement over particular cases, but the idea behind an effective
Travis case is that the relevant judgements are plausible to most language-
users.16 Intuitions about whether the meanings of the words of the sentence
in question shift across the utterances are less essentially reliable, especially
since the word ‘meaning’ itself is used in so many different ways, and we
have not settled on anything approaching a technical definition. However,
there is good reason to accept that something fundamental to the semantics of
the sentence and its sub-sentential expressions is being held constant across
the relevant utterances—if we were to posit that words such as ‘green’ were
ambiguous between subtly distinct meanings, each of which carried its own,
unchanging truth-conditions, then the apparent ease with which new Travis
cases are generated would suggest that there might be indefinitely many of
these semantic entries for many, if not all, words. This result seems to be
highly undesirable for a variety of reasons, most notably because it is very
hard to see how humans could ever learn a language with indefinitely many
semantic entries for each sub-sentential expression.
16See §2.2 for discussion of the rôle of judgements and intuitions in philosophy of language.
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Meanings as Characters
As Davies (2014) observes, the project of showing that meanings are contents
cannot, in reality, be wholly separate from that of showing that they are
characters, since at least some lexical items are undeniably indexical in nature,
and, in light of Travis cases like those just discussed that show that meanings
cannot be contents, theorists may be inclined to claim that they are characters.
This is a natural thought—if Travis has shown that the truth-conditions of
many more expressions than we previously thought are context-sensitive,
then we should adapt our treatment of the meanings of these expressions
so that, together with context, they provide determinate truth-conditions.
Kaplan’s (1989b) treatment of indexicals does just this, so seems a likely
choice. It is effective against the type of Travis cases already considered
as long as the contextual factors that seem to be relevant in shifting truth-
conditions in any particular case are included in the parameters taken as
arguments by the relevant characters. Including parameters in this way may
be problematic since it requires identifying the right contextual factors with the
right degree of specificity without being ad hoc. However, a bigger problem is
the potential generation of further Travis cases that turn on contextual factors
not considered by one’s parameters.
Travis does not often explicitly address the meaning-is-character project
in his work (cf. Travis 1978, pp. 412–413), but Davies provides a schema for
systematically developing an argument against the project, along the same
lines as his schema for arguments against meanings as contents:
1. Assumption: The meaning of an expression e is a character only if
there is a function F that provides a model of e such that:
a) F takes the parameters of the character as arguments and
returns the contents of e as values.
b) F stays constant if and only if the meaning of e stays constant.
2. Assumption: For any expression e, let F be a function from a set of pa-
rameters to the content of e that is a model for a character proposed
to be the meaning of e. The meaning of e and the parameters in the
argument of F can be held constant whilst the content of e is varied
by altering contextual factors that are not amongst the parameters
in the argument of F.
3. Conclusion: The meaning of an expression e cannot be modelled
as a function from parameters to contents, and thus cannot be a
character.
(Davies 2014, p. 9, substantially revised)
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The idea of this argument form is that Travis cases can be found showing that
no semantic analysis can be provided for an expression such that it meets
conditions a) and b) for being a character. Such cases would require taking a
proposed analysis, which provided determinate parameters, and holding those
parameters constant whilst varying the content of the expression by shifting
contextual factors not included amongst the parameters. If those factors
are added to the parameters, we then repeat the process by finding other
contextual factors and showing that the content can be varied by varying those
whilst holding the parameters fixed. Of course, it cannot be shown a priori that
this can be done for every proposed character. This is not a general argument
that shows that every set of parameters fails. Given enough imagination
and dedication, the process of proposing a character for an expression, and
showing that it fails, can run and run. However, the plausibility of the
characters will presumably decrease as they become ever more complex, and
the plausibility of the hypothesis that no character is satisfactory will increase
as each is shown to fail.
2.3.2 Occasion Sensitivity and Reference
Given the preceding elucidation of Travis’s position, one might reasonably
wonder how occasion sensitivity will be relevant to the reference of proper
names. As I have already mentioned, my major thesis about proper name
reference is that it is a pragmatic, rather than a semantic phenomenon, and
this position was initially, at least partially, motivated by Travis’s position on
the occasion sensitivity of other types of expression.
As I have discussed, occasion sensitivity (for predicates) is, or has the
result that, the contribution that is made by predicates to the truth or falsity of
an utterance is radically under-determined by their semantic content, where
semantic content is taken to be something determinate and constant between
uses. Being able to tell whether or not a predicate is being correctly or
appropriately applied on an occasion is something that requires domain-
general knowledge about the ways the world is on the occasion, not merely
knowledge of the semantics of the predicate. Thus, what is said with an
utterance—the content of an utterance—is not dependent upon the semantic
meaning of the utterance. That the semantics of predicates and sentences
under-determine utterance content might lead one to think that semantics
per se does not aim at providing determinate utterance content. Reference,
however, is a phenomenon that has an impact on the truth-evaluable content
of an utterance—in order to analyze what is said by an utterance containing
a proper name, and whether the utterance (or what is said) is true, we must
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know (in some sense) to what the name refers (at least, in most circumstances).
Indeed, a name can be said to refer to an object only if the truth of the utterance
containing it turns on the way that object is (again, in most circumstances).
Given these two claims—that semantics is not utterance content-oriented,
and that reference is utterance content-contributing—there is reason to think
that reference is not a semantic phenomenon. If reference belongs in the
domain of truth-evaluable content, and truth-evaluable content is a pragmatic
phenomenon, reference is pragmatic.
Of course, an argument of this sort is not going to convince anyone who
is not already inclined to take what Travis calls ‘the pragmatic view’ (Travis
1997, p. 111-3), but, again, it will be helpful to the reader to appreciate my
own initial motivations for developing the pragmatic view of proper name
reference. In chapters 3–6, I will try to motivate that view independently of
the broader Travisian framework.
2.4 Communication
Whether or not, and how, communication is relevant to what words mean,
whether and how it is relevant to when sentences, utterances, or thoughts are
true, and whether and how it is relevant to what proper names refer to, are all
controversial questions in the philosophy of language. I will not attempt to
explore them in great depth here, but since I make certain assumptions about
the rôle of communication, it will do well at least to stake my ground. It seems
to be a minimal constraint upon a theory of natural language and meaning
that it does not exclude the possibility of communication, even if it does not
explain it. Moreover, since communication is, at the very least, something that
humans use language for a great deal—to my mind, its primary use17—it must
be considered a boon if a theory of language and meaning makes successful
communication plausible. Indeed, we should look very unfavourably upon
a theory that makes communication implausible.18 Therefore, an account of
proper name reference should not make communication impossible, and, if it
has nothing to say with regard to communication, we might reasonably expect
17Chomsky has, famously, doubted such a claim. He observes:
Language is used in many different ways. Language can be used to transmit information, but
it also serves many other purposes: to establish relations among people, to express or clarify
thought, for play, for creative mental activity, to gain understanding, and so on. In my opinion,
there is no reason to accord privileged status to one or the other of these modes. (Chomsky
1979)
However, it is unclear that any of his examples are genuine challenges to the significance of
communication. All of the examples Chomsky provides seem to require information transfer, at
least at some stage, and I will claim below that communication amounts to nothing more than
information transfer.
18Thanks to Peter Sutton for highlighting these points to me.
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to be able to see how it makes communication possible, and why it is that it
does not need to address communication. In this section, I will highlight why
it is that I think that communication is relevant to language and meaning, and
how it relates to proper name reference.
First, a word about what I take communication to be. The most plausible,
minimal account of communication that I am aware of is that in the vein of
Shannon-influenced models,19 whereby communication is simply the transfer
of information. Information here need not be in the form of thoughts or
propositions, in the sense of fully determinate, truth-evaluable entities, but
could simply be an ‘indicator of probable states of affairs’ (Sutton 2013,
p. 126), though not necessarily correct indicators. This idea of communication
and information is compatible with the thought that words on their own
communicate relatively little, but that uses of words in context, together with
the application of various kinds of awareness about the circumstances of those
uses, allows for a great deal more information to be transferred. Speakers and
audiences are able to make use both of the information that might be carried
by words independently of any particular circumstance of utterance—what I
characterized in the previous section as their (semantic) meaning—but also
the information that they can carry upon particular occasions of utterance,
being aware that those words, having been spoken by the speaker, who has
particular purposes, provide reasons to believe certain things. All this is of
relatively little importance for the bulk of what I will have to say in this thesis,
except to make the point that what I take to be communicated by a referential
use of a name is just that information (which need not be true, or correct,
or intended) that is transferred to the audience given a speaker’s use of the
name.
2.4.1 Communication and Language
Language is used by people to do certain things. It is a tool that enables
people to do those things, and it can be used to do those things because
language-users are such that they can make it do them. Language is able to
represent, or carry information about, things as being a certain way because it
can provide reasons to suppose that things are that way:
[W]hat one thus says as to how things are, so when one would have spoken
truly, is determined by what it is reasonable to expect of that particular
describing—reasonable to hold one thus responsible for—given the cir-
cumstances of its giving; what expectations would, in those circumstances,
reasonably be aroused. (Travis 2006b, p. 31)
19See Sutton (2013) for arguments in favour of such models.
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What it is that we use our words to do, therefore, is not a question (merely)
of what we intend them to do, but of what we actually do do with them.
And that is inherently connected with, and constrained by, the effect they can
have within particular linguistic communities, broadly interpreted, given the
practices of those communities. And that brings in what is communicated: the
information carried by our words, giving other language-users reasons to think
that things are a particular way. It will not do to think that only one’s own
purposes or intentions are relevant to what one’s utterance expresses, because
that utterance will carry different information under different circumstances,
depending, at least, upon the practices of the communities in which it is
uttered, and carrying that information is what enables, or constitutes, what an
utterance expresses. Moreover, what is key to the idea of an utterance carrying
information at all is that that information be recognizable. There is no sense
in a signal—some words—carrying information, if the information is not, in
principle, recognizable by someone who is able to track what it would be
reasonable to use those words for. But recognizing what has been said with an
utterance, or what information it carries about the way things might be, is the
basis of communication. Thus, if I want to express a thought with an utterance,
that utterance must make that thought recognizable—communicable—in the
particular circumstances of utterance, that is, recognizable by a reasonable
member of the relevant linguistic community, who will have particular
expectations, given those circumstances. So, what one communicates with
an utterance is directly relevant to what one expresses with an utterance.
And what one can communicate is determined by the circumstances, and a
reasonable audience’s expectations in those circumstances.
2.4.2 Communication and Proper Names
Given all this, then, when a proper name is used to refer, what it refers to
must be affected by what it can communicate—what, all things being equal, a
member of the relevant linguistic community—which might be specified in
a way specific to a particular interaction—would take them to refer to with
the name, given the circumstances (which must include the linguistic context).
Of course, an audience must be in the right kind of position to appreciate the
circumstances in the relevant way. If they are not concentrating, or for some
other reason fail to understand what the speaker has said, despite the speaker
acting exactly as appropriate in the circumstances, then the audience is not
in a position to recognize what they should. However, it is also clear that
particular facts about the relationship between the speaker and their audience,
or particular facts about the audience that the speaker is in a position to
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appreciate, can affect the circumstances in such a way that it will not do merely
to substitute a generic rational speaker for the audience when describing the
significance of what should be understood by a referential utterance of a
name, and how that effects its reference. These kinds of considerations might
influence the way in which it is necessary to specify the relevant community.
Cohen (1980), Neale (2004), and King (2014) all appeal to the idea that
some kind of idealized rational language-user is what is needed to judge
(or is in someway relevant to) what a speaker has referred to with a use of
a name or other referring term. What would that person take the speaker
to have referred to in these particular circumstances? In order to capture
the fact that speakers frequently use names or other words in a way that
makes use of shared knowledge or past mutual experiences that they may
have with the audience, we might try to grant this kind of knowledge to the
idealized language-user too: Neale (2004) proposes a ‘a rational, reasonably
well-informed interpreter in [the audience]’s shoes’ (p. 80). However, it is
hard to see how it would be possible to capture all that would be necessary in
an expression such as ‘in the audience’s shoes’ without simply meaning ‘has
all the relevant knowledge and awareness required to get the right answer’. I
agree entirely that it is important to appeal to the notion of what would be
communicated by a use of a proper name, if all were to go well, or something
similar, but I do not think that appeal either directly to the actual audience,
or to an idealized audience is necessary, given the right understanding of
communication and occasion of utterance, though, as I have suggested, we
might appeal to a relevant linguistic community. If the circumstances of an
occasion of utterance are understood as including particulars of the speaker
and hearer that are recognized by or recognizable to each other, or if the
relevance of a specified community is sensitive to these issues, then there
is a way (or perhaps a gradation of ways) that an utterance of a proper
name should be understood, given those circumstances. This idea already
presupposes that the interlocutors are rational in the right way, and that they
are engaged with the circumstances in the right way.
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Introduction to Semantic Views
Treatments of proper names in the philosophical literature tend tocharacterize either their semantics, or their referential mechanisms—if indeed the treatment deems them to be referential—or both. Most
accounts of proper name reference in the last fifty or more years state that
it is determined by semantics. Thus their characterizations of referential
mechanisms can be considered as dealing in meta-semantics. Such accounts
hold that there is something in the semantic contribution a particular name
makes to a sentence or utterance containing it that either wholly or partially
determines, fixes, or specifies to what that name, or use of the name, refers.
They frequently, therefore, provide a story both about the semantics of names,
and about their referential mechanisms. It is characteristic of these semantic
accounts that they attempt to specify, in some way, necessary and sufficient
conditions for proper name reference, or at least imply that such conditions
are, in principle, available. I will call views that some semantic account of
proper name reference is correct semantic views.
There are five broad groups of accounts of proper names in the contem-
porary literature. Not all are mutually incompatible, and each is subject to
substantial internal variation. Some provide characterizations of both the
semantics and the referential mechanisms of names, and some provide char-
acterizations of only one. The five groups of accounts are causal-homophonism;
indexicalism; classical descriptivism; predicativism; and variablism.
Causal-homophonism20 is a group of accounts of both the semantics and
meta-semantics of names. It holds that names refer to their referents tout court
20See, for example, Corazza (2004); Jeshion (2015); Justice (2001); Kaplan (1990); Kripke (1981);
Mercier (1998); Sainsbury (2005, 2015); Salmon (2005); Soames (2002).
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in virtue of causal chains (or trees) of uses from the name to the referent,
and the semantics of a name is just constituted by its reference. Names are
individuated according to reference or baptismal-origin such that no name can
have more than one referent at a time (within one name-using community).
Indexicalism21 is primarily a position on the semantics of proper names,
however, that semantic position entails a particular kind of meta-semantics.
Indexicalism holds that names behave somewhat like indexicals, in that
they do not refer tout court, but have a Kaplanian character (Kaplan 1989b)
which specifies that certain determinate contextual parameters determine the
reference of a use of a name in a particular way.
Classical Descriptivism22 can be either an account just of how the reference
of a name is determined, or an account both of its reference and its semantics.
It holds that names (or name-using practices) are associated in some way with
a definite description, or a cluster or collection of descriptions, the satisfier of
which is the referent of the name.
Predicativism23 is a group of accounts just of the semantics of names. It
holds that proper names have the same basic semantic type as predicates,
rather than being basically referring terms. (In the jargon of traditional
formal semantics, they are terms of type 〈e, t〉 rather than type e.) When
names are used to refer, they are proceeded by a determiner, almost always
unpronounced in English. On many views the determiner is a definite article,
forming a definite description with the name predicate, on other views it is a
demonstrative such as ‘that’, forming a complex demonstrative.
Variablism24 is also a group of accounts of name semantics. It holds that
names have the semantic form of variables, as has been proposed for certain
occurrences of pronouns, such that referential uses of names behave like free
variables.
As stated, of these five groups of account, only the first two—causal-
homophonism, and indexicalism—are essentially committed to positions
on reference determination for proper names, and both of these positions
fall within the semantic view: causal-homophonism takes reference to be
constitutive of a name’s semantics; and indexicalism, although it takes the
reference of a name to be partially determined by contextual factors, states that
the manner in which this occurs is stipulated by the semantics of the name.
Predicativism is not, in and of itself, committed to any particular view on how
21See, for example, Burks (1951); Cohen (1980); Pelczar (2001); Pelczar and Rainsbury (1998);
Rami (2014, 2015); Recanati (1993); Tiedke (2011); Zimmermann and Lerner (1991).
22See, for example, Ahmed (2007); Jackson (1998); Searle (1958).
23See, for example, Bach (1987, 2002); Burge (1973); Elbourne (2005); Fara (2015); Geurts (1997);
Gray (2014, forthcoming); Katz (2001); Matushansky (2008); Sawyer (2010).
24See, for example, Cumming (2008); Dever (1998).
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the reference of names is determined, since this would depend on how the
reference of the complex referring terms claimed to explain referential uses of
names is determined. This holds similarly for variablism: if referential uses of
names are free variables, then the way the variable assignment is determined
will determine the reference of the name.25 Classical descriptivism is a
broad church, and so whether or not it falls within the semantic view will
depend both on how names are taken to interact with their reference-fixing
descriptions, and on what the semantics of those descriptions is taken to be. I
will not discuss classical descriptivism at any length in this thesis, as it is has
not played any major part in the literature on names in the last thirty years.26
There is a comparison to be drawn between the two types of account
constituting the semantic view of proper name reference, causal-homophonism
and indexicalism, and the two main positions opposing the (pragmatic
explanation of the) occasion sensitivity of predicates, discussed in Travis
(1997) and Davies (2014). Homophonist views about names are analogous to
ambiguity views about predicates, which attempt to account for Travis cases
(and polysemy) by claiming that each predicate can refer to multiple distinct
properties, e.g. green1, . . . , green367, . . . , greenn (Bosch 2007). Indexicalist
views about names (and other ‘moderate’ contextualist views about name
reference, such as might be added to predicativist or variablist accounts) are
analogous to contextualist views about predicates that suggest that predicates
as well as indexicals have complex Kaplanian characters (or similar parameter-
based structures) such that, given enough contextual parameters, the right
content will be forthcoming for every utterance (Hansen 2011; Rothschild and
Segal 2009; Szabo 2001).
In the following two chapters I discuss these two versions of the semantic
view, and offer arguments against each. I begin with causal-homophonism,
which I believe to be the more egregious of the two, since it treats names,
for the most part, as terms which refer essentially to particular objects, and
maintains that they are completely context-insensitive. However, it is also
the harder view to argue against because it shares fewer of my background
assumptions about what constitutes an adequate and plausible account of
proper name reference.
There is another group of views about proper name reference that are
not, or need not be, semantic views, but I include discussion of all of them
25In fact, Dever (1998) does have a view on how reference is determined, though this is
secondary to his view about the semantics of names.
26A significant anomaly to this claim is Jackson (1998). However, this paper did not spark any
particular resurgence of descriptivism, and I understand Jackson himself subsequently abandoned
the view. There may also be psychological evidence that suggests that classical descriptivism is
mistaken. See Garcia Ramirez (2011) for a survey.
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amongst the genuinely semantic views because they also do not treat names
as context-sensitive in the way that the pragmatic view I propose in part
III does. These are intention-based or intentionalist views that maintain that
a speaker’s intention to refer to a particular object with a use of a name
determines the reference of the name, or contributes to that determination in
a significant way. I discuss two types of intention-based view in chapter 5.
Firstly, constraint-based intentionalism, which could be considered a semantic
view, and maintains that the referent of a proper name upon a particular use
is whatever the speaker intends it to be, but within a constrained domain of
objects, for example, bearers of the name used. Intentions to refer to other
objects do not produce reference. Secondly, a variety of neo-Gricean view that
maintains that the reference of a use of a name is determined by a particular
kind of structured intention to communicate about a particular object. In this
case it is the intention itself that is constrained—one can only intend to refer
to certain objects with each name in particular situations. I will argue against
the first kind of view on the basis that it fails to result in a convincing account
of name reference. However, I will argue against the second kind of view
much more generally, by claiming that the kind of general view that would
be required to accommodate such a view of reference is incompatible with
certain empirical psychological data.
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Chapter 3
Causal-Homophonism
‘We name things and then we can talk about them: can
refer to them in talk.’—As if what we did next were given
with the mere act of naming. As if there were only one
thing called ‘talking about things’
L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations
Two common views on proper names after Kripke (1981) have beenthat, (i) since they have no descriptive meaning which determines theirreference, the semantic content or contribution of a name just is its
referent (this is a consequence of the assumption that semantics is truth-
conditional); and (ii) a name has a constant semantic content, i.e. it has the
same meaning (its referent) independently of any particular use. These two
views entail homophonism (or the ambiguity thesis), which is the view that
proper names are properly individuated in such a way that they have only one
(semantic) referent (at a time: cf. Sainsbury 2015). This means that, despite the
apparent ubiquity of multiple objects having the same name, strictly speaking,
these ‘shared’ names are actually multiple homophonous names on a par with
‘bank’/‘bank’. Thus, John Smith the Tadcaster brewer, and John Smith the late
Labour Party leader did not share a name, but had distinct names that are
spelt the same and sound the same.
This view is made somewhat more plausible by Kaplan (1990), who distin-
guishes between generic names, which are something like name templates—the
kinds of things found in books of baby names—and have no referential content,
and specific names (called ‘common-currency names’ by Kaplan), which are the
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things we actually use to refer to objects, and which cannot be shared. Kaplan
has the following to say about the distinction, upon introducing it:
There is the generic name “David”, and then there is my name “David”,
there is David Lewis’ name “David”, and so on. These are all three
distinct words. The latter two [being specific names] have—and here I
speak carefully—a semantic function: They name someone. The first, the
generic name doesn’t name anyone (doesn’t name anyone, perhaps it
names or is an unnatural kind). Furthermore, it doesn’t pretend to name
anyone (as certain empty [specific] names do). (Kaplan 1990, p. 111)
Thus, the two John Smiths have something in common: their specific names,
though distinct, both stand in the same relation to one particular generic name.
The relationship between generic and specific names is somewhat unclear. It
appears to be something like instantiation, though Sainsbury (2015) refers to
it as exemplification (p. 196). Kaplan compares the relation to that of species-
individual (Kaplan 1990, p.208).
Causal-homophonists combine the homophonist individuation of names
with various elaborations of the causal picture of reference put forward by
Kripke (1981). Homophonists developed Kripke’s picture into a theory of
reference and/or names, maintaining that the tout court reference of a name is
determined and maintained by a causal chain connecting uses of the name
back to an originating baptismal act that named the referent and brought the
name into existence. Uses of a name are uses of a particular specific name,
with its particular referent, in virtue of the causal connection that that use
has to previous uses, tracing it back to the particular baptism. The causal
connections are usually explained in terms of speakers intending to use the
name in the same way, or with the same reference, as some previous speaker’s
use.
I will offer four arguments against the causal-homophonist picture in §§3.1–
3.4. They are as follows: The argument from shared names (§3.1): Homophonism
explicitly endorses the claim that there are no shared names, merely multiple
homophonous/homonymous names. This is implausible given the ordinary
language conception of a name. Whilst defenders of the view claim that this
argument has no teeth, I believe that there is something to it, and causal-
homophonism’s counter-intuitive claims should at least count as a mark
against it.
The argument from communication (§3.2): Causal-homophonists and their
ilk assume that there are reference-fixing mechanisms (i.e. causal chains)
at play in our use of proper names that are independent of any awareness
particular speakers and hearers have of them. This means that, in order
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to successfully communicate using names, there must generally be other
mechanisms in play that facilitate awareness of what’s being referred to,
particularly where shared names, etc. are at play. The homophonist does
not deny this, but dismisses them as presemantics, not actually involved in
truth-conditional reference determination, and liable to come apart from the
metaphysical, truth-conditional-level reference. I argue that this is seriously
detrimental to an account of name reference because it divorces reference
from communication in a way that ignores how speakers actually use names.
The argument from family names (§3.3): Family names (or surnames), present
a problem for causal-homophonists, both as they are used to refer to families,
and, in particular, as they are used to refer to individual bearers of family
names. As far as I’m aware, Sainsbury (2015) presents the only significant
discussion of family names amongst homophonists, and his discussion is
very brief. Family names appear, almost essentially, to be shared amongst
members of a family. Sainsbury embraces this intuition, claiming that specific
family names refer to families as the specific names of individuals refer
to their bearers, and that it is these specific family names that combine
with individuals’ specific first names to create the two-part names such
as ‘Katharine Harris’ typical in Western, English-speaking cultures, as well
various others. This presents two problems for Sainsbury: firstly, how to
individuate families in the right way, particularly nuclear families; and,
secondly, how to account for the very common practice of using family names
to refer to individual people. I consider various ways in which homophonists
might alter Sainsbury’s account in order to account for this practice. I conclude
that each either undermines causal-homophonism by introducing contextual
elements to reference determination, or is implausible because it cannot
account for the familial nature of family names.
The argument for pluralism about reference determination (§3.4): The causal
chain view of reference determination is extremely inflexible. As my other
arguments will have revealed, in order to account for the full range of proper
name reference it either needs to make various implausible assumptions, like
the existence of inadvertent baptism, accidental attachment to casual chains,
and the speaker/semantic reference distinction,1 or it must take the view that
in some cases there is simply a fact of the matter about what is being referred
to, and it’s not what people think.
None of these are knock-down arguments against causal-homophonism,
nor, together, do they offer an indefeasible refutation. However, they do
indicate that the position is not nearly as inviting or elegant as its proponents
have suggested. Indeed, in order to account for the vagaries of the use
1This is a general problem for all semantic accounts of reference.
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of proper names, it must accept significant complications that weaken the
strength of its simplicity. Alternatively, causal-homophonists can maintain
their position’s simplicity by refusing to accommodate the complications, and
simply drawing a strong distinction between what names truly refer to, for
the purposes of contributions to truth-conditional sentence content, and what
people use them to achieve. In reality, homophonists often appear to lurk
somewhere between these two positions, accepting certain complications to
accommodate features of use, but only to a certain extent, so that significant
gaps still emerge between what the theory says about reference and how it
appears that speakers actually use names. All this leaves causal-homophonism
in a rather poor position, such that an account of proper name reference that
could more easily deal with the data, whilst being able to do everything that
causal-homophonism can, would be eminently preferably.
3.1 The Argument from Shared Names
It appears that many objects, particularly people and places, are named in
the same way—there are many people called ‘Lucy’ and ‘John Smith’, and
multiple places called ‘Newton’ and ‘Springfield’. Indeed, it is reasonably
difficult to think of real objects with names that are known to be unique. If
we did come across one, the chances are that it would be only coincidentally
unique, and there would be nothing to stop us ending the uniqueness by
simply granting something else the name. Even in domains where attempts
are made to name things uniquely, such as various scientific fields, or pedigree
animal or racehorse naming,2 the names are only unique within that domain:
whilst astronomers might not name more than one nebula ‘M 78’ (assuming
this is a name), nothing about that would prevent a pharmaceutical researcher
also naming a test subject ‘M 78’. And though rules laid down by horse racing
authorities might preclude me naming a new racehorse ‘Shergar’, I’m quite
free (in the UK at least) to so name my child. Moreover, Travis (1981a) observes
that in a case in which a name really only has one bearer (imagine an unusual
name given to a child which, coincidentally no one else has ever thought
of—‘Almost Chantilly’, perhaps, or ‘Nils Kürbis’), the name would not, when
used, always refer to her (pp. 26–27): Consider a talent show-style competition
in which participants are knocked out one by one. The participants each
wear a name badge, this being the only way that the judges and competition
2In fact, it appears that in the UK and US, the names of racehorses can be reused, as long as
any previous bearers are no longer registered with the relevant authority and are either dead
or above a certain age, and the name is not on the ‘International and Domestic protected lists’,
which seem to include the names of all successful and famous racehorses, whether or not they
are still alive.
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organizers can identify them. When the judges rule against a candidate, they
ask the security team to remove them bodily. Suppose Nils Kürbis—who tells
me that he believes himself to be the only bearer of his name in the world3—is
taking part in this competition, but through some administrative error his
name badge has been mixed up with another contestant’s, Herbert Melon,
but neither has had the opportunity to point out the error. At some stage in
the proceedings, Herbert Melon, the competitor wearing Nils’s name badge is
eliminated, and one of the judge calls out ‘Remove Nils Kürbis!’, meaning to
refer to Herbert, and the security team remove him, identifying him by his
badge. In such a context it is clear that it is Herbert that has been referred to
with the name ‘Nils Kürbis’, even though someone else is the only bearer of
that name in the world.
However, as discussed above, according to causal-homophonism, proper
names cannot be shared. This is because, if the meaning of a name is just its
reference, then either most names have multiple meanings, and are ambiguous
between them, or each name can in fact only have one referent, and there
are multiple, homophonous names. That there are multiple, homophonous
names ‘Lucy’, rather than one, multiply ambiguous name comes down to
how fine-grained one deems names to be: If one Lucy’s name is to another
Lucy’s name as ‘bank’ the financial institution is to ‘bank’ the river’s edge,
which seems to be the case if they have wholly different, unrelated meanings
(one’s meaning is constituted by its reference to one person, and the other’s
to a different person), then it is reasonable to claim that they are distinct, yet
homophonous, lexical items, just as is claimed with ‘bank’ and ‘bank’. So,
although there may be some sense in which there is one ambiguous name,
there is a significant sense in which there are multiple names—one for each
Lucy. This is the sense which implies that there are no shared names.4
The position that each proper name can only denote one thing seems to
have the consequence that utterances such as ‘I share a first name with Lucy
Campbell’ on the lips of speakers named ‘Lucy’ are actually (literally) false. Yet
such sentences are frequently held to be true, and I believe speakers of English
have a strong (pre-theoretic) intuition that they can be true simpliciter, and not
merely true when interpreted as a loose way of speaking, or as paraphrases for
some other sentences. Rami (2014, pp. 123) observes that proper names ‘are
social artifacts and their nature essentially depends on how we think about
them and how we use them.’ It is implausible, he claims, that speakers are
massively and systematically ignorant of the correct individuation of names.
3His name, when styled in English, would be ‘Neil Pumpkin’ after all.
4The idea that ‘Lucy’ is to non-co-referential ‘Lucy’ as ‘bank’ the name of a financial institution
is to ‘bank’ the name of a sloping side or sloping sided thing seems itself quite wrong. See Katz
(2001) for discussion and arguments to this end.
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Therefore, I take it that it is true that I share a name with the many other
Peters in the world, and a theory entailing that this, and all similar utterances,
are (always) false must be wrong.
It is important to note that many of the philosophers positing the thesis
that there are no shared names are not merely suggesting that names can
be adequately modelled as non-logical constant terms for formal semantical
purposes, they are saying something about the real metaphysics of the actual
lexical items we use to talk about things. Similarly, the sense in which I claim
that names can be shared is the sense that is relevant to semantic inquiry,
since, as I will argue, it is the only sense generally recognized by speakers of
English. The homophonist’s notion of a name is an artificial construct left over
from an idealized view of natural language, with little to do with how names
are actually used. Furthermore, there is no explanatory payoff to positing the
existence of names that cannot be shared, given the other problems I will raise
for causal-homophonism in subsequent sections.
3.1.1 Evidence Against Homophony
Generic Names
One might imagine that, on Kaplan’s account, the intuitions about sharing
names can be accounted for—there is an ambiguity in ‘name’ over generic
and specific names. But, as is pointed out in Rami (2014, pp. 123–4) it will not
work to say that it is generic names that are shared, because generic names
are not the sorts of things that can be ‘had’ or ‘borne’, at least not according to
the notion of a generic name employed by Kaplan (1990) and Sainsbury (2015).
Sainsbury explicitly states that ‘it’s only specific names, and not generic names,
that have bearers’, and that generic names have no significant semantics at all
(p. 196). Kaplan, as already stated, sees generic names as species to individual
specific names, and thinks that if they have any semantics, it is to refer to
kinds. Even if generic names are like species, it would not follow that they
were things that were had by bearers. Indeed, if it were claimed that every
object that bore a specific name also bore the generic name that that specific
name instantiated, then each object would bear two homophonous names, but
in radically different ways, since the names would be radically different kinds
of word. This would create an ambiguity not just in the word ‘name’, but also
in ‘bear’ or ‘have’ as they relate objects and names. Rami observes (p. 124)
that, if generic names have bearers derivatively upon the specific names that
instantiate them having bearers, there is nothing to prevent the claim that
generic names also derivatively have referents, since, for the homophonist, a
specific name’s bearer is just its unique referent. But there being referential
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names with multiple bearers is precisely what the distinction between generic
and specific names was supposed to avoid.
It seems then, at least according to the standard conception of generic
names, that assertions that multiple objects bear the same generic name must
be false, just as those asserting the same of specific names are. The closest
true sentences must say something like ‘My first name is an instance of the
same generic name as Peter Winch’s first name’, and this is not what anyone
(except the theoretically encumbered) believe they are asserting when they
say something about shared names. Whilst it may be possible for people to
be wrong about what it is they are expressing with their words from time to
time, it is implausible that all English speakers are systematically mistaken
about the content of utterances which appear to assert sameness of name
between two distinct objects. Similarly, no English speaker, to my knowledge,
believes there is a sense in which Peters have distinct names that is accounted
for by positing specific names. This is a different kind of case from simply
having false beliefs about certain ways in which language works, because
it constitutes a systematic mistake about what it is that we say with our
words—their content.
Quantitative vs Qualitative Identity
In many cases where the expression pthe same xq is used, it is possible to
distinguish both a qualitative and a quantitative reading. For instance, ‘Peter
and I have the same netbook’ could mean either ‘Peter and I have the same
model of netbook’, or ‘Peter and I share a netbook’. It has been suggested that
this distinction could be applied in the case of ‘the same name’, thus justifying
the generic/specific dichotomy, and providing a sense in which Peters do not
have the same name (Justice 2001). However, this does not survive scrutiny.
The sentence ‘Peter and I have the same name’ can be reformulated as ‘Peter
and I share a name’, salve veritate, and this is not so in cases where only
qualitative identity is meant; sharing usually entails numerical identity of
what is shared. For example, sharing an address, sharing a bed, sharing a
packet of Rolos, sharing a great grandfather. In all these cases, what is shared
is considered to be a single thing. There are some cases of sharing which do
not entail simple numerical identity, mostly in cases of things that it’s not
obvious how to count. For example, intentional emotions can be shared—‘We
share a hatred for Rick Trainor’—as can dispositions and desires. However, it
is clear is that these are not simple cases of qualitative identity either.
There also appears to be prosodic evidence that it is not merely qualitative
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identity meant by ‘the same name’5: In English prosody, expressions of the two
identities are often marked differently to get a different focus. For example,
‘We don’t have the same netbook’ denies quantitative, though possibly not
qualitative identity. Compare this with ‘We don’t have the same netbook’,
which seems to deny quantitative and qualitative identity (although this will
depend to some degree on the context). Inserting ‘name’ for ‘netbook’, the first
marking—‘We don’t have the same name’—seems to be infelicitous, or at least
does not seem to receive a quantitative reading: Imagine a pedant responding
to an ambiguous statement about the qualitative identity of netbooks by saying
‘They’re not the same netbook’, intending to assert numerical distinctness.
Although they might be annoying, we would probably understand what they
were getting at. But if the same pedant were to respond in that way to a
statement about name identity—‘But you don’t have the same name’—we
would think they’d either said something very odd, or that they were making
a pedantic point about some qualitative difference, like the spelling of names.
These two pieces of evidence strongly suggest that the ordinary language
notion of having the same name is not merely a qualitative one.
Loose Talk
Another possibility for the homophonist is that people are speaking loosely,
somehow, when they say that two Peters share a name. But loose talk is
generally recognized as such, and no one does think that this is loose talk.
There is simply nothing to suggest that ordinary talk of sharing names is
loose talk. Kaplan himself admits that his view is highly counterintuitive,
citing the incredulity a presentation of the view incited amongst distinguished
philosophers of language (Kaplan 1990, pp. 110–11), and such incredulity
would not arise if same-name talk was widely regarded as being loose or
ambiguous in some way. Moreover, as I have claimed above, the best para-
phrase available to the homophonist is wholly unconvincing.
A further argument against the homophonist thesis is made by Cohen
(1980, p. 143), who observes that the multiple reference of proper names is
very unlike genuine homophony, since names seem to be intrinsically versatile,
whereas homophony, such as ‘bank’/‘bank’, ‘bear’/‘bear’, or ‘fluke’/‘fluke’, is
a comparatively rare phenomenon, or at the least, it is frequently coincidental.
It is simply wrong to suggest that the reuse of names is an inconvenience
arising from the impreciseness of natural language, as Frege (1892) does,
or that occurrences of shared names are deviant from the norm. The very
opposite seems to be true: in many cases people very intentionally reuse
5Many thanks to Peter Sutton for pointing this out to me.
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existing names, indeed in many cultures it would be unusual or even deviant
to introduce an entirely new name for a person or place.
3.1.2 Homophonist Responses
Those inclined towards the homophonist picture of names are frequently
disposed to react dismissively to arguments from the existence of shared
names.6 They are inclined to see such arguments from ordinary language use
as akin to arguments from folk-intuitions against scientific discoveries. For
example, arguing that names must be shared, because sentences such as ‘there
are many people who share the name “Lucy Campbell”’ are widely deemed to
be true, may seem analogous to arguing against heliocentrism on the grounds
that sentences such as ‘the sun moves across the sky’ are frequently deemed
to be true. Ordinary folk, it is argued, do not have the same insight into
the nature of the words and language they use as theorists who are in the
business of analyzing those words and language, and presenting theories to
best explain how they work. Whilst I do not claim that ordinary language
arguments about shared names are definitive against homophonism, I do not
think the analogy between its claims with regard to name individuation, and
the claims of empirical sciences hold up.
When epistemologists attempt to define knowledge, it seems that they are
under a certain obligation to account for many, if not all, English speakers’
uses of the term ‘knowledge’, at least of a particular kind. There is an idea, at
least on some understandings of the project, that speakers are in possession of
a concept knowledge, and the epistemologist is aiming to provide an analysis
of that concept. If their analysis fails to account for what look like good cases
in which the speakers’ concept applies, then it is inadequate. Whilst it might
be an analysis of some epistemological or psychological phenomenon, it is
not knowledge. It may be that there is a distinction to draw between the use
of ordinary language intuitions in such a case, and claims about proper name
individuation. Homophonists will claim that, in providing an account of the
individuation of names, they are not in the business of providing an analysis
of any ordinary language concept proper name. Rather, they are observing
how names are used, or, more likely, what names are purported to do, and
attempting to provide an analysis of how names must be in order to do that,
within a broader semantic framework. Thus, homophonists may claim that
they are under no obligation to respect the ‘folk-intuitions’ of speakers about
how their language works. Speakers qua speakers have no more insight into
6In person at least. Published responses to such arguments are harder to come by.
69
3.1. The Argument from Shared Names
the true nature of the words they use than thinkers do into the true nature of
the brain’s workings.
This account of what the homophonist is doing in denying that names
can be shared is misguided, however. As mentioned above, homophonists
are saying something about the metaphysics of the actual proper names we
use to talk about things. They are not introducing a technical term, ‘proper
name’, that fits into a model-theoretic account of language. If they were to
do that, although the account might not entail the falsity of utterances of
English, we would be left with the question of whether or not the technical
term described anything actually present in natural language generally, or
English in particular.
In general, renaissance astronomers and contemporary neuroscientists
purport to be describing the world as it is, rather than creating self-consistent
models. But unlike them, the homophonist, when making claims about the
individuation of names, does not observe how names are used, or consult with
speakers who use names. Homophonists come to the conclusion that speakers
are wrong in their conception of names because they (the homophonists) begin
with a very particular, and theoretically-encumbered, view of how proper
names function. They take them to refer to objects, which is plausible enough,
but they take that reference to be a substantial metaphysical relation between
a word and the object that holds independently of any particular use. They
also assume, as mentioned at the beginning of chapter 3, a truth-conditional
conception of semantics, and that the only semantic contribution a name
makes to the truth-conditions of a sentence containing it is its reference. It
is these assumptions, when taken together, that lead to the counter-intuitive
homophonist individuation of names: If a name refers tout court, it must refer
independently of any context of utterance, and if it is to contribute a reference
to the truth-conditions of a sentence such that a determinate truth-value could
be returned, it must have only one referent.
The assumptions that lead to the homophonist individuation of names are
not, however, empirically grounded in the way that the claims of renaissance
astronomers or contemporary neuroscientists are generally assumed to be. The
claim that proper names refer tout court has little empirical or intuitive sway:
names never occur independently of a use in a context, so there can be little
reason beyond a historical predilection for assuming that word meanings are
not context-sensitive for assuming that names refer independently of use. And
indeed, many contemporary scholars deny that names refer tout court, even
though they have access to all the same data as the homophonists.7 Similarly,
7See, for example, Burge (1973); Cohen (1980); Cumming (2008); Dever (1998); Elbourne
(2005); Fara (2015); Gray (forthcoming); Katz (2001); Matushansky (2008); Michaelson (2013);
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truth-conditional approaches to semantics, although widespread, owe more to
Frege’s place at the conception of formal semantics than they do to empirical
observation, and dissent from the applicability of truth-conditional semantics
to natural language is common. Although there is some initial intuitive pull
to the idea that knowing the meaning of an expression is to know under
what conditions the sentence in which it occurs is true, consideration of some
examples of natural language usage, for instance, Travis cases (see §2.3),
demonstrates that things are more complex.
The assumptions that lead homophonists to their position on name indi-
viduation are a result of theoretical rather than empirical considerations.
So it appears that the situation in which they claim that the beliefs of
ordinary speakers about the nature of names is rather more like that of
the epistemologist who claims to have a better idea of what knowledge is
than speakers who employ the notion daily, and less like the astronomer who,
through celestial observations, realizes that the Earth orbits the Sun rather
than the other way around, as had previously been assumed. Sainsbury (2015)
is explicit that causal-homophonism, and the notion of semantic reference it
creates, are theoretical, and suit theoretical purposes (p. 209). However, this
leaves the position open to the claim that its theoretical posits fail to capture
anything significant about natural language, particularly if an alternative
account of proper names is available that adequately captures the referential
use of names in natural language without burdensome theoretical notions
that entail the falsehood of ordinary kinds of utterance.
3.2 The Argument from Communication
Travis (1981a) argues that semantic conventions that stipulate or limit what
a referring term can refer to are impotent in the face of pragmatic cues for
reference or for communication (ibid., pp. 24–26). Donnellan cases (Donnellan
1966) provide examples of this. Consider Donnellan’s famous man with a
martini: a speaker can succeed in using the expression ‘the man with the
martini’ to refer to someone who is not drinking a martini, even though it
is generally thought that the semantics of definite descriptions stipulate that
it can only be satisfied by an object fulfilling the description, given the right
context. For example, if there is a man present drinking water from a martini
glass, and no other perceptually salient men are drinking from martini glasses,
then he is likely to be the referent of ‘the man with the martini’, in the sense
of the utterance being about that man and best taken to be so, the truth of
the utterance depending upon him (on reasonable accounts of the truth of
Pelczar and Rainsbury (1998); Rami (2014); Recanati (1993); Sawyer (2010); Travis (1981a).
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utterances). This can be the case even if there are other men nearby who
are covertly drinking martinis. This can also be the case if the speaker is
aware that their referent is only drinking water, and that there are covert
martini drinkers around. For example, the speaker may use the expression in
a tongue-in-cheek manner, yet still succeed in referring, or simply be aware
that the expression is the best way to refer, given her audience’s perspective.
One plausible analysis of such cases is that it is what a use of a name can
reasonably be taken to make recognizable in the particular circumstances
of utterance that is important to what gets referred to, rather than how the
world might be, independently of the aims and interests of interlocutors.
And what words are best understood by a reasonable audience to have made
recognizable as what is being said with them is essentially what those words
are communicating under the particular circumstance.
The homophonist account of proper names does a very good job of
explaining how proper names could refer just in virtue of their semantic
content, given that many names appear to be multiply referential. However, it
goes little way towards explaining how such names are used to successfully
communicate about single objects, since the causal chains which individuate
homophonic names are often not cognitively accessible to users of those names.
For homophonists, the mechanisms that allow hearers to appreciate what a
speaker’s use of a name refers to are entirely separate from the mechanisms
that determine the name’s reference. Sainsbury (2015) accuses Pelczar and
Rainsbury (1998) of failing to recognize the distinction between the facts that
determine the bearer of an utterance of a name (which for him constitutes
its reference), and the evidence an interpreter might have for it (p. 197).
Homophonists are well aware that language-users must often make use of
contextual information in order to work out what a name refers to on an
occasion of use, at the very least in order to disambiguate homophony, but
they refer to such information, and its processing, as pre-semantics (Kaplan
1989b; Perry 1998)—the kind of non-semantic cues that allow language-users
to appreciate which words comprise a phonological string, prior to parsing
their semantics. They maintain that this use of contextual information does not
contribute to what is strictly-speaking referred to, i.e., to the truth-conditions
of the sentence or utterance:
Each name-using practice involves exactly one baptism; baptisms meta-
physically individuate practices, and thus fix the referent, if any, of a
practice, though when we wish to know to which practice a given use of
a name belongs, or what the referent of a practice is, it is rare that we can
reach an answer by first identifying the baptism. Normally our evidence
is associated information, even though this is evidence only, and does not
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make a practice the practice it is. (Sainsbury 2005, p. 106)
3.2.1 Communication and Causal Chains
The causal-homophonist account of reference is not, however, completely silent
on communication. The causal theory of reference, as developed from the
picture presented by Kripke (1981), notably by Kaplan (1990) and Sainsbury
(2005), states that the reference of a name is transmitted causally by the
deference of users to prior uses. This principle extends beyond the reference
of names-as-uttered to singular thought: object-oriented thoughts that are
about a particular object directly, not in virtue of any general, descriptive
content. Being tied into a causal chain of reference enables one to have singular
thoughts about the referent. Thus, although causal chains are not generally
cognitively accessible, a speaker can communicate a singular thought to their
interlocutor using a name, just in virtue of admitting them to the chain.
According to Sainsbury (ibid.) this process can convey knowledge of the
referent of a name to a hearer, even though they may have no knowledge of
the referent other than that it is the referent of the name:
When we come to master the use of a name with a bearer, we thereby
come to know (I hold) who or what the bearer is, and more generally
we satisfy any reasonable demand for discriminating knowledge of the
bearer. (ibid., p. 97)
Mastery of the use of a name here just amounts to ‘having a resolution to use
the name “in the way it is used” by the existing users’ (ibid., p. 113), although
it presumably also requires that one not also be systematically confused about
the use of which one is a master. In claiming that resolving to use a name in
the way that others use it grants one discriminating knowledge of its bearer,
Sainsbury is making the strong claim that simply employing a name that
is causally connected to an object grants one not only the capacity to have
singular thoughts about that object, but also the capacity to single that object
out from all other objects, even though one has no other capacities, such as
perceptual or descriptive capacities, to do so. This is in contrast to Evans
(1982), who claims that ‘a capacity to distinguish [an] object of his judgement
from all other things’ is required in order to have singular thoughts about
that object (p. 89), but he denies that ‘the use of a proper name [. . . is] an
autonomous way of satisfying the requirement that one have discriminating
knowledge of the objects of one’s thoughts’ (p. 403).
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According to Sainsbury’s causal-homophonist account of reference trans-
mission,8 the use of a name transfers the capacity to have singular thought
about its bearer from speaker to hearer, and so allows the communication
of the singular thought expressed by the speaker. The sentence/utterance
and the thought are about the referent of the name because they are causally
connected to it. The fact that a hearer may in fact have plenty of other
descriptive or perceptual information about the referent that is not connected
to the causal chain is irrelevant. As observed by Evans (1973), this model of
communication using names appears to work very well in a limited range of
cases: those in which a hearer is entirely unacquainted with a referent, or in
which a speaker truly does begin using a name deferentially—what Evans
calls ‘mouthpiece cases’, and Rami (2016) calls ‘parasitic uses’. For example: Lucy
joins her friends Peter and Alex at the lunch table whilst Peter and Alex are
already involved in a conversation about someone called ‘Rory’. Lucy does
not know Rory, and has not heard of him before. Lucy can learn things about
Rory from what Peter and Alex say, and she can even join in the conversation
about him by saying things like ‘Rory sounds like he needs some help’. So
Peter and Alex can communicate with Lucy about Rory using the name ‘Rory’,
even though she had no prior knowledge of him, and she is able to talk about
him and to refer to him successfully using the name. If Lucy were asked
‘Who’s Rory?’, she might plausibly reply—in certain contexts—that Rory is
the person about whom Alex and Peter are talking, and state some relevant
information about him she has picked up from the conversation.
3.2.2 Causal Chains Without Communication
The causal-homophonist explanation of communication using names works
well in cases such as Lucy’s because it explains how Lucy is able to refer to
Rory just in virtue of having picked up his name from Peter and Alex, and
her deference to their reference. However, as already indicated, this is a very
particular kind of communicative interaction. We can well imagine that if
Lucy were to approach Jen, who was not involved in the conversation with
Peter and Alex, and who does not know Rory, and say, without providing any
context, ‘Rory sounds like he needs some help’, she would fail to communicate
anything about Rory—at least on a reasonable understanding of the kind of
uptake required for communication—because Jen simply does not know who
‘Rory’ is, and it seems very unlikely that Jen would thereby be able to have
8Sainsbury does not, in fact, commit himself to the homophony thesis about the individuation
of names in his (2005); he applies the Kripkean causal theory of reference to naming practices,
rather than directly to names themselves. Sainsbury (2015) explicitly adopts homophonism and
outlines a causal theory of names, drawing on Kaplan (1990).
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a singular thought about Rory. Jen might well respond ‘What’re you talking
about? Who’s Rory? Leave me alone!’. Furthermore, if Jen were to instead
respond ‘Rory sounds like he needs to pull himself together’, or even ‘He
sounds like he needs to pull himself together’, quite as a joke, it is not clear
that Jen would have said anything about the particular person Alex and Peter
were talking about, even though she appeared to use the name in deference
to Lucy’s use of the name, or used ‘he’ anaphorically upon it.
‘My friend Katharine’
It is notable that when a speaker wants to communicate about a person (or
other named object) that their interlocutor is unfamiliar with, or unfamiliar
with by name, in many contexts it is normal and—plausibly—necessary, to
form a description with the name of the person, or insert some small piece
of descriptive information about them. For example, if Helena wants to tell
Clare about Katharine’s love of Bowie, but she knows that Clare doesn’t know
Katharine, and isn’t familiar with talk about her using her name, then she
will not simply begin ‘Katharine loves Bowie’, but will say something like
‘My friend Katharine loves Bowie’ or ‘I have a friend from school, Katharine,
who loves Bowie’.9 Not only does this seem like a polite convention on
Helena’s part, it seems that, at least in many contexts, Clare would be wholly
confused by Helena’s utterance, and unable to interpret it, if it were just
to contain the name without the descriptive content. She will reject the
attempt at reference, and request clarification by asking something like ‘Who’s
Katharine?’: it appears that Helena is unable to use the name to communicate
referentially. Indeed, it appears that, in English, in many contexts, if a name
is used bare, without additional descriptive content, there is a presupposition
that the audience is already familiar with the use of that name to refer to
the speaker’s intended referent, and will be able to suitably appreciate the
reference. Adding some kind of minimal descriptive content (and it is clear
that it can be extremely minimal) to the use of the name seems to mitigate
this constraint on communication, although the question of whether singular
thought will be elicited in a hearer unfamiliar with the referent by such a
referential expression bears further consideration.
Regardless of one’s view on this question of singular thought, it seems clear
that the causal-homophonist cannot account for this quirk of communication
using proper names. According to the causal theory, Helena’s use of the
name ‘Katharine’ should be enough to induct Clare into the relevant naming
9Providing philosophical examples is one obvious counter-example to this practice: I am
not actually trying to refer to particular people in my examples, and I can indicate this brute
introduction of characters by using names without any accompanying description.
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practice and communicate to her the referential thought being expressed.
The homophonist must claim that, had Helena just said ‘Katharine loves
Bowie’, she would have referred to Katharine, and either Clare does know
who Katharine is in virtue of Helena’s reference, but seeks further information
about her, or Clare is stubbornly refusing to appreciate the reference proffered
to her, demanding richer information. Both these options are problematic.
The first option is problematic because, although it might appear that Helena
referred and Clare was able to pick up on her reference by saying ‘Who’s
Katharine?’, in fact, nothing more was communicated than that Helena was
trying to talk about someone using the name ‘Katharine’. She might well
have simply said ‘“Katharine”?’. It is clear that, on any understanding of
‘knowing who’ that is relevant to her, Clare does not know who Katharine
is in this context. She would actively disavow such knowledge, and might
not even ascent to Katharine being whomever Helena referred to with the
name. The second option is implausible because Clare’s situation of ignorance
seems eminently reasonable: she is not being obtuse, or difficult, or in any
way trying to be unco-operative.
Deference and Context
Further problems for the view of communication by reference put forward
by the causal-homophonist can be brought out with a similar example to that
of Lucy, involving picking up names from the newspaper, and then using
those names in discussing the news, apparently referentially. This is a fairly
common scenario. Suppose Mike reads a newspaper article that contains the
sentence ‘Police are searching for a third man, Brian Blessed, in connection
with the robbery’, that being the only time that the name ‘Brian Blessed’
occurs in the article. Mike can (under certain circumstances) say ‘If I were
Brian Blessed, I’d have skipped the country by now’, and successfully refer
to the person mentioned in the article. The causal-homophonist can explain
this reference by claiming that Mike’s deference to the use of the name in the
article ties him in to the chain of referential uses stemming back to the person
themself. But now consider two supplementary scenarios: In the first, the
person Mike addresses when he speaks, Luke, has not read the article, and is
unfamiliar with the story; in the second, the author of the newspaper article
has made a mistake, and the suspect the police are searching for is actually
called ‘Ryan Jones’.
In the first situation, it seems very likely that Luke, not knowing the
content of the article Mike was reading, would take him to be talking about
the well-known actor called ‘Brian Blessed’, rather than the suspect mentioned
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in the article. Mike has then failed to communicate about the person he meant
to, and has, in virtue of failure to appreciate the context of their utterance,
unintentionally communicated about someone quite different, but with a
same-sounding name. The causal chain connecting Mike’s use of the name
to its bearer has failed in its task of facilitating a singular thought about the
bearer in Luke, and Luke has a singular thought about someone else entirely.
But it seems entirely reasonable that Luke took Mike to be referring to the actor
Brian Blessed: Mike used the name out-of-the-blue, without ensuring that
Luke was aware of the content of the article, and Luke assumed—apparently
very naturally—that Mike was trying to communicate in a way perspicuous
to him, i.e. by using ‘Brian Blessed’ in a way he was familiar with. According
to the homophonists, Luke has failed to appreciate which name Mike was
using because of a breakdown at the pre-semantic level.
Consider the second situation, in which the author of the newspaper article
made a mistake, and the suspect the police are looking for is not in fact named
‘Brian Blessed’, but ‘Ryan Jones’. Suppose the author intended to reproduce
the correct information provided by the police, but that, as she was composing
her copy, someone mentioned the actor Brian Blessed and, in a moment of
aberration, she wrote that name rather than that of the suspect. Suppose
also, this time, that both Mike and Luke have read the article containing the
anomalous name. When Mike says ‘If I were Brian Blessed, I’d have skipped
the country by now’, if Luke, taking Mike to be talking about the suspect
mentioned in the article, replies ‘If I were him, I’d be living it up in the South
Pacific’, it seems that they are having a conversation about the suspect, and
are referring to him. This is in spite of the fact that the name printed in the
paper is causally connected, in some manner, to Brian Blessed, the actor. The
homophonist is not obviously committed to the claim that it is Brian Blessed
referred to by either the author of the article or Luke and Mike, since the
author did not intend to use the name ‘Brian Blessed’ in the way it is normally
used—this generally being a requirement of being a link in a referential causal
chain, e.g. for Sainsbury (2005)—but it is not clear how the homophonist could
happily explain Mike’s use of ‘Brian Blessed’ apparently referring to Ryan
Jones. They might claim that an inadvertent baptism had taken place, and
that the author of the article had created a new name ‘Brian Blessed’, referring
to the suspect, or that such a name is created at some point, given Mike’s use
of the name. Such a claim is implausible. It is entirely opaque when or how
such an act could have occurred: The author did not intend to use the name
‘Brian Blessed’ to refer to the suspect. Though Mike did, it does not seem in
keeping with the tenets of homophonism to assert that one use of a name,
which the speaker also intended to be in keeping with previous uses, could
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create a new name and baptize an object with it.
Shared Names and Causal Chains
Evans (1973) provides an example designed to undermine the causal theory
of reference, in which a quiz show contestant asserts, when asked to name
a capital city, ‘Kingston is the Capital of Jamaica’. Evans has the strong
intuition that the contestant has ‘said something strictly and literally true’,
even though, in his example, it turns out that contestant had learned this
piece of (apparent) information from a racist who actually meant to refer to
Kingston-upon-Thames (p. 194). The causal theory of reference predicts that,
since the contestant picked up the name ‘Kingston’ from someone who was
intending to use it as part of a causal chain attached to the settlement now
in southwest London, the contestant’s use is also a part of that causal chain,
and she too refers to Kingston-upon-Thames, rather than Kingston, Jamaica.
I agree, of course, with Evans that the contestant says something true in the
context of the quiz, and certainly answers the question correctly, although I
do not accept the notion of something being strictly and literally true: there
might be contexts in which the contestant will end up saying something false
with the same words.
With just the bare bones of Kripke’s causal picture of reference, the causal
theorist does not have much to counter Evans’s intuition about the Kingston
case, but by introducing the homophonist individuation of names, they have
a little more to say. According to the causal-homophonist, the quiz show
contestant says something literally false, because she is not in fact using the
name of the Jamaican capital at all, although it sounds like it, but is using
the name of a quite distinct town. They might allow that, in quiz contexts,
what is literally said is less important than a favourable interpretation of what
might have been said, but the homophonist is still committed to the idea that
the contestant literally spoke of Kingston-upon-Thames. Whilst this response
does not get the homophonist the most intuitive result, it does provide an
explanation of why the intuition arises (the traps of homophony), and why the
intuition is incorrect. However, examples can be constructed which highlight
the fact that the homophonist response is unsatisfactory. Consider Sam, who
is told by Sarah, ‘Lucy is upstairs’. Sarah is talking about Lucy Goldstein,
who she believes to be the only person upstairs. In fact, Sarah is wrong: only
Lucy Campbell is upstairs. Sam knows neither Lucy. He goes upstairs, bumps
into Lucy Campbell and says ‘You must be Lucy’, intending to use the name
as Sarah used it. Lucy replies ‘Yes, I am. Nice to meet you’. Does Sam now
know Lucy Campbell’s name? Intuitively, he does: she just agreed that she
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was Lucy, which, under normal introductory circumstances, entails that her
name is ‘Lucy’.10 So Sam knows that Lucy’s name is ‘Lucy’. But according
to the most obvious reading of the causal-homophonist thesis, he does not.11
When he said ‘You must be Lucy’, he uttered Lucy Goldstein’s name, not
Lucy Campbell’s, because his use was tied, via his intention to reproduce
Sarah’s name use, to the causal history of the former Lucy’s name. However,
it is clear that Sam and Lucy’s interaction was in fact perfectly felicitous,
and Sam learnt Lucy’s name. Of course, things would be very different if
Sam had an appointment with Lucy Goldstein, and Sarah sent Sam upstairs
for his appointment. Then, it is clear that Sam is looking for a much more
particular Lucy, and there is a case of mistaken identity between Sam and
Lucy Campbell. As it is, although there is a mistake, it is solely Sarah’s. And
while it is pure chance, arising because of Sarah’s mistake, that Sam got Lucy’s
name right, he did so nevertheless.
Sainsbury (2005) and (2015) both seem to allow that something like the case
just described can arise, but it is unclear whether either can properly account
for it. Sainsbury (2005), does not assume the homophonist individuation
of names, but rather relies on name-using practices, which are brought into
existence, and individuated, by baptisms, such that for each name-using
practice there is a unique baptism (p. 106). Moreover, Sainsbury claims that, as
a practice’s baptism fixes its reference, a practice has its reference essentially
(ibid., p. 113). If a name appears to change its reference, then a new practice
has arisen, which must have been begun by a new baptism, even if that
baptism is inadvertent (p. 111). In Sainsbury (2015), name-using practices
have been replaced by names individuated in the homophonist manner. Like
name-using practices, names are individuated by a unique baptism that brings
them into being,12 but unlike the practices of (2005), the names of (2015) can
change their referent without the occurrence of a new baptism, inadvertent or
otherwise.
Sainsbury (2005) must treat the above case as a failed initiation into the
practice of using ‘Lucy’ to refer to Lucy Goldstein: Sarah tries to initiate Sam
into the practice, but, because his very first attempt at using the name as part
of the practice goes awry, Sam is simply not initiated into the ‘Lucy Goldstein’
practice (ibid., pp. 113–4), although perhaps he is, quite coincidentally, induct-
ed into the practice of using ‘Lucy’ to refer to Lucy Campbell, as a result of
10Though certainly not all circumstances.
11Thanks to Clayton Littlejohn for highlighting this kind of epistemic problem for the
homophonist.
12Note that in neither case must the baptism have an object, empty names being a primary
motivation for Sainsbury’s work on proper names.
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his interaction with her. This explanation is inadequate, however.13 In order
to account for an initiation into a name-using practice taking, or, conversely,
not taking, Sainsbury appeals to a speaker’s speaker reference—the object of
a speaker’s referential intention, discussed further in §3.2.3—coinciding, or
not, with the referent of the name-using practice in question—the semantic
reference. So, when Sam says to Lucy Campbell ‘You must be Lucy’, in order
for him to fail in his use of the practice into which Sarah tried to initiate him,
the object of his referential intention must not be Lucy Goldstein. In fact, it
should presumably be Lucy Campbell, if he is going to come to know her
name as a result. But it is far from clear that Lucy Campbell is the speaker
referent of his utterance of ‘Lucy’. He is asking her whether she is Lucy, and
attempting to use Lucy in the way Sarah did. If Lucy Campbell’s name were
not ‘Lucy’, then she might have said ‘No. I’m not. Lucy just went down the
fire escape.’, or some such, and then it seems unlikely that we would have the
intuition that she was his speaker referent, and it would be clear that Lucy
Goldstein was both the speaker and semantic referent (assuming we allow for
such notions at all).
The notion of speaker reference is also essential to the account of names in
Sainsbury (2015). Sainsbury uses speaker reference to explain the continued
reference of a name to its bearer, and the possibility of a name changing its
reference. Unlike his (2005) account, he allows that a speaker can properly
acquire use of a particular specific name, but be using it to speaker refer to
something other than its bearer, at least for a while. The example he gives
is of a child who has misunderstood their parents’ introduction of the name
‘Whiskers’ for a kitten, and wrongly applies it to a puppy until corrected
(Sainsbury 2015, p. 206). It seems likely that Sainsbury would use this same
idea in the case of Sam and Lucy. Although Sam acquires Lucy Goldstein’s
name from Sarah, upon meeting Lucy Campbell, he speaker refers to her with
the name. However, as just discussed, it is not at all clear that Lucy Campbell
is his speaker referent. Moreover, this would still leave Sam with the wrong
belief.
3.2.3 Speaker Reference
Kripke
The notion of speaker reference, as a distinct phenomenon to semantic
reference, plays a rôle not just in Sainsbury’s accounts of proper name
13Since the explanation is mine rather than Sainsbury’s, the inadequacy is presumably mine.
However, it is hard to see how else Sainsbury would approach the problem using the framework
he lays out in his (2005).
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reference, but in many semantic views of reference, both in order to account
for discrepancies in intuitions about reference from the predictions of theories,
and, as in Sainsbury’s causal accounts, in order to ground semantic reference.
The speaker reference/semantic reference distinction first arises in Kripke
(1977), which is, in part, a response to Donnellan (1966). As already mentioned,
Donnellan argues that definite descriptions can be used to refer to objects,
even if the referent fails to fulfil the relevant description. Kripke’s paper
introduces the distinction between speaker’s reference and semantic reference
in order to account for this alleged phenomenon. The distinction is claimed to
be a special case of Grice’s distinction between speaker meaning and semantic
meaning (Kripke 1977, p. 263).
Kripke claims that referential expressions such as definite descriptions,
proper names, and indexicals have a semantic reference, which is what they
refer to in virtue of their meaning, and determines their truth-conditional
content. Thus, the expression ‘the King of Spain’ can only semantically refer
to a person who is uniquely the King of Spain; the name ‘Felipe VI’ can
semantically refer only to its bearer, which will be determined causally; and
the indexical ‘yesterday’ uttered by me at the time of writing will semantically
refer only to the 16th February, 2016. Kripke claims that the meanings
he appeals to are determined by conventions in a speakers idiolect, which
will usually be closely connected to a common language (ibid., n. 20), and
that the particular convention that determines the semantic reference of a
referring expression is a general intention to refer to a particular object with the
expression (ibid., p. 264). Speaker reference, on the other hand, is determined,
by a speaker’s specific intention to refer to an object on an occasion, together
with a belief that the object is the semantic referent of the term being used.
A speaker can, therefore, speaker refer to an object using an expression not
conventionally used for such a referent so long as she has a specific referential
intention to so refer, and believes it is semantically appropriate. However, in
such a case the semantic reference will not be the speaker referent, and so, in
spite of what the speaker might succeed in communicating about the speaker
referent, the literal truth-value of the utterance will depend upon the semantic
referent.
Sainsbury
Sainsbury appeals to speaker reference in both his (2005) and (2015), but
does not specify what he means by it in either case, so I think it is largely
safe to assume that his conception is similar to Kripke’s: a speaker, in using
a proper name, speaker refers to whatever object they specifically intend to
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refer to using the name (where a referential intention may be a specific sort of
thing). However, we might credit Sainsbury with dropping Kripke’s condition
that a speaker must believe that the object of their referential intention is the
semantic referent of the name they’re using. Such a condition is in tension
with, for example, certain kinds of accidental baptisms. Diverging further
from Kripke, Sainsbury (2015) goes on to define semantic reference as a
conventional matter, supervening on a community’s use of a proper name (or
other expression), that is, on individual members’ speaker reference:
The “semantic reference” of a name, as used in a community, is its conven-
tionalized, stabilized or normalized speaker-reference in the community.
“London” refers to London among many speakers who live in England
(and elsewhere) because it’s a conventional or stabilized or normal fact
about these speakers that they use the specific name “London” (I hope
you know which specific name of the genus “London” I have in mind)
only if they intend thereby to refer to London. The notion of semantic
reference is a theoretical one, and one that needs to be constructed to
suit theoretical purposes. In the present case, we need a conception of
semantic reference that will supervene on use and help explain features of
usage (for example agreement, disagreement, correction). Basing semantic
reference on speaker-reference is the most straightforward, and perhaps
the only, way to achieve this. Speaker-reference can be theoretically
described without any theoretical commitment to semantic reference, so
the supervenience has a reductive character. (ibid., p. 209)
This is in contrast to Kripke, who bases the conventions of semantic reference
on speakers’ general intentions to use a name in a particular way within their
idiolect.
The view that there is a distinction to be drawn between semantic reference
and speaker reference is very much the orthodoxy amongst philosophers
of language working on reference. With regard to proper names, it is
fairly essential to any semantic view of reference because such views are
characterized by their insistence that proper name reference is determined by
(or constitutes) the semantics of the name: it is the semantic reference being
determined. Any apparent deviation from the semantic reference must be
accounted for by the notion of speaker reference, and, indeed, in the case of the
causal theory of Sainsbury and others, a notion of reference prior to semantic
reference is posited to ground the causal chains of semantic reference.
Speaker Reference and Communication
Speaker reference, and its distinction from semantic reference, are relevant
to the argument from communication against causal-homophonism because
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speaker reference is often appealed to in cases in which a proper name is used
to communicate about an object that is not its bearer, and thus, according
to homophonism, is not its semantic referent. I have two main objections to
the use of speaker reference by homophonists. The first is that examples are
available in which a name is used, but the object communicated about—and
what might intuitively be thought of as the referent of the use of a name—is
neither what a homophonist would consider to be the semantic referent, nor
the speaker referent, if we consider that to be just the object of the speaker’s
referential intentions. The second objection is that the homophonists’ use of
the speaker reference/semantic reference distinction provides a picture of
reference that is overly complicated since it posits an unnecessary ambiguity
in the notion of reference: If one notion of reference were able to account for
everything we might want to say about reference, the distinction would be
redundant.
My first objection is that there are cases of apparent reference which are
explained by neither speaker nor semantic reference, and fall into neither cate-
gory. Consider the following example: David Cameron has been attacked by
a vengeful citizen, and is critically injured. In the newsroom of a broadcaster,
political correspondents and journalists await further news. A man runs in
and shouts ‘Cameron’s dead! Cameron’s dead!’. Naturally, those present take
the speaker to be telling them that David Cameron, Prime Minister of the UK,
has succumbed to his injuries, and, given the context, it seems very natural
to claim that the speaker communicated that to his audience, and referred
to David Cameron. However, suppose that the speaker, oblivious to the
developing political situation, was actually trying to convey information about
American actor Cameron Diaz, of whom he is a big fan. We can certainly agree
that the speaker was trying to refer and communicate about Diaz. But, because
his audience was primed to hear news of David Cameron, and, furthermore,
they expected the name ‘Cameron’ to be used to refer to him, it is implausible
that the speaker did refer to or communicate about Diaz: given the context in
which he spoke, he did not have good reason to use the name he did without
elaboration, and the name he used did not provide his audience with good
reason for taking him to be talking about Cameron Diaz.14 However, the
14It is worth noting that the locution ‘was referring to’, employing the imperfective aspect, can
be used to report what a speaker meant to refer to, even if the speaker is at fault in causing a
misunderstanding. However, it is not clear that this imperfective locution entails success: Just as
‘I was running home’ does not entail ‘I ran home’, ‘She was referring to Lucy’ might not entail
‘She referred to Lucy’. It might not even entail partaking in an activity that might lead to success.
Particularly in first-person reporting (‘I was referring to’), such locutions may simply be reports
of a speaker’s intentions, or what they believed they intended, even if they were not in a position
to fulfil those intentions or supposed intentions. This point is raised by Travis (1980, p. 142; 1981a,
p. 16). The same point seems to hold for the locution ‘was talking about’.
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causal-homophonist has nothing to say about the speaker’s relationship to
David Cameron, except that his audience wrongly took him to be referring
to him, and this places the mistake on the audience and not the speaker.
Cameron Diaz is both the semantic and speaker referent of the speaker’s
utterance of ‘Cameron’ because he was using her name ‘Cameron’, causally
linked to her baptism, and he intended to refer to her.
My second objection questions the need for positing a notion of semantic
reference in addition to a notion of reference supposed to explain what
happens in communication. As already discussed, Sainsbury (2015) maintains
that semantic reference supervenes on speaker reference, and invokes speaker
reference in explaining how names maintain or change their bearers and
therefore (semantic) reference. Without speakers speaker referring with their
uses of names, therefore, there would be no semantic reference: there would
be no specific names with their referential semantic content. But if it is
accepted that people can use names referentially, without those names being
connected to their referents in virtue of their semantics, and, in doing so, at
least sometimes communicate successfully (presumably when their intentions
are perspicuous), then it is not obvious what rôle semantic reference fulfils,
since it certainly does not provide correct truth-conditions in all cases. It
is my view that the perceived need for proper names (and other referring
expressions) to have a reference in virtue of their semantics, particularly a
reference tout court, as homophonists contend, is symptomatic of the view
that sentences (rather than utterances) (perhaps together with a formally
represented context to allow for indexicals and tense) have a literal meaning
that is truth-conditional, and thus are literally true or false simpliciter.
Such a view is particularly apparent in Kripke (1977).15 Kripke reveals his
rather conservative conception of semantics and pragmatics in a dismissal
of Donnellan’s apparent suggestion that the use of language is not merely
epiphenomenal:
It is not “uses”, in some pragmatic sense, but senses of a sentence which
can be analyzed. If the sentence in not (syntactically or) semantically
ambiguous, it has only one analysis; to say that it has two distinct analyses
is to attribute a syntactic or semantic ambiguity to it. (ibid., p. 262)
Whilst Kripke does not deny that speakers can use their words to do things
that are not mandated by their semantics, he maintains that this is a pragmatic
issue that must be accounted for separately. Kripke chastises Donnellan
for positing unnecessary semantic ambiguities (ibid., p. 268), but does not
consider that he is himself positing an ambiguity around reference that would
15Which is, admittedly, nearly forty years old.
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not be required if all reference were accounted for at the pragmatic level (as it
will be in chapter 6).
Travis (1981a) argues that there is a genuine natural language phenomenon
of reference, which he calls reference simpliciter, but that neither speaker
reference, nor semantic reference, capture it adequately. Reference simpliciter
is the kind of phenomenon I introduced in §2.1, and discussed in §2.4: it
is supposed to accord with judgements about what an utterance is about,
and what its truth turns on, in virtue of particular uses of proper names,
both of which are connected to what is recognizable, given the use of the
name, in the particular circumstances of utterance. Both Kripke and Sainsbury
seem to assume that semantic reference is the kind of thing that is required
to capture intuitions about reference in natural language, but they realize
that it is not enough on its own. Neither considers the possibility that they
could do away with semantic reference entirely. Whilst something like the
pragmatic phenomenon of speaker reference that Kripke describes, and to
which Sainsbury presumably defers, might get closer to reference simpliciter,
because of its reliance on speaker intentions, it clearly will not account for
instances such as the ‘Cameron’s dead!’ case. I present a more detailed
critique of intention-based accounts of reference in chapter 5.
3.3 The Argument from Family Names
The homophonist view is usually stated in terms of ‘shared’ first names,
or full names, but less attention has been paid to family names.16 Whilst
it may not be totally absurd to think that two Lucys have distinct names
‘Lucy’, and two Lucy Goldsteins have distinct names ‘Lucy Goldstein’, it is
much less plausible that a grandmother and granddaughter have distinct
family names ‘Goldstein’, since the whole point of family names seems to
be that they are shared between members of the same family. Sainsbury
(2015) offers a brief discussion of family names (p. 197, particularly n. 2). He
claims that family names name families in the same way that the names of
individual people name individuals, i.e., one (specific) name refers to each
family, and, if there are multiple families apparently named ‘Smith’, there
are multiple, homophonous (specific) names ‘Smith’. So, while members
of individual families all share a family name that forms part of their own
unique individual name, this is not the case between members of distinct
homophonously-named families.
16Many different customs and practices exist with regard to family names. In this section I will
consider only how family names are generally used in Western, English-speaking communities,
though it may apply more broadly.
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3.3.1 Which Family?
Sainsbury’s view of family names presents an immediate problem if he wishes
to account for their use to refer to nuclear families, or other limited family
groups. Families are not discrete entities in the way that people are. Families
are, on the blood-linear understanding of family that goes hand-in-hand with
the sharing of patriarchal family names, iterative.17 This is because the relation
of ‘belonging to the same family’ seems to minimally apply symmetrically
to parents and their children, and to be transitive. The problem, then, is this:
according to Sainsbury, family names refer to families. He doesn’t specify
what he takes a family to be, but it is clear that ‘The Goldsteins’ can refer to a
nuclear family, that is, just one or two generations who are directly related.
Sainsbury claims that each name ‘Goldstein’ will refer to just one family
(at a time), just as the names of individuals do. If more than one family
appears to be named ‘Goldstein’, there is more than one homophonous name.
However, families cannot be neatly individuated into nuclear families. Nuclear
families overlap. If two parents and two children are one nuclear family
named ‘Goldstein’, then one of those parents together with their siblings and
parents are also a distinct nuclear family named ‘Goldstein’. And it cannot
be that those families bear distinct homophonic names, because both families
considered together are also a family named ‘Goldstein’, and the younger
nuclear family are only called ‘Goldstein’ because they are a part of a larger
family stretching back many generations, all of which is called ‘Goldstein’,
and every individual member of which is a Goldstein.
The point of homophonism is to simplify the name/reference relation such
that each name can only refer to one object. But it seems that in the case of
families, one name can be used to refer to a whole host of differently-composed
families, some of which overlap, and some of which do not. Consider two
nuclear families living near each other, each of which contains one of two
siblings whose family name is ‘Yu’. Both families are referred to in the area
as ‘The Yus’ when the context doesn’t require further disambiguation, and,
according to Sainsbury’s view that family names refer to families, a bare name
‘Yu’ refers to each family, regardless of any rôle the definite article might
play. This is a natural case for homophonists to explain using their account
of causal name individuation. And yet it is clear that the families are both
called ‘Yu’ because they contain members of a larger family called ‘Yu’, and
there are times when ‘Yu’ can be used to refer to both families together, and
their common near-ancestors. If the homophonist were to account for every
17And, of course, this is probably a very bad way of thinking of families, for all sorts of
reasons. Not least that, in many contemporary societies, members of families increasingly do not
share names with one another, and are not formed along patriarchal bloodlines.
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different referential use by positing a distinct name, we would be dealing with
an implausible proliferation of explanatorily-connected homophonic names.
A potential response to this problem for the homophonist view18 is
observing that families are vague entities, and so this kind of extensional
variation is to be expected. That an object has vague identity conditions is not
a problem for reference. Places (and indeed people) are often such that their
names can refer to lesser or greater geographical (spatial) areas on different
occasions: ‘Los Angeles’ can refer to just the City of Los Angeles, or to the
County of Los Angeles, or to the metropolitan area, and to gradations more
or less of each at their boundaries. ‘Mark Sainsbury’ can refer to different
physical quantities of the same man, withstanding loss of hair, or even limbs,
and the gain of hair or weight. But the problem for families is not simply
that their constitution is vague. Vagueness for a property or term is generally
thought of as a phenomenon whereby there are points which definitely count
as falling within the extension, and points which definitely don’t count, and
the points in between are less clear, such that any particular, determinate
boundary would be arbitrary. For example, in a classic sorites case, whilst
n grains is definitely a heap, and n− 1000 grains definitely isn’t, there is no
stage at which the removal of a single grain can definitely be said to change
the heap into a non-heap, such that a boundary may be drawn. But this is not
the case for families as we are thinking of them.19
Consider a family tree. Suppose one man at the top is definitely a member
of the Goldstein family. His son is definitely a member of that family, because
of the way family related-ness was defined. But for the same reason, the son’s
son is also definitely a member. This continues, such that a Goldstein at the
bottom of the tree, directly descended (down the male line), is also definitely
a member of the same Goldstein family. But, unlike in a sorites sequence, we
have not reached a false conclusion. It is perfectly plausible that these relatives
are all members of the same family. The whole lot of Goldsteins is legitimately
a single family called ‘Goldstein’, but so, as mentioned, are many smaller
groupings of those people, which need not all even overlap with each other.
The problem is not simply that there’s no non-arbitrary place to draw a line
which limits a family, it is that there is nowhere along a patri-linear family tree
at which a person cannot legitimately be counted as a member of the family,
and that many smaller groupings along the tree also legitimately count as
families. This is not an issue of vagueness in the way that the case of drawing
the boundary of, for example, the green part of a colour line is, because, in
18Suggested to me by Mark Sainsbury.
19Although, of course, relatedness, and being in the same family, generally are vague in this
way.
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that case, you eventually stray into definitively not-green. Sainsbury, then,
must say more either about what kind of family each family name refers to,
without invoking arbitrary or ad hoc divisions between families, or he must
specify how and why one name can refer to differently-composed families in
different contexts, perhaps by specifying the nature of the vagueness at play.
3.3.2 Which Individual?
Family names present a further problem for homophonists. If not as they refer
to families, then as they are used to refer to individuals who bear the family
names. It is very common in a whole host of domains to refer to people by just
their family name, for example, using just ‘Frege’ to refer to the philosopher
and mathematician Gottlob Frege. In such cases it seems implausible to claim
that a specific name unique to the referent is being uttered, since family names
are shared by members of the same family. Indeed, Sainsbury is explicit
that the full names of individuals contain names referring to their family:
‘John Smith’s name is a combination of his given specific name “John” and
the specific name of his family, “Smith”’ (Sainsbury 2015, p. 197, n. 2). He
also suggests that the family name contained in an individual’s name is not
granted to the individual by baptism: he says of George (H.W.) Bush that his
‘dubbing involved just “George”. The family name “Bush” was applicable
merely in virtue of his parents having that name, not in virtue of a dubbing’
(p. 197).20 Thus Sainsbury, and homophonists generally, cannot obviously
explain how ‘Frege’ can refer to Gottlob Frege and not to his mother, Auguste
Frege.21
Family Names as Abbreviations
One solution would be to claim, apparently contra Sainsbury, that whenever
one uses just a family name to refer to an individual, one is, in some sense,
using an abbreviation of their full name, so the name has the semantic value
of the person’s full name. Clearly, a speaker need not be aware of the full
name of every person they refer to using a family name, particularly given
that the position presumably entails that the unabbreviated version of a name
contains middle-names (etc.) as well as first names, so even ‘Lucy Goldstein’
20Whilst it is plausibly true of Bush that he has the family name he does just because it was
his parents’ family name, the point no longer generalizes throughout the English-speaking world.
In the UK, when a birth is registered, the child may be given any family name the parent or
parents wish. So, even if a child receives the family name of one of its parents, and even if the
parents do not deliberate about this, there is a definite sense in which both a child’s first names
and its family name must be decided upon, and the child is thus dubbed with the whole name.
21This point is raised by Travis (1981a), who makes the point regarding Frege and his uncle
Dieter.
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is an abbreviation if the bearer’s full name is ‘Lucy Susan Levy Goldstein’.
Note with respect to this that Frege’s full name was ‘Friedrich Ludwig Gottlob
Frege’. This need not be a problem, however: one generally does not need to
know what a word is an abbreviation of—or even that it is an abbreviation—
in order to use it meaningfully. For example, many English speakers are, I
imagine, unaware that the word ‘Gestapo’ is (or was) an acronym for ‘Geheime
Staats-Polizei’, or that ‘Haribo’ is an acronym for ‘Hans Riegel, Bonn’. But
that does not prevent them from using these words to refer to the Nazi secret
police, and the German confectionary company, respectively. However, in
the case of these names, there are not multiple, different long-form names,
all of which have the same acronym, i.e. ‘Haribo’ isn’t also an acronym for
‘Hannah Riegel, Bonn’.22 Something must determine that one utterance of
‘Frege’ is an abbreviation of ‘Friedrich Ludwig Gottlob Frege’, but another is
an abbreviation of ‘Auguste Wilhelmine Sophie Frege’, when the speaker is
unaware of either abbreviation.
I will consider two possible answers to the question of what might
determine which full name ‘Frege’ abbreviates on a use. One view would be
that the use of ‘Frege’ is causally connected to the full name of one family
member, and it is that full name that it is an abbreviation of. This is clearly
an overly complicated picture. The homophonist already thinks that the full
name is causally related to its referent (or to a baptismal event)—this is what
determines its reference—and it is hard to see why any causal chain relating
the abbreviation to the full name would not essentially be an extension of
the referential chain. Thus, we can simply say that a particular use of ‘Frege’
refers to Gottlob rather than Auguste in virtue of its causal connection to him
(or to other uses of his name, or an abbreviation of it, to refer to him). At this
point, there are two more possible routes to take: one is to maintain that there
is one family name ‘Frege’, shared by Gottlob and Auguste; and the other
is to claim that in fact, there are two distinct individual names ‘Frege’ that
abbreviate the two full names of Gottlob and Auguste.
On the first route, that there is one family name ‘Frege’, we now have a
causal chain picture of reference without homophony. The very same name
can refer to different individuals (though only within one family so far) in
virtue of a causal connection, but only on an occasion of use—the family name
cannot refer to an individual person tout court. So, within a homophonist
22Of course, many acronyms, initialisms, and other abbreviations do abbreviate more than
one expression (or, perhaps, there are many homonymous abbreviations), but these generally
differ from family names in that they are not related to each other: it is by chance that ‘am’ can
mean both ‘ante meridiem’ and ‘amplitude modulation’, but it is not by chance that ‘Frege’ can
refer both to Gottlob and his mother. Nor is it by chance that ‘Sellars’ can refer to both Wilfrid
Sellars, and the unrelated Peter Sellars.
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picture, we’ve found a way of referring quite properly with a single name to
multiple objects, within a restricted domain. But, if that were accepted,
it seems that there would be little reason to maintain the homophonist
individuation of names at all. Why should multiple referents of one name
‘Frege’ via causal connection be sanctioned, but not multiple referents of one
name ‘Friedrich Ludwig Gottlob Frege’ by the same mechanism? I suggest
that there would be no good reason to block such a move, and we are left with
a position upon which proper name reference occurs only on an occasion of
utterance, and, on each occasion of utterance, the reference is determined by
a causal connection of the utterance to the referent, or a baptism of the object.
Something like this is the indexicalist view of Pelczar and Rainsbury (1998).
So this approach to family names appears to undermine homophonism, if not
the causal picture of reference.
Multiple Specific Family Names
The second route, that there are two distinct individual names ‘Frege’, looks
more likely to preserve homophonism, and seems likely to be the most
coherent option for the homophonist. However, it requires us to abandon
the view that the members of a family share a family name. On this route,
since ‘Friedrich Ludwig Gottlob Frege’ is a specific name unique to Gottlob
Frege, the abbreviation ‘Frege’ that refers to him is also unique to him, and
is effectively just another specific name (in virtue of being an abbreviation
of a specific name). Thus, any use of the name ‘Frege’ just is part of the
causal chain linking its long-form version to Gottlob. However, there is
no particular connection between Gottlob’s specific name ‘Frege’, Augusta’s
specific name ‘Frege’, and the specific family name ‘Frege’, other than that
they are ‘instantiations’ of the same generic name. Moreover, it is not clear
what the relation of the individuals is to the specific family name. Certainly,
Gottlob and Auguste both belong to the Frege family, which bears that specific
name, but they do not bear it; it does not form part of their full names,
although it could be that they were given their specific names ‘Frege’ because
they instantiate the same generic name as their specific family name.
This route has the problem that it seems that one can refer to an individual
using just their family name—or, according to the view in hand, a name
that is distinct from, yet homophonous with, their family name—without
ever having been connected to the causal chain associated with (or forming)
their specific name. For example, suppose a speaker, Frau Großbart, sees
a young Gottlob Frege with his mother. Frau Großbart knows Auguste’s
name, but not Gottlob’s. She could say something like ‘Ah! Young Herr Frege
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is out for a walk with his mother’, and successfully refer to Gottlob, even
though she inferred his name from his mother’s specific name (or perhaps
from the family’s specific name, itself inferred from Auguste’s) and has never
been inducted into the causal chain of ‘Friedrich Ludwig Gottlob Frege’.23 A
response that the causal-homophonist may be tempted to make is to claim
that Frau Großbart was in fact able to tap into the correct causal chain, simply
by brute force. Even though she was not explicitly inducted into the chain,
in virtue of knowing that it was very likely that a child’s family name would
instantiate the same generic family name as its mother’s (perhaps more than
likely in nineteenth-century Mecklenburg-Schwerin), she was able to infer
what the child’s specific family name would be, and thus she was able to use
that with the intention of using it in the same way as previous speakers.
This response to the problem of causally unconnected uses of a specific
name is not especially convincing. The point seems to rely upon the idea that
Frau Großbart is inferring that there is a specific name ‘Frege’, which is an
abbreviation of a longer specific name, and with which she was previously
unfamiliar, and then, crucially, she intends to use that name as her community
does. Sainsbury is clear that such an intention is key to the acquisition of a
specific name (2015, pp. 205–6).24 Both parts of this idea seem implausible as
a description of the speaker’s actual psychology. Whilst the homophonist may
be able to argue that Frau Großbart’s assumption that Auguste and Gottlob
share a family name is in fact an inference about different specific names, it
does not seem plausible that her—presumably object-oriented—intention to
use that family name to refer to Gottlob can be reinterpreted as an intention
to use a specific name in the way that it has been previously used.
Problems for the idea that each person’s family name is a distinct specific
name unique to them also arise from conjunctive referential uses of joint
family names such as ‘Lucy and Michaela Goldstein’. According to the view
23Evans (1973) raises essentially the same problem for the causal theory of reference more
generally, with his example of Wagera Indians and their alleged practice of naming children after
relatives in a systematic manner, according to the order of their birth (p. 195). Evans suggests that
Kripke, whose presentation of the causal theory (or picture) he is criticizing, will respond that the
‘denotation of a name in a community is [. . . ] to be found by tracing a causal chain of reference
preserving links back to some item’ (ibid., p. 195), even though ‘a knowledgeable speaker may
excogitate a name and use it to denote some item which bears it without any causal connexion
whatever with the use by others of that name’. This response, which does not presuppose the
homophonist individuation of names, looks like it will entail a very much reduced version of the
causal picture than that suggested by the homophonist. If participation in causal chains is not
the only means by which a speaker can refer using a name, and it may not even be the primary
means, then the causal theorist is making a rather meagre claim about one means of referring. It
is also not clear what could be forming the causal chain of uses of a name if most of the uses
are not causally connected to one another. Evans’s response also does not address the issue for
the homophonist that a speaker presumably needs to be using the specific name of the intended
referent in order to refer to them, it will not do to use their mother’s specific name.
24As he is for the earlier incarnation of that process, initiation into a name-using practice (2005,
pp. 113–6).
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in hand, ‘Goldstein’ can be any one of three (relevant) distinct specific names
(or an abbreviation of them), but it can’t be more than one at once, because
the semantic value of each is just its referent, i.e. Lucy, Michaela, or the
Family Goldstein. In order to account for these kind of constructions, and,
indeed, as we have seen, the use of family names generally, the homophonist
must complicate their account of proper name reference significantly, adding
new levels of name-type and offering ad hoc explanations. For instance, to
account for ‘Lucy and Michaela Goldstein’-type cases, homophonists might
say that ‘Goldstein’, as it appears in the phrase, is just part of the name
‘Michaela Goldstein’, which appears in long(ish)-form, and ‘Lucy’ appears
as an abbreviation of ‘Lucy Goldstein’, the ‘Goldstein’ part of her name not
appearing. However, this would fail to capture the apparent meaning of such
expressions. There is a strong impression that ‘Goldstein’ is functioning to
complete both names, and is able to do so because it is Lucy and Michaela’s
shared family name. Alternatively, the homophonist might claim that there
is some kind of ellipsis at work. However, it is very unclear how this would
work. The phrase would presumably be elliptical for ‘Lucy Goldstein and
Michaela Goldstein’, but since the second ‘Goldstein’ is just part of the longer
specific name ‘Michaela Goldstein’, whose semantic contribution is just its
referent, it’s unclear how it could license the elision of part of the name
‘Lucy Goldstein’. The semantic contribution of that name is just its referent,
and, there is no semantic connection whatsoever between the two names.
The elision (or appearance of it) might be explained as a form of zeugma or
semantic syllepsis,25 but it bears few, if any, of the characteristic marks of
these figures of speech. Moreover, any claim that there is ellipsis or syllepsis at
play would also fail to explain why ‘John and John Smith’ would not be used
to refer to two unrelated John Smiths. This is because, if the specific names
which exemplify or instantiate the generic name ‘Goldstein’ in both Lucy and
Michaela’s names are distinct, and the specific name referring to their family
is also distinct, there is nothing in their semantics or meta-semantics that
connects their names to the exclusion of the names of members of any other
family called ‘Goldstein’—all merely have specific names that instantiate the
same generic name.
A third approach, that goes someway towards responding to the problems
of the first two, is to claim that there is some kind of pragmatic rule that
indicates how to form conjunctive names of relatives who have homophonic
family names in virtue of being related. The rule might state that one can put
25As employed by Flanders and Swann in the song ‘Madeira, M’Dear’: “as he hastened to put
out the cat, the wine, his cigar, and the lamps”; “she made no reply, up her mind, and a dash for
the door”.
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together the names of the two individuals and delete the first individual’s
family name to create a plural name for both individuals that does not bear a
rigorous semantic analysis of its component parts. Whilst such an explanation
addresses the problem, it is ad hoc, side-stepping the issue of what the semantic
status is of the occurrence of ‘Goldstein’ in the construction. However, the
analysis effectively provides an additional way that family names can function
to the already complicated list comprising an over-arching generic name; a
specific name for each family; a specific name for every member of every
family bearing the name; and, potentially, both a generic version of just the
family-referring names to explain the connection between those specific names,
and one for the specific names of each particular family. As we have seen
throughout the discussion of causal-homophonism, accommodation of very
ordinary quirks in the use and implementation of proper names requires
severe complications of the homophonist account of reference.
Contextual Determination of Family Name Reference
A second possible answer to the question of what might determine what
full name a family name abbreviates, when used to refer to an individual,
is context. This view would amount to something like the following: The
specific family name ‘Frege’, when used bare, can abbreviate the names of
any of several members of the family who bears it, and which of those family
member’s names it abbreviates depends on the context in which it is used.
For example, if we are in a philosophy seminar on logicism, ‘Frege’ will
probably abbreviate and thereby refer to Gottlob, but if, in 1870, we were in
the school led by Auguste Frege, ‘Frege’ might well refer to her. This view is
very odd. This does not sound like the way a homophonist should conceive
of abbreviations. It also seems very likely to collapse into a slightly less odd
view, and one suggested to me by Mark Sainsbury:26 Bare ‘Frege’, as used to
refer to an individual, is not an abbreviation of that individual’s full name, but
rather, has its reference determined contextually from amongst the members
of the Frege family.
On this view, again, it is clear that ‘Frege’ does not refer to any individual
Frege tout court. This might be thought of as some kind of deferred reference
or metonymy (cf. Nunberg 1993). However, the use of family names to refer to
individuals seems different to other examples of metonymy, since, although
Sainsbury maintains that family names refer to families, generally in English
we cannot use bare family names to refer to a family, but rather, have to
form definite article phrases in which the family name appears to occur
26The suggestion was made somewhat ‘on-the-fly’, and should not be taken as reflective of
Sainsbury’s considered view.
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predicatively: ‘The Freges’, ‘The Frege Family’, or even ‘The Family Frege’.
Bare uses of family names are assumed to refer to individuals whose full
names contain the family name: ‘Frege’ can refer to Gottlob or Auguste, but
not, as it stands, their family. This seems to put pressure on this phenomenon
being an example of deferred reference or metonymy, since those are assumed
to rely on a term which could refer to one object referring to another in virtue
of some relation holding between the objects.
If Sainsbury’s micro-contextualist picture is not an example of deferred
reference, then we just have the idea that a family name picks out a family,
and when used bare, is contextually determined to refer to one member of
that family. So, once again, it appears that we’re forced into a kind of localized
use-theoretic contextualism, for family names only. But if we have this picture
for family names, nothing is to stop us, in principle, from adopting the same
kind of view of first names: when I use ‘John’ referentially, my reference is
selected from amongst all Johns by the same kind of contextual factors that
selected from amongst the Freges. And if we are granted this for first names,
the whole idea of the homophonist individuation of names, and even the
causal theory of reference, gives way to a contextualist, particularist account
of proper name reference. A further problem for the position arises from the
fact, mentioned above, that the family name ‘Frege’ either refers to a vast
swathe of distantly related Freges, or there is some contextual restriction, such
that a particular use can refer just to a subset of that swathe. If it’s the former,
then the contextual mechanisms that allow bare ‘Frege’ to pick out Gottlob are
doing a very large amount of work. If it’s the latter, then context is entering
the picture twice: once to restrict the particular (e.g.) nuclear Frege family,
and then to pick an individual from amongst them. In either case, it looks like
the causal picture of reference is doing very little work in getting us to the
individual referent of ‘Frege’.
3.4 The Argument from Pluralism about Reference
Determination: Conclusion
In §§3.2 & 3.3 I have offered arguments to the effect that causal-homophonism,
as an account of proper name reference determination, is too inflexible to
capture the vagaries of proper names use. The account must make a variety
of implausible or overly-complicated modifications to the original picture in
order to accommodate these vagaries, perhaps the most striking of which is
the homophonist individuation of names, criticized at length in §3.1. As
I discussed at the beginning of §3.2.1, the causal picture of reference is
well suited to accounting for deferential mouthpiece or parasitic cases, but,
94
3.4. The Argument from Pluralism about Reference Determination:
Conclusion
although it may be true that most referential uses of a name refer to a bearer
of that name, and most users will have learnt the name from another user,
many uses do not fit neatly into the deferential model. Rami (2016) makes
the point that, according to the causal pictures of Kripke (1981) and Sainsbury
(2005), with each utterance of a name, a speaker intends to use the name to
refer to whatever the name refers to (even if, after an initial induction into a
name-using practice, a speaker no longer remembers the specific use that their
first use was parasitic upon), but in many cases this is implausible. When a
speaker is introduced to a person and says ‘Hello, Dave’, they presumably
intend just to refer to the person. Similarly if a speaker knows the referent of
a name very well: When I talk about London, referring to the capital of the
UK, where I’ve lived for ten years, I intend to refer to the city,27 and have no
(de dicto) intention to refer to whatever is the bearer of the name.
I also observed, in §3.2.2, several types of case in which it appears that
context trumps a causal connection in fixing the reference of a use of a name,
most notably either because there is insufficient information for the parasitic
take up of a name, so no communication, or the wrong communication takes
place, or because a mistake has been made with regard to causal chains, but
the context is sufficient to rectify it. In such cases, it seems that the causal-
homophonist is likely to claim that the causal chain tying the particular specific
name used to the baptism of its referent is still playing a rôle, and that the
name still refers, in some manner, to its bearer, regardless of context, or what
is communicated. In response to this claim, I ask: why, in the face of a whole
variety of different ways and situations in which names appear to be used,
insist that only one mechanism is at play in determining reference proper?
I recognize, of course, that in many, if not most, cases, we use the name we
do in a particular situation because the thing we want to refer to bears that
name. Naming practices, which do seem to proliferate in part by being passed
from speaker to speaker, are very important to the way we use names, and
seem to be primarily what separate proper names from referring terms like
pronouns and demonstratives. But homophonists do not make it clear why
such practices should be the only factor in determining reference, particularly
when, in order to account for shared names—an apparently ubiquitous and
universal phenomenon—they have to posit a homophonist individuation of
names, which I criticized at length in §3.1. Moreover, inserting name-using
practices, and naming events into an account of reference determination
threatens the universality of an account of proper name reference by tying it
contingent and messy social conventions.
Rami (2016) argues for a pluralist conception of the determination of the
27Though, of course, I do not think my intention is relevant to my reference.
95
3.4. The Argument from Pluralism about Reference Determination:
Conclusion
name-bearer relation, and thus, according to him, of the determination of
proper name reference. He claims that causal theories of reference, such as
those of Sainsbury (2005, 2015), make too great an idealization about proper
name use when they put baptisms at the heart of their theories. Although
Sainsbury (2005) acknowledges that a name-using practice can appear to
emerge and develop over time, such as in the case of unintentional nickname
giving (p. 111) in which an initial use of a common noun to describe someone
initiates a practice of using that term as a proper name, he claims that the
initial use (or the initial referential use) counts as a baptism. He maintains
that whether or not a novel referential use of a term counts as a baptism will
depend on whether or not the use initiates a genuine name-using practice.
But Rami observes that it is implausible to claim that such practices come
into being with a single use in this way. He claims that it is much more
plausible to see these kinds of practice as emerging over time, as multiple
speakers use them. Moreover, Rami claims that this is how most name-using
practices in fact begin, rather than with the paradigmatic baptismal speech
act of ‘I hereby name this NN’, and that even such an act would fail to attach
a name to an object, even if all the conditions were apt (the speaker had the
relevant authority, etc.), if a practice of using the name for the object were not
established.28 Although I think that Rami’s pluralism does not go far enough
in abandoning the speaker reference/semantic reference distinction (referred
to by Rami as pragmatically- and semantically-licensed reference), I think he
is exactly right in observing the importance of not trying to make the many
different ways in which names are used fit into a single, idealized model. It
is similarly important, however, not to simply adapt one’s model by trying
to fit in a disjunction of the many different social factors relevant to naming
and name use. I will discuss the problems of this type of approach, typical of
indexical accounts of proper name reference, in the next chapter.
28Rami weakens his position somewhat by apparently claiming that legal acts of naming
(presumably whatever process is involved in granting a name such that it’s recognized by the
state) are made by paradigmatic baptismal speech acts. At least in the UK, and I imagine in other
European countries, parents decide to give their child a particular name through a process of
deliberation, and using sentences such as ‘Let’s call her Mary’, which Rami explicitly denies is an
act of naming, and when they’ve decided, that name becomes the child’s legal name by being
written on a birth certificate.
96
Chapter 4
Indexicalism
‘No physical theory of local hidden variables can ever
reproduce all the predictions of quantum mechanics’
Bell’s Theorem
Indexicalism is a family of views about the semantics of proper namesthat suggest that names are, in some respects, similar to indexicals suchas ‘I’, ‘you’, ‘here’, and ‘today’ that can only refer upon occasions of
use, since their reference is sensitive to aspects of the context of use. Some
indexicalist views propose that names are in fact a sub-class of indexicals, as
a syntactic-semantic category, whilst others simply suggest that names have
certain key features in common with indexicals.
As I use the term, I consider indexical views to make at least the following
claims about names:
(i) Names refer only upon an occasion of utterance;
(ii) The reference of (a use of) a name depends on the context of use;
(iii) The semantics of a name contains an appeal to context or to non-linguistic
factors as norms of their use or reference.
Claims (i) and (ii) separate indexicalism from causal-homophonism, which
maintains that names are context-insensitive, and refer tout court: whether
they are being used or not. Since indexicalism regards names as context-
sensitive expressions, it is, in my view, to be greatly preferred to homophonism.
However, most indexicalist accounts of names still aim at providing a semantic
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view of reference. This is recognized by claim (iii), which maintains that the
way in which context is involved in the use of names is governed, at least in
some minimal way, by their semantics. As it stands, this claim is very weak,
primarily in order to include the heterodox, but self-avowedly indexicalist,
account of Rami (2014), discussed in §4.1.3. Most other indexicalist views
could be captured with a stronger alternative to claim (iii):
(iii*) The semantics of a name specifies that some aspect(s) of context or non-
linguistic factor(s) determine(s) the reference of (a use of) the name.
(iii*) makes names look much more like traditional conceptions of indexicals,
whereby the way that context affects their reference is specified by their
semantics. It may still be that the exact details of how context is involved
are under-specified by the semantics, as we will see in §§4.1.1 & 4.1.2, but
nevertheless, indexicalist accounts, especially those embracing (iii*) have in
common that they are attempting to provide truth-conditions for proper
names, or attempting to show how they could, in principle, be provided.
The manner in which indexicalist views of proper names go about ex-
pressing their particular picture of the relation between names and context
varies. Some indexicalists, such as Cohen (1980), do not attempt to provide
an explicit or formal account of the semantics of names, merely discussing
some contextual factors that they claim are relevant to reference determination.
Such accounts may not make any connection between indexicals and names,
but still fall into the category of indexicalism according to my broad definition.
Other indexicalists, such as those I will discuss in detail below, are much
more explicit about what the semantics of names looks like, often providing a
formal or semi-formal interpretation. Such interpretations frequently involve
specifying two semantic levels within the meaning of a name. Recanati (1993)
does this by stating that names have, as part of their meaning, a specification
that they just contribute their reference to the truth-conditions of an utterance
containing them, and they also have a mode of presentation of that reference,
which specifies how the reference is determined.
Pelczar and Rainsbury (1998) and Rami (2014) both avail themselves of a
two-level semantics provided by a Kaplanian-style logical framework, as is
frequently applied to the analysis of other indexicals (Kaplan 1989a,b). This
framework distinguishes between the character and the content of a word. The
content provides the extension or reference of the word (relative to a world
and time of evaluation), and the character determines the content, relative to
specific aspects of the context. Character is usually represented or modelled
as a function from context (which is represented as a tuple of contextual
parameters such as speaker, time, world of context, place, and, potentially,
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any other aspects of context deemed to be relevant to the determination of the
content of a particular expression), and content is represented or modelled as
a function from world and time of evaluation to an extension. In the simplest
cases, in which the world and time of evaluation do not alter the extension of
a term, as is the case for names, given the standard analysis of their rigidity,
or in which the world of evaluation is the same as the world of context, the
content of a word effectively just is its extension, and its character is just a
function from context to extension, that is, a specification of the—potentially
context-sensitive—truth-conditions of the term.
As mentioned in the introduction to part II, there is a parallel between the
homophonist and indexicalist approaches to proper names, and two approach-
es to the meaning of predicates and other general terms and expressions that
are discussed in relation to the work of Travis in §2.3.1. The first approach—
the parallel of homophonism—involves treating the meaning of expressions
as contents or extensions, which Travis argues against by showing that the
meaning of an expression can be held constant whilst the truth-evaluation
varies, indicating a variation in extension. The second approach, parallel to
indexicalism, involves treating the meanings of expression as character-like,
specifying particular contextual parameters that effect the extension of the
expression in a determinate and systematic way. The Travisian response to this
approach, as discussed in Davies (2014) and §2.3.1, is to demonstrate that any
proposed character for a term is either too general, and so does not specify a
particular way that the context must be to determine an extension—and so
the character does not provide any truth-conditions at all—or it is wrong, and
the specified parameters can be held constant whilst the extension or content
can be varied.
My response to the indexicalist approach to names will be similar to the
Travisian response to the second approach to general expressions. Travis (1980)
also provides such an approach for referential terms—in particular, what is
essentially an indexicalist account of the reference of descriptions. In §4.1, I
will discuss three prominent indexicalist accounts in the literature, and discuss
problems with them, the foremost of which, in each case, will be that they
fail to specify any determinate contextual conditions on the determination of
proper name reference. They are not only thereby too general, but they are
incomplete: they do not provide an explanatory, truth-conditional theory of
proper names, although they give the strong impression of being engaged in
the project of doing so. In §4.2 I will offer a general discussion of the problem
with providing determinate contextual parameters for reference, and argue
that the indexicalist accounts I discuss fail even to provide general constraints
on name reference. I then discuss, in §4.3, a particular parameter common to
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all three accounts—that of name/bearer relations—and argue that it could be
neither a determining factor, nor a constraint, on name reference. Finally, in
§4.4, I suggest a particular interpretation of indexicalism upon which it could
avoid many of my criticisms.
4.1 Proponents of Indexicalism
The first indexicalist approach to proper names seems to be Burks (1951),
who explicitly relates names to indexicals. Cohen (1980) could also be
considered an early proponent. Although he does not make an explicit
connection to indexicals, or provide any kind of formal consideration of
the semantics, he does mention various contextual factors that he maintains
effect the determination of reference. Cohen is an influence on Recanati
(1993), who puts forward probably the first indexical account that contains
a reasonably detailed (semi-)formal indexical treatment of the semantics of
names in English.1 Pelczar and Rainsbury (1998) provide an account that it
similar to Recanati’s, though making use of a slightly different formalism
and slightly different contextual factors. These two versions of indexicalism
are probably the most cited and discussed in the literature on names, so I
provide extended discussion of them in this section of the thesis. I also discuss
Rami (2014) at length, since it represents a version of indexicalism that is both
thoroughly informed by previous versions, and interestingly divergent from
them.2 Tiedke (2011) also provides a formal indexicalist account of proper
names, but I will not discuss it here since it is similar to Pelczar and Rainsbury
(1998) in its use of contextual factors and its assumptions about them, only
differing significantly in being designed to accommodate fictional names.
4.1.1 Recanati
Indexicals
Recanati (1993) does not claim that names are indexicals, but leaves it an
open question of little significance whether they are a category of indexical, or
merely have many close similarities to indexicals. Recanati defines indexicals
thus:
An indexical expression t in an utterance S(t) indicates that:
1Zimmermann and Lerner (1991) provide a slightly earlier indexical account, but it’s in
German, so unfortunately beyond the reach of my analysis. Rami (2014) suggests that it is quite
similar to Recanati’s account, so subject to similar criticisms.
2I have Rami (ibid.)’s detailed survey of indexicalism, and my exposure to the author’s
general painstaking approach to literature review to thank for the breadth of this chapter.
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There is an object x which is F (= linguistic mode of presenta-
tion), such that the utterance is true if and only if x satisfies
S( ).
The mode of presentation which is one aspect of the meaning of t makes
a certain object contextually identifiable, and the feature REF, which is
another aspect of the meaning of t, presents the utterance as true if and
only if this object has the property expressed by the predicate in the
sentence. For example, ‘You are G’ indicates that there is a person to
whom the utterance is addressed (linguistic mode of presentation), such
that the utterance is true if and only if this person is G. (Recanati 1993,
p. 140)
Thus, Recanati does not treat indexicals explicitly in the Kaplanian manner,
but there are strong similarities: The feature REF entails that indexicals are
referential terms whose only semantic contribution is their reference, just
as, for Kaplan, the content of an indexical is just its reference. Similarly,
the linguistic mode of presentation that determines reference contextually on
each occasion of utterance is analogous to a Kaplanian character, mapping
contextual parameters to contents.
Names with No Meaning
Recanati’s discussion of proper names begins with consideration of the view,
held in some sense by the causal-homophonists, and certainly associated with
direct reference theorists in the vein of Mill and Kripke, that names have no
meaning in the manner of other kinds of expression—such as might specify or
determine a referent—but only refer to their referent (ibid., p. 136). However,
according the machinery of direct reference Recanati has specified in his (1993)
prior to his discussion of names, such a position is not possible since he has
defined directly referential expressions as conveying the feature REF within
their meanings. He now considers that the meaning of every name might
consist solely of the feature REF, producing 1*:
1* The meaning of a proper name is nothing over and beyond the
feature REF. By virtue of its meaning, a proper name NN indicates
that there is an entity x such that an utterance S(NN) is true iff
x satisfies S( ), but it does not present this entity in a particular
way. Hence a proper name has no ‘meaning’ in the sense of a
(linguistic) mode of presentation of the reference. (ibid., p. 137)
Recanati states that a strong reading of 1*, whereby all proper names are
equivalent and indicate only that the speaker has a referential intention,
without providing any clues as to what the speaker intends to refer to, is
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unacceptable as an account of the meaning of names. This is because he claims
that names very obviously do provide a clue as to what they refer to: an
utterance of ‘Cicero was bald’ is significantly different to ‘Aristotle was bald’,
because, unlike what Recanati calls ‘pseudo-names’, such as ‘thingumybob’
and ‘what’s-their-name’, there are conventions associating those names with
particular objects.
Adding Bearers to Meanings
Recanati moves on towards his eventual indexical account via a position
reflecting a weaker reading of 1*, 1**, which establishes his view of name-
using conventions:
1** By virtue of its meaning, a proper name NN indicates only that
there is an entity x such that an utterance S(NN) is true iff
x satisfies S( ). NN also indicates which entity y is such that
y = x, but this indication is not part of the meaning of the
name: it is conveyed by the name by virtue of an extralinguistic
convention, namely the convention which associates NN with its
bearer. (Recanati 1993, p. 138)
1** still states that there is nothing more to the meaning of a name than
the feature REF, but it also states that the name indicates—independently
of its meaning—which entity it refers to, and it does this in virtue of an
extra-linguistic, i.e. social, convention associating the name with its bearer.
The idea that the conventions that associate names with their bearers are
not linguistic conventions encoded in semantics, but, rather, social conventions
that form part of the context of an utterance of a name is the most significant
feature of Recanati’s indexical view of names, and is essentially what separates
it from homophonist views.3 This is also the most significant point that will be
carried over from indexicalism into my pragmatic view. Recanati argues that
this idea is reasonable because being competent in a language clearly does
not require one to know all the name bearers, given a broad understanding
of what constitutes a natural language. Whereas, one presumably does need
to know both the meanings of a great number of other words, and how to
use a proper name, once one has been familiarized with at least one name-
using practice. Indeed, it seems plausible (if unlikely) that a speaker could be
completely competent in a language without being aware of the bearers of
any proper names.
Once Recanati has used 1** to establish the idea of name-bearing con-
ventions being social, rather than linguistic, phenomena, he rejects it on
3As Recanati discusses on pp. 143–152.
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the grounds that it does not place those conventions close enough into the
meaning of names. He claims that the assignment of referents to (uses of)
names in virtue of these conventions is part of what defines the category of
names: having one or more bearers is essential to being a proper name. This
connection to name-bearing conventions must be encoded in the meanings of
names. Thus, Recanati reaches his indexical account of names:
A proper name NN indicates not only that there is an entity x such that
an utterance S(NN) is true iff <x> satisfies S( ) [feature REF], it also
indicates—simply by virtue of the fact that it is a proper name—that x is
the bearer of the name NN, i.e. that there is a social convention associating x
with the name NN. (Recanati 1993, p. 139)
The indication that there is a social convention associating the name with its
bearer is the mode of presentation of the name. This is a general, linguistic
convention that holds for all names:
For each proper name there exists in principle a social convention linking
that name to a definite individual, called its bearer. This individual is the
referent of the name. (ibid., p. 139)
Unlike this linguistic convention, the social conventions it refers to are specific
to each name, and, as Recanati highlights in a parenthetical note, there is
sometimes more than one convention associated with each name ‘as when a
name has more than one bearer’ (ibid.).
Despite Recanati’s apparent under-appreciation of the ubiquity of shared
names, he clearly intends that his position should be able to account for
them. However, the way in which his mode of presentation goes about
selecting a unique referent is in conflict with this intention. It states that for
each name there is a bearer, which is the referent of the name. But, given
that Recanati accepts that some names have more than one name-bearing
convention associated with them, it is unclear at this point how just one bearer
can be selected on an occasion of use. He says that ‘[t]he reference of NN
is the entity which is called NN in the context of utterance’. He goes on to
suggest that, although there may be multiple bearers of a name generally, on
an occasion of utterance, the context will provide just one bearer, which is
reminiscent of a Kaplanian-style logic of indexicals, in which a context is a
tuple of parameters providing a single speaker, time, world, place, etc.:
What happens in this sort of situation is that there are two distinct name-
conventions associating the same name type, say ‘Gareth Evans’, with
particular persons (the regretted British philosopher and an Australasian
politician). These conventions are not appealed to in the same contexts of
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utterance, and this is why the reference may vary from one token to the
next. The reference of a particular token of ‘Gareth Evans’ is the person
who is related to the name type ‘Gareth Evans’ by a name-convention
operative in the context of utterance of this token. (Recanati 1993, p. 141)
This conception of bearer-in-a-context, determined by the ‘name-convention
operative in the context’ allows for a very simple indexical character of names,
but leaves much under-specified.
Problems for Recanati
One significant problem is that, at least according to an intuitive notion of
context of utterance, there can be more than one name-convention operative,
and whilst, in such contexts, speakers may generally go to lengths to disam-
biguate different referential uses of the same name, for example, by supplying
additional descriptive information, at least according Recanati’s account as I
have provided it, there is no room for this information to affect the reference
of the name. Consider an utterance of ‘Gareth Evans is dead, unlike the
other Gareth Evans’. There will be circumstances in which this is a perfectly
comprehensible utterance, and a hearer will understand what each token
utterance of ‘Gareth Evans’ refers to. In this case, ‘the other’ is providing
evidence that a different name-convention is being invoked. But this needn’t
be the case. Consider ‘Lucy went to the shops whilst Lucy listened to the
radio on her phone’. Nothing in the content of such an utterance obviously
entails that there is more than one referent of ‘Lucy’, since the activities
ascribed are simultaneously compatible, and there is nothing to indicate a
shift in context, in the intuitive sense of ‘context’, but there seems to be a
presupposition that the repetition of a name within such a short period (rather
than introducing a name and then using an anaphoric pronoun) is indicative
of the uses of the name having different referents.4 In order to account for
such circumstances, in which a single name is clearly used to refer to different
objects, apparently within the same context, Recanati must either allow that
contexts, in his technical sense of ‘context’ can shift very quickly, in which case
we might justifiably ask what determines these context shifts, or that further
pragmatic factors can affect the reference of a use of a name. In either case,
it appears that further factors are at work, and that the indexical account of
names, as Recanati presents it, is under-specified; it does not give us anything
approaching a full story of the determination of proper name reference.
4This quirk of the use of names in English—which may well also occur in other languages—is
particularly complicated, and is hard to characterize in any systematic manner. Indeed, it appears
to defy any such characterization.
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In fact, Recanati recognizes that the mode of presentation of an indexical,
which specifies the relation that must hold in context between the indexical
and the referent (the bearer-in-context relation for names), may, in some
contexts, not identify a single object because more than one object stands in
the correct relation to the expression in the context. In a footnote, he says:
[T]he linguistic mode of presentation of the reference does not always
uniquely determine the reference, even with respect to a context of utter-
ance. In other words, the linguistic mode of presentation of the reference
is not always a complete ‘character’ in Kaplan’s sense—a function from
context to content[. . . ]. When the linguistic mode of presentation is
‘incomplete’ in this sense, a powerful pragmatic mechanism involving
something like Grice’s maxims of conversation is required to determine
the reference on the basis of the indication provided by the expression
mechanism (see, in particular, Sperber and Wilson (1986)). (Recanati 1993,
n. 6, p. 153)
Recanati thus admits that further pragmatic factors, in addition to the notion
of bearer-in-a-context, are required to determine the reference of a name in
certain cases—and, notably, factors that other theorists regard as significant
not for determining reference itself, but only for aiding hearers in under-
standing what is being referred to (e.g. Neale (2004, p. 85–87); Sainsbury
(2015, p. 198)). However, it is clear that, even in cases in which Recanati
wishes to maintain that only one name-convention is operative in the context,
something must determine that that convention is operative. What determines
this will—presumably—be a combination of factors such as circumstance of
utterance, topic of conversation, what mutual acquaintances interlocutors
have, perceptual or spatial proximity, salience, and the interests and aims of
speakers.
Again, Recanati’s indexical account looks suddenly very under-specified.
Indeed, unless he actually intends the notion of being a unique bearer-in-a-
context to be primitive—and his footnote regarding shared names, and com-
ments later in the book, discussed below, suggest he does not—it is simply not
a truth-conditional account of proper name reference since it does not provide
determinate truth-conditions. Whether Recanati intended to offer something
approaching a complete truth-conditional account, or whether he believes that
there is, in principle, a way of codifying the pragmatic mechanisms involved
in determining reference into determinate truth-conditions is unclear. Either
way, it appears that, with his indexical mode of presentation for names, he
has given us a constraint upon the reference of names: that the referent of
a use of a name must be a bearer of that name. However, Recanati tells us
little about what it is to be the bearer of a particular name. In §4.3, I will call
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into question both the idea that the bearer relation is a suitable candidate for
playing the rôle of parameter in an indexical view of names, and the idea that
it is a constraint or necessary condition on the reference of names.
A Problematic Account of Bearers
In the chapter that follows the introduction of Recanati’s (1993) indexical
account of names, he offers an elaboration of the notion of bearing a name
in a context that he initially left under-specified. The elaboration arises in an
attempt to defend the meta-linguistic element of his account—that a name
refers to the bearer of that name—from criticisms from Kripke (1981) of similar
views. Specifically, Kripke’s criticism (p. 69) that a form of descriptivism that
maintains that a proper name such as ‘Socrates’ should be analyzed as ‘the
individual called “Socrates”’ is circular, since, superficially at least, it appears
to say that what a speaker calls ‘Socrates’ is whatever is called Socrates.5
Recanati’s response is extremely complicated. He observes that his indexi-
cal view relies on, but does not explain, the notion of being a bearer of a name
or being called by a name (Recanati 1993, pp. 159–160). If that notion were
explained in terms of what token utterances of a name refer to, then clearly
it would be circular to explain the reference of token utterances of names
in terms of the notion. Recanati instead introduces name types, a pseudo-
homophonist idea that he explicitly links to the specific names of Kaplan
(1990) (Recanati 1993, p. 166, n. 5). Rather than existing as individual lexical
items in a whole language, name types refer to particular objects just amongst
local communities of speakers. So, name-using practices centre around the
reference of a name type within a community, and an object bears a name in
a context if it is the referent of a name type that is appropriately related to the
name (instantiates it, perhaps) in the community selected by that context. And
so, an utterance of a name refers to an object if that object is the referent of the
name type of which the utterance was a token, as determined by the context
of utterance (ibid., p. 166, n. 5). This leaves us wondering how a name type
gets a reference in a particular community. According to Recanati, who draws
from Evans (1982) and Loar (1980), there are Putnam-style producer experts
in each community who determine and sustain the reference of a name type
with the reference of their token uses of the name.
Recanati’s story about how objects bear names has severe problems, largely
owing to its complicated nature, that I will not discuss in detail here. One
problem is that the localized homophonism he introduces opens him up to
5Kripke attributes this view to William Kneale, though it should be noted that it is very
similar to the view of Bach (1987, 2002) and Katz (2001), and foreshadows recent predicativist
views such as those of Fara (2015); Gray (forthcoming); Matushansky (2008).
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various problems for causal-homophonism. Another problem is with his
reliance on producers to fix the referents of the name-types for the consumers
in their communities, and the sharp distinction between them that this requires.
It appears that producers do not themselves use name-types to refer, for this
would risk circularity. They must use the names themselves, such that they
could refer to anything with them. But this seems to require not only that
they cannot be the producer for any more than one homophonic name-type,
but that they cannot even be the consumer of a homophonic name-type. It
is their uses of the name that create the name-type they produce, so nothing
could plausibly distinguish their productive uses of the name from their
consumptive uses of a name-type that is itself a specific form of the name.
4.1.2 Pelczar and Rainsbury
The indexical account of names offered by Pelczar and Rainsbury (1998) is
similar in many respects to that of Recanati (1993), though they explicitly state
their view in terms of a Kaplanian-style logic of indexicals.6 The stated aim
of the paper is to develop an account of proper names that has the benefits
of existing direct reference account of names (by which Pelczar & Rainsbury
mean causal-homophonism)—most obviously rigidity—but that is also able
to deal with the various puzzles of propositional attitudes7 with the ease of
descriptivist theories. The account produced treats names as rigid indexicals
in the vein of ‘I’ and ‘you’. In the Kaplanian terms assumed by Pelczar
& Rainsbury, this means that names have a constant content—the content
returns the same referent in every world of evaluation (rigidity)—and a non-
constant character—the character can return different contents in different
contexts of utterance (indexicality) (Pelczar and Rainsbury 1998, pp. 293–4).
Dubbings-in-Force
If names are indexicals, and indexicality is assumed to be explained using a
Kaplanian framework, then there must be a feature (or features) of the context
of utterance that governs what content is returned. Pelczar & Rainsbury
propose adding the feature dubbings-in-force to the tuple forming the context:
6Pelczar & Rainsbury cite Recanati in a footnote towards the end of their paper, but only
as one example of a mode of presentation-type view of names that is, they claim, unable to
accomplish all that their indexical view can. It appears that they overlook the similarity of the
accounts, and how easily Recanati’s mode of presentation could be adapted in a Kaplanian-style
character.
7Problems such as Frege’s puzzle: If Hesperus is Phosphorus, and proper names just stand
for their referents, why is that ‘Phosphorus’ cannot be substituted salva veritate for ‘Hesperus’ in
an utterance of ‘The ancients believed that Hesperus is Hesperus’ (Frege 1892)?
107
4.1. Proponents of Indexicalism
A dubbing is a speech-act whereby a name acquires a referent, and a
dubbing is in force in a given context if in that context the item that
was dubbed in that dubbing bears the name it received in that dubbing.
(Pelczar and Rainsbury 1998, p. 294)
Like the homophonists, then, Pelczar & Rainsbury are assigning semantic
significance to naming events, and assuming that such events are what create
and maintain name-bearer relations. And, like Recanati, they are appealing
to the idea of an object bearing a name in a context such that it might not
bear it in a different context. Indeed, the only significant differences between
Pelczar & Rainsbury’s account of the meaning of names, thus stated, and
Recanati’s account, seems to be that Pelczar & Rainsbury explicitly make use
of a Kaplanian-style logic of indexicals, and that they provide a slightly more
detailed view of what constitutes bearing a name.
Problems for Pelczar & Rainsbury
Since their accounts are so similar, Pelczar & Rainsbury run into essentially the
same issues that Recanati does, and address them in the same way. They are
thus subject to the same criticisms. They provide no indication of what might
determine when a dubbing is (or isn’t) in force, although, unlike Recanati,
they recognize this fact, saying:
The dynamics of dubbings-in-force can be complex, and we shall not
attempt to provide a systematic way to decide which dubbings are in
force in a given context. (ibid., p. 295)
It is not clear from this whether or not it is believed that, in principle, a
systematic way to decide which dubbings are in force could be provided.
Given the tenor of the sentence quoted, it seems that Pelczar & Rainsbury
might believe that it could be, suggesting that they do indeed intend their
account to be, in principle, fully truth-conditional. However, since they neither
provide any indication of how this might be done, nor suggest that they take
dubbings-in-force to be primitive, we are left, just as by Recanati, with an
under-specified and indeterminate account of proper name reference that, at
best, only provides constraints on reference, and lacks explanatory power.
A further problem that Pelczar & Rainsbury’s indexical account has in
common with Recanati’s is that there are clearly likely to be contexts in which
dubbings are in force such that more than one object bears the same name in
that context. Pelczar & Rainsbury use the example of using the name ‘George
Bush’ in the context of talking about US presidents to illustrate the issue.
Although they are significantly more forthcoming about it than Recanati, their
response is extremely similar, claiming that, in such a situation,
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one of the competing dubbings must be brought to prominence in order
to determine a unique referent for the name (in that use). This might be
achieved by a variety of mechanisms. One important factor in this raising
to prominence might be relevant features of the conversation (if any) of
the context of utterance of the name. (Pelczar and Rainsbury 1998, p. 295)
Just like Recanati, Pelczar & Rainsbury mention Gricean conversational
maxims as potentially being particularly relevant in bringing a dubbing
to prominence. But, again, it is unclear whether the ‘relevant features of
the conversation of the context’ are supposed to be systematizable such that
they could be added to the formal context to provide a fully-explanatory
determinate truth-conditional semantics. If not, and this time it is perhaps less
likely that this is the authors’ intention, then the aim of providing a semantics
for proper names that determines their reference—as is suggested by the use
of a Kaplanian-style framework in which context is a formal notion—is clearly
undermined.
The need to raise a particular dubbing-in-force to prominence in order to
arrive at a determinate reference also raises the question of why prominence
was not simply built into the framework to begin with: Given that some mech-
anisms, presumably pragmatic mechanisms, are required to determine which
dubbings are in force for a particular name in a context, and then, in many
cases, pragmatic mechanisms are also required to raise one such dubbing
to prominence, it would seem simpler just to posit most-prominent-dubbing-
in-force as a feature of the context, determined by pragmatic mechanisms.
That Pelczar & Rainsbury do not do this, preferring a two-stage approach,
might suggest that they do indeed believe that the first stage, but not the
second stage, could be systematized.8 It might alternatively be indicative that
Pelczar & Rainsbury conceive of the fixing of reference in a very hearer-centric
manner, in which it is clear to a hearer, apparently without having to make
any conscious inferences, that only certain objects are possible referents of a
8Pelczar (2001), which considers some general criticisms of indexicalism, acknowledges that
his indexical formulation of a semantics for names is a ‘veneer of simplicity’ that ‘covers an
immense complexity that is simply gestured at by an appeal to “dubbings in force”’ (p. 143). He
goes on:
Any effort to state precisely the conditions under which a given dubbing of a thing with a
particular name is in force (in any context) quickly leads to the consideration of multifarious
factors, semantic, pragmatic, and even extra-linguistic, that, to say the least, resist tidy
encapsulation. (p. 143)
However, despite appreciating the complexity of the context-sensitivity of name reference, Pelczar
does not see this as reason to abandon the idea of there being systematic truth-conditions.
Instead, he notes that many indexicals have equally untidy relationships with context. This is,
of course, true, but it should not be assumed the contextual determination of those indexicals
is systematizable. Later in the paper, Pelczar seems to acknowledge even that there may be
under-determination in the rules determining reference for some names and some indexicals.
He suggests that, in those cases, the under-determination is resolved by ‘speaker discretion’
(p. 149–150), by which, I presume, he means speakers’ intentions.
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speakers use of a name—these are the dubbings in force. Often, so it might
seem, there will only be one such object, and the work is done. But at other
times, ambiguity might remain, and in these cases it seems reasonable to
invoke such contextual conversational mechanisms as Gricean maxims. Whilst
this might be an accurate picture of how hearers respond to the use of a name
on different occasions, if we are interested in describing the rôle of context (in
the non-formal sense) on reference, it is unnecessary to divide things up in
such a manner, especially if there is no pretence of offering a genuinely truth-
conditional semantic account. It would be far simpler to observe that various
different contextual mechanisms play a rôle in determining which bearer a
name refers to on different occasions. However, I will argue, in §4.3, that even
the mention of bearers or dubbings in the character of a name is misguided.
4.1.3 Rami
The indexical account of proper names developed by Rami (2014) is, in my
view, by some distance, the most advanced indexical-type view in the current
literature. This is primarily because Rami engages deeply with the prior
literature, offering criticisms similar to those I have laid out above. He then
specifically attempts to develop a view that avoids the problems of those prior
accounts, though, as a result, it has somewhat more limited aims. He also
develops his view slowly and painstakingly, addressing at every step the kind
of subtle contextual issues that affect the use of proper names, and which I
have tried to highlight as the undoing of semantic views of name reference.
However, whilst my response to the powerful effects of pragmatics on the use
of names is to abandon the idea that their (semantic) meaning has anything
to do with the determination of their reference, Rami, influenced by Predelli
(2012, 2013), introduces to the semantics of names a use-conditional level, in
addition to the truth-conditional levels of character and content. Using this
apparatus, Rami develops ‘a novel version of a formal constant approach of the
indexical view on names that is based on [Kaplan’s logic of demonstratives]
and holds that names are a distinctive kind of indexical expression’ (Rami
2014, pp. 120–1).
Although we share somewhat similar aims and motivations, there is
a certain sense in which Rami’s approach to the problems of reference
determination is the opposite to that which I will take in chapter 6 of this
thesis. I follow Travis in pushing reference, and other phenomena that are
relevant to the truth- or correctness-evaluability of utterances (those things
that go towards determining what thought an utterance expresses) into the
pragmatic level, leaving in the semantics just those things that are context-
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invariant, to play some rôle in, perhaps, compositionality and/or logical
form. Rami keeps whatever is truth-conditional within the semantic level, but
largely rejects the strong distinction made by most other reference theorists
between semantic and speaker reference, preferring to maintain a single
phenomenon of reference (for the most part) that is truth-conditional. In
order to distinguish between those referential uses of names that seem to be
correct and acceptable—what would normally be considered their semantic
reference—and those that are in some way incorrect, although they achieve
reference—usually conceived of as mere speaker reference—Rami posits a
use-conditional layer within the semantics of names, which need not affect the
reference or truth-conditions of a use of a name, but distinguishes semantically
correct uses from semantically incorrect uses by means of a contextual constraint.
Learning from the Mistakes of Others
The first few sections of Rami (2014) consist of discussion of existing views
about the semantics of proper names, including criticism of both causal-
homophonism, and various forms of indexicalism.9 In taking into account
the various problems of those accounts, Rami develops a pluralist account of
reference determination, similar in motivation to the pluralism I discussed in
§3.4.10 In fact, Rami’s pluralism might well be described as a disjunctivism—a
fact he gladly acknowledges in conversation—since, rather than allowing an
indeterminate and indefinitely large class of mechanisms of determination, as I
am inclined to, he admits just three mechanisms: demonstrative identification,
descriptive identification, and parasitic identification (ibid., pp. 127–30). The
first form of identification includes cases in which a speaker refers to an
object using a name in virtue of some form of demonstration; the second form
includes cases in which a description is used to fix the reference of a use of a
name, either explicitly or implicitly, such as when a speaker says ‘Barry, the
one who really likes wine’; and the third form includes mouthpiece-type cases
in which a speaker fixes the referent of their use of a name simply in virtue of
using the same that another speaker has used.
Another point Rami takes from discussion of other positions, and the
indexical positions of Recanati (1993) and Pelczar and Rainsbury (1998) in
particular, is the non-viability of the notion of bearing a name in a context.
9Rami defines indexicalism rather more broadly than I have, including various accounts
that I have categorized as either predicativist or variablist. I have not discussed these views on
the grounds that they do not commit themselves in principle to a distinctive form of reference
determination for names. For example, they subsume the question into that of the reference
determination of definite article or complex demonstrative expressions (Burge 1973; Elbourne
2005; Geurts 1997; Sawyer 2010), or simply by taking a stand only with regard to the logical form
of names, and not about referential mechanisms (Cumming 2008; Dever 1998).
10Which cited Rami (2016) extensively.
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Rami’s criticism of this notion is somewhat more specific than mine. Whilst
I criticized other indexicalists, in §§4.1.1 & 4.1.2, for failing to say anything
about how it is determined what bears a name in a context, Rami takes it
that both Recanati and Pelczar & Rainsbury implicitly rely on salience to do
this job (he takes Pelczar & Rainsbury’s prominence to be salience by another
name). Rami observes that, if the other indexicalists are invoking salience,
they are doing it in a rather odd way: instead of claiming that a particular
bearer of a name is salient in a context, they claim—according to Rami—that
a name-bearing convention is salient (Recanati), or that a dubbing-in-force is
salient. Social conventions and acts of naming, unlike objects that bear names,
are not the kinds of things that, in the ordinary way of things, language users
are aware of being salient or not (Rami 2014, pp. 137–8). However, Rami goes
on, even if it were objects themselves that were required to be salient in order
to refer to them, it is clear that, in fact, an object need not be salient, in an
ordinary sense of ‘salient’, in order to be the referent of a name. Nor is being
a salient bearer sufficient to be the referent in many cases (ibid., p. 138).
Problems with Truth-Conditions
With these considerations in mind, Rami begins to develop his own account,
making use, like Pelczar and Rainsbury (1998), of a Kaplanian-style logical
framework. Rami’s last attempt, before introducing the notion of a use-
conditional level of semantics is as follows:
(IXC.1) [[Alfredn ]]c,〈w′ ,t′〉 = the object that is identified demonstra-
tively, descriptively or parasitically in
cw in respect to the occurrence n of
‘Alfred’ by ca and that is a bearer of
‘Alfred’ at ct.
(Rami 2014, p. 140)11
Here, c is the context, 〈w′, t′〉 is the content, a world-time pair, cw is the
world of the context, ca is the agent of the context, and ct is the time of the
context. n is an integer that indexes occurrences of a name in a sentence,
such that, at the level of logical form, names are represented syntactically
as ordered pairs of a proper name and an integer (or numeral). So, for
example, if a sentence contains two occurrences of the name ‘Paris’, whether
they refer to the same object or to two different objects, the representations
of those occurrences in the logical form of the sentence will be 〈‘Paris’, 1〉
11I have made some very small changes to Rami’s notation.
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and 〈‘Paris’, 2〉 respectively.12 Rami introduces this indexing of occurrences
in order to be able to allow that multiple uses of the same name within a
single context might have different bearers. If the interpretation of a name
were simply the object identified in the context that bore the name, this
would not be possible. Given this motivation, merely indexing occurrences of
names within a sentence would be insufficient, they would need to be indexed
throughout any discourse taking place within a single context. This would be
an easy enough change on Rami’s part, however.
By introducing the idea that the referent of a use of a name must have been
identified in some manner by the speaker, Rami is able to avoid introducing
anything like the bearer-in-the-context or the most prominent dubbing-in-
force, and so proposes a character for names quite unlike the indexical-
ists already discussed. The only constraint on the object of the speaker’s
identification is that they bear the name used at the time of the context.
The introduction of identifications means that Rami appears not to rely on
non-specific contextual mechanisms, such as Gricean conversational maxims,
that are usually taken to be cues for a hearer’s comprehension, and that
Rami criticizes Recanati and Pelczar & Rainsbury for using in their accounts
of reference determination. However, whilst Rami might not rely on an
unspecified notion of context to fill in gaps in the same way that Recanati
and Pelczar & Rainsbury do, it is unclear how his identifications would
work without either invoking a great deal of context, or relying on unstated
metaphysical assumptions about the nature of demonstrations, descriptions
and the repetition of names.
Rami’s (IXC.1) provides an account of names that operates solely at the
semantic level of character and content. He goes on to discuss how the account
deals with semantically correct, and incorrect, uses of names. Given the
account, just those uses of names, the reference of which accords with (IXC.1),
are semantically correct uses. Rami identifies three forms of infelicitous,
or otherwise imperfect, uses of names (Rami 2014, p. 141): incomplete uses,
which are not accompanied by an act of identification; empty uses, which are
accompanied by an act of identification that fails to identify a single object;
and improper uses, which are accompanied by an identification of an object
that does not bear the name used. Of these, Rami claims that improper and
incomplete uses of names are semantically incorrect, but that empty uses can
be perfectly acceptable, as is widely discussed in the literature. Rami suggests
that the simplest way of accommodating semantically correct, empty uses
of names is to adapt the Kaplanian-style framework he uses into a negative
12The use of sequential positive integers is, presumably, arbitrary. Rami simply needs a means
to differentiate each occurrence from any other.
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free logic in the manner of Sainsbury (2005). This would have the effect of
rendering all positive utterances containing empty name false.13 However,
Rami observes, that in terms of truth-conditions, there is no difference between
incomplete and empty uses of names: neither have referents, and so utterances
containing either will come out false. (IXC.1), as a wholly truth-conditional
account of meaning, thus does not correctly distinguish between semantically
correct and incorrect uses of names.
A further problem for (IXC.1) in this respect is that it rules out two types
of name use that Rami deems to be semantically correct, on the grounds that
they appear to refer to objects that are not, in some sense, bearers of the name
used at the time of use (Rami 2014, p. 142). The first of these uses are to refer
to potential future bearers, such as when one tries out a new name for an object,
with the intention of establishing a new name for it. Rami uses the example,
borrowed from Ziff (1977), of an utterance of ‘Whiskers is in the kitchen’ in
response to the question ‘Where’s the cat’, where the cat in question does not
yet bear a name (as far as the interlocutors know). Rami claims that such a
use of a name is perfectly correct, but need not be itself an act of naming,
since a practice of calling the cat ‘Whiskers’ may not arise. The use is thus
semantically correct, although it refers to an object that does not yet bear the
name used.
Rami’s second type of case involves uses of names that were formerly
borne by their referents. Such cases are discussed in detail by Saul (1997)
and Zimmermann (2005), and will feature largely in §4.3. Rami observes
that sentences such as ‘Leningrad has more than one hundred thousand
inhabitants’ seem unacceptable (though not, apparently, false), but both ‘In
1944, Leningrad had more than one hundred thousand inhabitants’ and, ‘In
1944, St Petersburg had more than one hundred thousand inhabitants’ seem
fine.14 The problem seems to be that former names generally cannot be (or
should not be, or are not) used to refer to their former bearers at reference
times15 subsequent to the time they ceased to bear the name, whereas names
that are currently borne can be used to refer at any reference time. This
may, of course, be too much of a generalization, but it is clear that at least
in some cases such restrictions on felicity exist. Rami observes that the issue
does not appear to be truth-conditional, since it does not seem to be false
that Leningrad has more than one hundred thousand inhabitants, but an
13I will not discuss here the value of such a move.
14Note that the city currently known, officially, as ‘St Petersburg’ was called ‘Leningrad’ in
1944.
15The notion of reference time, as distinct from speech time and event time, introduced by
Reichenbach (1947), indicates the time at which an object is being talked about, indicated by tense
and aspect, and/or temporal adverbial phrases. So ‘In 1944’ indicates that the reference time of
the subsequent occurrence of ‘Leningrad’ is 1944.
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utterance to the effect would still be incorrect or impermissible in some other
way. Presumably, we might also want to allow certain identities to hold
between Leningrad and St Petersburg, since the city has, in some ways at
least, remained the same city throughout its many twentieth century name
changes, and this would lead to problems if assertions that were true of St
Petersburg were false of Leningrad, especially since many of those true of
Leningrad also seem to be true of St Petersburg. Again, then, Rami claims that
this question of semantic correctness and incorrectness must be dealt with at
a use-conditional level.
A Use-Conditional Semantics for Names
For these two reasons, together with considerations about what the logical
(truth-conditional) entailments of uses of a name should or shouldn’t be, Rami
develops an account of the semantics of proper names that contains both a
truth-conditional and a use-conditional level. He states:
What we need [. . . ] is a specific minimal formal characterization of
the rigid content and indexical character of names that allows us to
transfer all components of the meaning of a proper name that concern
the determination of semantically correct referents of proper names to the
level of use-conditional meaning. (Rami 2014, p. 147)
To this end, Rami proposes a partial assignment function, relativized to
contexts and occurrences, to assign referents to occurrences of names at the
truth conditonal-level (or not, in the case of empty names). This function,
N, takes ordered triples of the world of context, cw, the name itself, and an
integer marking the occurrence of the name, n, as arguments, and returns an
object in the domain of discourse.16 This gives us:
(IXC.2) [[Alfredn ]]c,〈w′ ,t′〉 = N(〈cw, ‘Alfred’, n〉)
(ibid., p. 147)
The use-conditional level is introduced as a contextual constraint, (CC), on
possible contexts of use, defining just the semantically correct ones for the use
of a particular name:
16Rami does not mention what the domain of discourse is for any particular use of a name,
but since he is clear that non-salient objects can potentially be referred to using names, we might
assume that every object is in the domain of every discourse.
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(CC) c is a semantically correct context of use of the name ‘Alfred’ in
respect to its occurrence n if an act of demonstrative, descriptive
or parasitic identification is performed by ca in cw in respect to
n whose unique target is, if any, identical to N(〈cw, ‘Alfred’, n〉)
and this target, if it exists, satisfies at least one of the following
additional conditions:
(a) it is a bearer of the name ‘Alfred’ relative to ct;
(b) it is not a bearer of the name ‘Alfred’ relative to ct, but it
is used in cw by ca with the intention to introduce a new
bearer of ‘Alfred’;
(c) it is not anymore a bearer of ‘Alfred’ relative to ct, the
loss of the target as bearer of ‘Alfred’ was not due to an
(implicit) shift in bearer-hood from one object to another,
and the occurrence n of ‘Alfred’ in cw is in a sentence
whose truth-value evaluation relative to ct depends on a
time s such that this target was a bearer of ‘Alfred’ at s in
cw. (Rami 2014, p. 148–9)
Problems for Rami
Rami claims, correctly, I think, that his account avoids the problems that he
identifies for the various other accounts of names that he considers, but in
doing so it is unclear what we are left with. Semantic reference, as conceived of
by homophonists (and probably other indexicalists) has effectively been done
away with, since there are no constraints on reference at the truth-conditional
level. All we have there is a stipulation that a particular use of a name returns
a particular referent in a context. Anything resembling the speaker reference/
semantic reference distinction comes at the use-conditional level, and what
we have there is effectively a list of conditions specifying which ways of using
a name are acceptable in some way. This some way is semantic according
to Rami, but presumably only in the sense that it is encoded in the context-
insensitive meaning of the name. The lack of a speaker/semantic distinction
at the truth-conditional level is, in my view, a positive feature of the account.
However, in separating any conditions on reference from truth-conditions,
and making them constraints rather than criteria, Rami has effectively—and,
presumably, intentionally—depleted his account of any story about how the
reference of names is determined. Recanati and Pelczar & Rainsbury state
that the semantic reference of a use of a name is the bearer-in-the-context or
the object of the most prominent dubbing-in-force, respectively, even though
they don’t specify what it is to be one of those things, but in Rami’s final
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formulation of the semantics of a name, we don’t get anything like that. He
tells us when a use of a name is semantically correct, and gives us a function,
which is presumably only a representation or model of reference, but he does
not state why or when the function maps to what it does.
My criticism, if it is a criticism, of Rami may seem odd here, since my aim
in this thesis is to develop an account of proper name reference that does
not impose upon it necessary and sufficient conditions (or strong constraints).
Moreover, my primary criticisms of semantic views of reference have been
that the conditions they provide impose on the reference of names have
excluded good cases. Rami appears to impose no conditions on reference, only
conditions on semantically correct reference. The problem is, however, that
he puts reference in the semantic meaning of names at all. Unlike Recanati’s
REF, which just states that there is a referent—that the truth-conditions are
singular (Recanati 1993, p. 17)—Rami’s (ICX.2) is a function that provides a
referent (except in the case of empty names) at the semantic level, but without
any guide to how this happens. On the view I will develop in chapter 6, the
semantics of a name provides no guide to the reference of a use of it, but
reference is conceived of as a phenomenon at the pragmatic level: names have
no truth-conditional content at the semantic level. It seems very likely that
Rami intends that speakers’ own determinations of reference,17 mentioned
during his discussion of pluralism, are what are in fact doing the work here—
we know that Rami thinks that there are at least three semantically correct
ways that a speaker can determine a name’s reference—and these might
plausibly be considered either pragmatic mechanisms, or a feature of pre-
semantics. The function (ICX.2), then, might simply be a means to represent
that at the semantic level: to introduce the reference to the semantics such
that it can contribute to truth-conditions, and can be interpreted at the use-
conditional level. Rami has informed me in conversation that he requires the
reference to be introduced to the level of truth-conditional semantics in order
that various inferences be possible. So, perhaps Rami does indeed intend such
acts to occur purely at the pragmatic level—all to the good—but given that,
within his framework, truth-conditions are semantic, and the semantics of
names does not incorporate a means of involving such pragmatic mechanisms,
specified or not, it is currently rather unclear how reference fixed in such a
way could affect truth-conditions.
Rami might respond to this kind of criticism by adding to his function N an
argument for something very under-specified such as ‘pragmatic mechanisms
that determine reference’. This might allow him the freedom to be very
liberal about how reference contributes to the truth-conditional level, whilst
17Something he has confirmed in conversation.
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providing a mechanism for getting it there. His account would then be in
the state for which I criticized Recanati and Pelczar & Rainsbury in §§4.1.1
and 4.1.2, such that it gives the appearance of attempting to provide truth-
conditions for names, but fails to do so because the contextual input is under-
specified. Of course, in Rami’s case this would be intentional. Moreover,
for Rami, the truth-conditional semantics would be wholly under-specified,
since all it would state is that there is a reference specified pragmatically by
extra-contextual (in the formal sense of ‘context’, c) factors. This would be
something similar to Recanati’s 1*, and, at this point, the claim is essentially
that proper name reference is pragmatic, but there are certain use-conditional
constraints upon what is semantically correct.
What, then, of Rami’s (CC)? The first point to note is that (CC) is doubly
disjunctive: there is a tripartite disjunction of permissible means of reference
determination, and a tripartite disjunction of conditions on bearer relations.
This leaves one with the worry that the nine total constraints Rami codifies
might just be those that he happens to have thought of. The bearer conditions
in particular seem to be the result of an admirable, but limited consideration
of the vagaries of the use of past and future names. To this end, Rami
acknowledges that his account may appear to be ad hoc, and to lack theoretical
unity (Rami 2014, n. 93, p. 149). He responds that both disjunctive lists may be
incomplete and require additions, but that the apparent lack of unity that this
engenders is not a flaw in the account, but a symptom of the multi-faceted
nature of language use. Indeed, Rami invokes Wittgenstein:
It is one of the Wittgensteinian lessons about natural language that we
should not in general expect some kind of unification or deep explana-
tion if we are interested in how natural languages work and how their
expressive tools function. (ibid.)
With this point, I agree wholeheartedly. However, I take it to be motivation
not to attempt to include the kind of considerations found in (CC) in the
semantics of names at all. Whilst Rami is content for his lists to continue to
grow, I find it implausible that anything approaching a determinate list could
exist. Moreover, if the semantics of a word is, as I take it to be, the context-
invariant content that speakers learn when they learn that word, it seems
unlikely to contain the highly contingent social factors to which Rami appeals.
Consider, Rami’s Leningrad example. If the historical considerations that
lead some sentences containing ‘Leningrad’ to be felicitous, and others not,
are contained in the semantics of the word, then speakers who, for whatever
reason, continued to use the name after it was officially decided to change the
city’s name back to ‘St Petersburg’, were making a mistake with regard to the
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semantics of the word. Old Party diehards who continued to use ‘Leningrad’,
knowing the name had been changed, were not simply making a social or
political statement, but making a semantic mistake. This seems implausible if
one considers such speakers using the name between themselves: the name
functions in exactly the way it did in the days of the Soviet Union18 and
it would seem hopelessly naïve to inform a diehard using ‘Leningrad’ that
the city’s name had actually been changed, so she should alter her practice.
We might claim that such speakers still regard the city as bearing the name
‘Leningrad’, at least in a certain sense, and so regard their utterances as
correct, but it is still not clear why this is an issue for semantics, rather than
being merely a pragmatic social consideration. It is also unclear whether the
temporal issues involving the temporal aspects of name bearing generalize to
other languages, or even other dialects of English.19 Facing such an objection,
Rami could claim just to be providing a semantics of proper names in English,
or a dialect of English, but given the apparent universal occurrence of proper
names playing very similar rôles, this would seem to significantly weaken
his thesis. If we think of naming-conventions as social practices, or, at least
practices that arise socially (or even legally (Rami 2016)), then it makes sense
to think of the norms of these practices—which are presumably what (CC)’s
(a)–(c) amount to—as norms of social practices, not of semantic or linguistic
practices. Calling St Petersburg ‘Leningrad’ might be taboo in certain social
interactions, or reveal certain political dispositions of the speaker, but this is
quite different to claiming that a semantic mistake has been made. Refusing
to use the name a person has chosen for themself, and instead using one they
have asked you not to use, may well be a moral, personal, or social affront,
but not obviously a semantic mistake.20
4.2 Problems with Parameters
As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, I maintain that there is
a general and insurmountable problem with the programme of attempting
to account for the reference of proper names by providing a character-like
meaning that specifies particular contextual factors that will, on an occasion
of use, determine reference. Indeed, I maintain that it is unlikely even that
contextual constraints on the reference of names could be specified such that
they held for every use of a name. I claim that, for any proposed set of
contextual parameters alleged to determine the reference of names, they will
18Zimmermann (2005) uses a similar example with Karl Marx Stadt and Chemnitz.
19This is, of course, an empirical question. I have no evidence either way.
20I will discuss this position further in §4.3 and chapter 6.
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be either too general, such that they cannot predict what the referent of a
name will be on an occasion, and will not decide between potential referents
in all cases, or they will be wrong, such that they predict the wrong referent
on some occasions. Although it is, of course, nigh on impossible to provide
a general argument to this end, it seems very likely that, for any proposed
character of a name, cases can be provided in which the reference of the name
shifts without the proposed parameters changing.
In §4.3, I will consider a parameter very commonly proposed as either
a determinant of name reference, or a constraint on it: bearerhood. In this
section, however, I will provide arguments against some other plausible
parameters. One such parameter, which Rami accuses Recanati and Pelczar
& Rainsbury of appealing to, although it is only implicit in their accounts, is
salience. Salience is often appealed to in contextualist accounts of meaning, in
literature on indexicals, demonstratives, and other types of expression. For
the time being, let us put aside worries about bearerhood, and imagine a
proposed character for names such that the referent of a use of a name is
the most salient bearer of that name, or simply the most salient object that
is plausibly the referent of the name. I aim to show that such a character
will fail because salience is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition on the
reference of names.
4.2.1 Salience
Salience is a particularly vague notion. With regard to contextualism, there
seem to be at least two ways of interpreting salience. The first is as just one
kind of contextual factor, perhaps among many, that might be relevant to the
determination of the content of context-sensitive expressions. The second is as
some kind of broad category for various more specific contextual mechanisms—
a kind of placeholder for finer-grained factors. On the first interpretation, it is
possible to show that salience, although presumably sometimes relevant to
the determination of the reference of names, is neither necessary nor sufficient.
And on the second interpretation, appealing to salience simply provides no
kind of theory of name reference, amounting to little more than saying ‘context
does the job’, but with the disadvantage that not all contextual factors can
plausibly be covered by the term.
It is relatively easy to come up with cases to show that salience, on the
first, more specific, understanding, is not a necessary or sufficient condition
on name reference. On this understanding, salience is something related to
apparentness and pertinence. An object will be salient in a context if, for
example, it is present, or conspicuous, or is obviously relevant to the topic of
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conversation. But clearly, one feature of names is that, in certain circumstances,
they can be used to refer to objects that are not present or already relevant.
Consider a case in which Ben is talking to Tom about Stormont. They are
alone in a room. Having tired of Stormont, Ben says, out of the blue, ‘I saw
Lucy Campbell the other day’, referring to a mutual friend, who was in no
way salient in the context or the discourse. This seems like a perfectly good
case of reference to an object that was not salient prior to being mentioned
(though, of course, she would be afterwards). The fan of salience may respond
that, it is not salience alone that informs name reference, but rather a scalar
parameter like ‘the most salient bearer of the name’, in the manner of Pelczar &
Rainsbury’s ‘most prominent dubbing-in-force’. The Lucy Campbell referred
to is thus the referent because she is the most salient of all Lucy Campbells in
virtue of being well-known to both Ben and Tom, and them both knowing this.
But we can construct a case in which the apparent most salient Lucy Campbell
fails to be the referent: Suppose that instead of saying ‘I saw Lucy Campbell
the other day’, Ben says ‘Have you read anything by Lucy Campbell? She’s
the new columnist for The Point.’. Tom and Ben’s mutual friend must still
be the most salient Lucy Campbell at the time the name is used, even if the
salience shifts during the second sentence, so should be the referent according
to the proponent of the salience parameter. But it is clear from the second
sentence that Ben is meaning to talk about a different Lucy Campbell, and
it seems fair to assume that he did refer to that different Lucy, even though
it may not become clear to Tom until after Ben has uttered the name. This
example shows that salience is not a necessary condition upon name reference,
at least not in any simple or obvious way, since the object referred to was not
salient, and also that it is not a sufficient condition, since there was a more
salient Lucy Campbell who was not referred to.
A view by which salience determines reference on the second interpretation
of salience, whereby it is treated as something like a conflation of a variety of
more specific contextual factors, is harder to address by cases, simply because
it does not make any specific claims about how reference is determined. As
such, however, it is clear that it is also too general to make any kind of
predictive claims about reference, and so does not contribute to anything
resembling a genuinely truth-conditional semantics for names. Claiming
that such a broad notion of salience is involved in every case of reference
determination, and that it is the kind of thing that could play the rôle of a
semantic parameter in an indexical account of names, must either be some
kind of promissory claim—that the rôle of context could be unpacked and
codified—or it is to reject the idea that such a semantics determines reference
at all, at which point the exercise becomes redundant. An indexical account
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of names based on this notion of salience would have nothing to say about
the second Lucy Campbell case, for example, unless it was simply assumed
that the notion gave the right result in every case.
Mount (2008) develops a salience-based account of demonstrative reference
that seems to skirt somewhere between the two interpretations of salience.
According to her account of the reference of demonstratives, the referent of a
demonstrative upon an occasion of use is the object that is mutually recognized
as maximally salient by conversational participants (p. 154). Mount does not
apply this thought to proper names, and indeed appears to think that names
are not context-sensitive (p. 156), but it will be instructive to consider whether
her account of maximal salience amongst interlocutors could plausibly be
applied to names.21 Mount claims that ‘an object is mutually recognized as
maximally salient by conversational participants when all interlocutors have
focused their attention on it’ (ibid., p. 154). This seems like a plausible account
of what maximal salience might be, and Mount presents a variety of cases in
which demonstratives are used whilst speakers and audiences are in various
states of awareness or ignorance about various objects in the vicinity, and
about which her salience-based view makes convincing predictions.
However, her notion of salience is not plausible as a determinant of the
reference of names because it gets the order of explanation wrong: proper
name reference is, at least in some circumstances, a means of focusing the
attention of interlocutors on an object, or otherwise bringing it to mind in some
way. To claim that an object must be maximally salient in order to be able to
refer to it with a name is either to get things the wrong way around, or it is
redundant, since, in many cases, it is the referring to an object that focusses
one’s audience attention on it. Names seem to be unlike demonstratives in this
respect:22 An effective use of a demonstrative often requires that the intended
referent be made salient by the speaker at around the same time, i.e. with a
demonstration, or that the object already be salient in some way. But, whilst
names can be used with a demonstration to indicate their reference—and I
do think that such a demonstration can determine name reference in some
circumstances—and can be used such that a salient object is their referent
simply in virtue of being contextually compelling, they can also be used to
refer to objects that were not, prior to their use, salient to the interlocutors.
Clearly, given this difference between demonstratives and names, claiming
that the referent of a name is the maximally salient object at the time of
utterance cannot work. Instead, one of the options I suggested above, that the
referent of a use of a name is the most salient bearer of that name, or the most
21I will not consider whether it provides a good account of the reference of demonstratives.
22Or, at least, names are unlike the way Mount claims demonstratives to be.
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salient object that is plausibly the referent of the name might be considered.
But it is unclear how these could be implemented. We might simply modify
Mount’s account and say that the referent of a name is the object that is made
the focus of the interlocutors’ attention when the name is used. But this tells
us nothing about reference. There is no more reason to think that this is the
order of explanation than the converse: that it is referring to an object that
focuses attention upon it.23 Indeed, if certain pragmatic factors—which may
vary from occasion to occasion—determine what interlocutors’ attention is
focused on, then those same factors might also be what determines reference,
but it adds nothing to say either that reference determines or is determined
by attention focus. Furthermore, this account of name reference is unlikely to
give any kind of clean results since, given any particular utterance of a name
within a longer utterance, any number of objects might fleetingly be the focus
of interlocutors’ attention, especially if more than one name is uttered, and it
seems unrealistic to suppose that appreciating what a name has referred to
requires focusing one’s attention on that object, however briefly.
Alternatively to this modification of Mount’s view of demonstrative ref-
erence, we might turn to a different idea of salience: one that does not
explicitly appeal to the focus of interlocutors’ attention following the use
of a name. Such an account might entail something along the lines of ‘the
most salient bearer of the name is the bearer of the name that, given the
topic of conversation, location, interests and purposes of the interlocutors,
proximal objects, and other contextual factors, is most likely to be appreciated
by interlocutors as the referent of the name’. However, whilst this might be
considered a perfectly adequate account of the most salient bearer of a name
in a context, it clearly won’t do if it is also supposed to do duty as an account
of proper name reference, since it appeals to likely name reference in the
definition. Moreover, it is unclear to me how the salience of a bearer of a
name could be accounted for without either requiring that a bearer already be
present or apparent to interlocutors, which will clearly rule out good cases of
name use, or mentioning what a use of the name is likely to achieve in the
minds of the interlocutors.
4.2.2 Other Parameters
What other contextual parameters might an indexicalist consider appealing
to in the semantic character they provide for names? Recanati and Pelczar
& Rainsbury both mention Gricean conversational maxims playing a rôle in
differentiating between rival referents, though it does not appear that they
23Thanks to Alex Clark for highlighting this point.
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intend these to be codified into the semantics. Other options might include
conversational topic, proximity, the interests and purposes of interlocutors,
linguistic context, previous reference, general relevance, and knowledge or
beliefs of interlocutors about various aspects of each other’s knowledge or
beliefs. It is clear, I think, that none of the items in this list would, by
themselves, be necessary or sufficient for name reference. It is easy either to
think of potential counter-examples, or to see that a factor is not sufficiently
determinate to play the rôle. Rather than stating that any particular contextual
factors are necessary or sufficient for determining reference, the indexicalist
might instead propose a disjunctive character, such that, although no one
factor is necessary or sufficient, the whole disjunction is. This is a similar idea
to Rami’s conditions upon semantic correctness for a use of a name.
My main objection to this strategy is that such a list of possible contextual
factors could, in principle, never be complete, unless the items on the list were
extremely general, at which point, clearly the strategy in uninformative. Again,
it impossible to demonstrate that no finite, determinate list of factors could be
complete, but the strategy for showing that any particular list is incomplete
is, as ever, to provide counter-examples. There are further problems with
the idea of a disjunctive character, however. Firstly, there must, presumably,
be some principle or principles contained in the character that adjudicate in
cases in which particular factors are in conflict with each other with regard to
determining a referent. Such a principle or principles may have to be quite
complex. It is unlikely that something such as a simple majority system, or a
weighting of the factors would be adequate, since in different circumstances,
different pragmatic factors will be relevant in different ways, or not relevant.
Indeed, once this is acknowledged, it is clear that there is a second-order
problem of context-sensitivity: the particular way that context affects the
reference of a name varies from context to context. A second problem with
the disjunctive character approach is that the semantics of a word, according
to the notion of semantics I am employing, is the kind of thing that must be
encoded in some manner in the minds of language-users: it must be learnt
by speakers when they learn the word. But an indefinitely long disjunction
of pragmatic mechanisms, together with rules for their implementation, does
not seem like a plausible candidate for what is learnt when a word is learnt.
The ability to see how a name or other word interacts with the contextual
circumstances in which it is uttered seems much more like something that
comes with domain-general knowledge of the world and how things are with
it on particular occasions than knowledge of the specific meanings of names
or words.
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4.3 Problems with Bearers
Most indexicalist views of proper names, and many other kinds of view
besides, consider a minimal constraint on the semantic reference of a name
to be that the referent bears that name, or has been so dubbed, or something
very similar (e.g. Matushansky 2008; Pelczar and Rainsbury 1998; Recanati
1993; Sawyer 2010). This presents a problem if the views are supposed to offer
a determinate and specific account of the determination of name reference,
or at least to provide a constraint on it. The relation of bearing a name is
highly occasion-sensitive: there are many ways to bear a name, and there are
many ways to have been dubbed. Indeed, different ways of acquiring a name
might well give rise to different ways of bearing it. This state of affairs might
be ok if it appeared to be the case that name reference tracked the occasion-
sensitivity of bearerhood, such that a name only ever referred to objects that
counted as bearers of that name on an occasion of use. However, I will show
that this is not the case. Moreover, it is also not the case that names can only
refer to objects that on other occasions count as bearers of them, or will, at
some point, so count.
4.3.1 Many Ways to Bear, and Not Bear, Names
One can bear a name legally, because it appears on one’s birth certificate;
one can bear a different name because one’s parents use it to refer to one; or
because one’s school friends or maths teacher used it.24 Similarly, one can fail
to bear a name in many ways. And whilst on some occasions one might be the
bearer of a particular name, on others one might not be. One can bear a name
because one chooses to, and, conversely, not bear a name because one has
chosen not to. Such decisions can lead to moral and social limitations on the
use of certain names, but it is not clear whether they can create semantic or
linguistic limitations except after the fact, in virtue of altering general usage.
In this section, I am interested in how names can be used to refer. I will try
to show that this is a different issue to how they should be used with regard
to considerations that go beyond simply referring.
We have already seen, in §4.1.3, examples in which it appears that a name
can refer to object that does not count as bearing it. These are the cases
discussed by Rami regarding past and future bearers:
24Dolf Rami has objected to me that there are actually only two ways to bear a name presented
here: bearing a name officially in some way, and bearing a name because there is a practice of
referring to one with that name. This is, of course, one way to divide up ways. But, as Rami also
pointed out to me, we can simply recast ‘ways of bearing’ in terms of what we would plausibly
say that an object is correctly called in particular kinds of circumstance or situation. This type of
locution captures what I will say below just as well.
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# Leningrad is on the Baltic.
# Byzantium is a major tourist destination.
# Cassius Clay suffers from Parkinson’s syndrome.25
X Karl Marx Stadt is now called ‘Chemnitz’.
X Whiskers, as I think I might call her, is in the kitchen.
As Rami recognized, the first three of these cases are problematic in some
manner, apparently because the objects referred to no longer bear those names.
But, on pain of contradiction, this cannot be because the names used fail refer
to anything. The problem is not that nothing is referred to in these cases so
that the inscriptions come out false, or neither true nor false. Whatever is
at fault with these cases, and I acknowledge that something is, the names
used refer, or have the potential to refer, to objects that used to bear those
names. In the last two cases, there seems to be nothing at all wrong with
the inscriptions. One might imagine that, in the case of ‘Karl Marx Stadt is
now called “Chemnitz”’, a prior, perhaps infelicitous, use of ‘Karl Marx Stadt’
might have occurred, to which this inscription is a correction, but this only
seems to highlight that the name can be used referentially, although the city
no longer bears it.
One way to respond to this kind of data would be to claim that it is the
existence of a name/bearer relation at reference time rather than speech time
that is significant. Thus ‘Leningrad was the second largest city in the Soviet
Union’ is felicitous because the city referred to was called ‘Leningrad’ for most
of the time that the Soviet Union existed. However, this does not explain why
current names can be used felicitously to refer to their bearers at reference
times prior to their coining: ‘St Petersburg was besieged during the Second
World War’. It might be that it is fine to use current names at any reference
time, but past names can only be used at reference times at which they were
current. However, not only is such an account rather convoluted, it still cannot
account for entirely felicitous utterances such as ‘Karl Marx Stadt is now called
“Chemnitz”’, in which a past name’s reference time coincides with its speech
time. Moreover, it is hard to see how the proponent of such an account could
explain how reference seems to work fine whatever the name or reference
time, but felicity is significantly affected.
Another way to respond might be to claim that names do not easily lose
bearers, and that in all of these cases of apparent former name use, the names
25This section was written prior to Muhammad Ali’s death. I have not adjusted tenses where
it would affect the point of my examples. Though, in fact, this particular example might now be
even more infelicitous: # Cassius Clay suffered from Parkinson’s syndrome.
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are still in fact borne by their referents, at least in the contexts in which they
are being used26—as evidenced by the fact that their use is still possible in
these contexts. However, this response seems unsatisfactory. It appears that
the notion of name-bearing being appealed to by indexicalists is the same
as, or very close to, the ordinary language kind of conception of bearing a
name, or having a name, or being called by a name (as in ‘The city is called
“St Petersburg”’). According to Recanati, the name-bearing conventions he
appeals to are social conventions, and presumably are supposed to be the
same social conventions that speakers are aware of as they track namings
and the use of names. But, as far as I am aware, according to this ordinary
conception of naming conventions, it is quite possible for the names of objects
to change, such that one name stops being the name of an object, and another
takes its place as the object’s name.27 Indeed, this seems like the natural
explanation for what happened in the case of St Petersburg—a city whose
name changed three times during the Twentieth Century. If this is not the
kind of convention that Recanati or other indexicalists have in mind, then they
must provide some account of the nature of the social conventions they are
appealing to, such that objects can gain, but rarely lose, names, and which are
largely insensitive to the authority both of recognized namers, and of general
use.
The bearer-reliant indexicalist might claim that objects can lose names,
but only when their use has completely ceased. Or, at least, that they only
lose names in all contexts when their use has completely ceased. We might
then reasonably ask in what kinds of contexts objects still bear names that
are widely considered to be merely former names. The answer clearly cannot
be: those in which the name still refers to the object, on pain of begging the
question. The idea that a name/bearer relationship is simply dead once its
use has ceased is also strange. Presumably, there must be a long period in
which the name is not used to refer to the object in question before it can be
considered forgotten as a name for that object. Consider an ancient settlement,
the remnants of which are buried deep underground, and which has been
forgotten for so long that no one has referred to it by its name for thousands of
years. It appears that the settlement can still bear the name: if an archeologist
were to discover the ruins of the settlement, and find written evidence of its
name, she could speak that name and refer to the settlement, and it would be
natural to say that she had discovered its name. It might no longer be regarded
as bearing the name, however: if the settlement had been discovered well
26Recanati has indicated, at least in conversation, that this would be his preferred route.
27Though, of course, objects can have multiple names simultaneously. For example, Derry/
Londonderry.
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before the written evidence was discovered, it might have already been given
a name by the archeologists, and if, when the original name was discovered, it
was particularly hard to pronounce in modern English, the new name might
stick and we would say ‘the settlement was called “such-and-such” by its
inhabitants’, but not necessarily ‘the real name of the settlement has been
discovered’. Of course, this may be very sensitive to context, and there would
be perfectly good ways of talking by which the settlement did bear the name.
It seems clear, however, that simply going out of use is not sufficient for
a name to stop having a particular bearer. So this is not a route that the
indexicalist can take to explain when a name loses a bearer, or vice versa.
A further problem that the indexicalist must face if they wish to claim that
the referent of a name must bear it at the time of use, is that they must come
up with an explanation for why utterances such as ‘Leningrad is on the Baltic’
so often sound infelicitous, without appealing to names changing. They could
perhaps appeal to different ways of bearing names and state that although St
Petersburg changed its official name, the City officials (or the Kremlin) had
no power to effect its status with regard to the social name-using convention
associating it with ‘Leningrad’. It must then be claimed that the existence of
any variety of name-using practice is sufficient for allowing reference, but,
for some reason, current official naming practices are relevant to whether or
not a reference to a city sounds admissible or strange. However, if this line
is adopted, the indexicalist needs to say something about what it is about
official names that is significant to the felicity—but not the reference—of
utterances in some contexts, but not others. Note that there will be contexts,
such as those in which the interlocutors are old Party diehards, in which there
is no infelicity in using ‘Leningrad’ in present tense utterances.
There also appears to be nothing special about names being ‘official’ if this
means something recognized by law. Consider Muhammad Ali. He stopped
bearing the name ‘Cassius Clay’ in popular discourse at some point after he
adopted ‘Muhammad Ali’. Ali explicitly renounced his former name, and
it appears that it is normal to talk about him changing his name, and—as
just demonstrated—referring to ‘Cassius Clay’ as a former name. Certainly,
utterances such as those of the form ‘Cassius Clay suffers from Parkinson’s
syndrome’ will sound strange in many contexts, whilst those of the form
‘Muhammad Ali was born in Louisville’ won’t. If a racist sports reporter
had continued referring to him as ‘Cassius Clay’ after Ali changed his name,
and particularly after his new named had been widely adopted, the reporter
would have been doing something incorrect: presumably committing a social
and moral transgression. However, Ali never legally changed his name. So, in
legal contexts, Ali never stopped being the bearer of ‘Cassius Clay’. If he had
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given his name to the US Court of Appeals as ‘Muhammad Ali’ when he was
appealing his indictment for draft dodging, he would have said something
incorrect in the eyes of the law. It is clear that in both these Ali cases—the
sports reporter and the courtroom—there is no issue with reference: ‘Cassius
Clay’ can be used by the reporter to refer to Ali, even though this is no
longer regarded by the public as his name, and people in the courtroom
would have been able to refer to Ali using ‘Muhammad Ali’, even though
that was not his name in the eyes of the court. The indexicalist who would
maintain that the infelicity of uses of particular names in certain contexts is
not due to referents not bearing those names in those contexts, must provide
an explanation of these cases that does not simply appeal to official names
being felicitous. Even if ‘official name’ is taken to include something like ‘the
most widely used name’, assuming that legal names of people are also official,
a further distinction must be made. Claiming something along the lines of
‘in non-specialist contexts, the most widely used name is the most felicitous’
is also problematic. Firstly, it is unclear how non-specialist contexts could be
identified adequately. Secondly, it seems implausible that such a claim is true:
infelicity is, presumably at least in part, subjective, and hearing it does not
generally require awareness of how most other people use a name, though it
does seem to require awareness of whether or not a name has been changed
in one of various different ways.
4.3.2 Reference Without Bearers
The problems for appealing to name-bearing as a parameter that contributes
to the determination of reference of a name go further than the fact that objects
can bear names in different ways and count as bearers in some contexts and
not others in ways that do not affect reference. It also appears that there are
perfectly good cases of reference that do not merely amount to a speaker
willing that whatever name they are using refers to what they want it to. There
may be many cases in which a speaker has simply mislearned a person’s name,
but nevertheless, they may succeed in referring in many—though perhaps
not all—situations. If the mistake carries on for long enough, and it becomes
recognized by a variety of hearers that the speaker has an idiosyncratic way
of referring to the person, we might wish to say that the mislearned name
has become a name for the person, but this is by no means required for
reference. Consider a case in which Lucy mistakenly believes that Harris
is called ‘Farris’, simply in virtue of having mis-remembered his name, not
because of any mistake about identity involving someone actually named
‘Farris’. Lucy attempts to introduce John to Harris by saying ‘John! Have you
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met Farris here?’ and indicating Harris. It is clear that Lucy can have referred
to Harris with her use of ‘Farris’, even though this is not a name that Harris
bears. Lucy may have committed an embarrassing social faux pas, and she has
failed in at least one thing she set out to do with her words—informing John
of Harris’s name—but it is not clear that she has made any semantic mistake,
or a mistake with regard to reference.
For another example, consider a group of speakers who give a friend a form
of nickname by which they use a 6-digit numeral sequence to address and refer
to her, perhaps as a cruel joke about her prison spell. This nickname can have
exactly the same syntactic use as an English proper name, and be understood
amongst a reasonably large group as a name for the friend. But now suppose
that instead of using a stable numeral sequence, the users of the nickname
generate a sequence at random each time they use it: ‘763549’, ‘477863’, and
‘968732’, for example. This practice can go on for a long time with very little
repetition, as it is relatively easy to spontaneously generate such apparently
random sequences, and there are one million possible combinations (though
some, such as ‘000000’, might never occur). It is easy to imagine that this
naming practice could be effective: amongst those speakers who are aware
of it, it will generally be obvious, at least from linguistic context, that the
nickname is being used, rather than some unrelated 6-digit sequence being
spoken. The nickname(s) clearly refer to the object of the practice since they
are used very effectively to communicate and talk about the object within a
community. However, although we can talk about ‘the object of the practice’,
none of the individual sequences is borne by the friend, or is her name, and
we could even imagine that no sequence is ever used more than once. Here
again, then, we have a case in which uses of terms that strongly resemble
names clearly refer to an object which is not a bearer of those terms, and do
so in a way that clearly does not merely depend upon the intentions of the
particular speaker. It also seems plausible that, although there is a convention
or practice associated with the referential uses of these terms, it is a social
phenomenon, not a semantic one, and one that does not seem to form any
essential part of the semantics of the terms.
The kinds of example I have considered in this section are supposed to
lend credence to the idea that notions such as name/bearer relations, naming
conventions, and dubbings-in-force, are not the kinds of thing that can play
the rôle of determinate contextual parameters that will, on any occasion
determine, or contribute to the determination of, the reference of a name.
At least, not in the way that seems to be envisaged by most indexicalists.
It would be possible to add in piecemeal additions or exclusions to the
semantic character of names in order to account for the various kinds of
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consideration I have offered, and to continue to do so as more are thought
of or arise, much as Rami seems to propose for his conditions on semantic
correctness. However, even more so than for Rami’s conditions, this would
seem to undermine something in the nature of a semantic character that
determines reference. It would be to attempt to incorporate contingent and
highly contextual considerations about how names can be made to work
on particular occasions into the general, context-insensitive, meaning of
names. These complex social considerations about reference that would
have to be codified and systematized—something that is anathema to such
phenomena—in order for them to be contained in semantics. Far simpler,
then, to postulate that the meanings of names do not essentially involve them,
reference occurring in a pragmatically determined way on occasions of use,
and it may or may not be affected by social conventions pertaining to the
use of names. If certain other pragmatic factors outweigh the usual social
pressures, and, for example, a name is used to refer to something that does
not bear that name, though the error may be significant, it is a social, or even
a moral error, not a semantic one.
4.4 Indexicalism: Not all Bad
So far, my criticisms of indexicalist accounts of proper names have focussed on
a particular understanding of indexicalism: that characterized by the claims (i),
(ii) and (iii) or (iii*), as introduced at the beginning of this chapter. This does
seem to be the view of most indexicalists, and it is inspired by a particular
conception of indexicals: one in which the semantic meaning of the indexical
specifies how its reference will be determined, relative to a context of use.
However, if one were to conceive of indexicals differently, it might be that the
comparison between indexicals and proper names would be more compelling.
If one didn’t imagine that the semantics of an indexical was, in principle,
supposed to provide truth-conditions for it, then many of the problems I have
raised for the indexicalists would be less pressing.28 And, indeed, if one were
to generalize the position I espouse with regard to proper name reference to
the reference of other terms, one would be inclined to abandon that view of
the semantics of indexicals.
My primary objection to indexicalist accounts of proper names has been
that there could, in principle, be no set of determinate contextual parameters
such that they could, together, determine the reference of a name on every
28As I have stated, Rami, apparently unlike Recanati and Pelczar & Rainsbury, doesn’t do
this. However, his placing of semantic constraints on the use of names presents different, though
related, problems.
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occasion of use. Clearly, however, if indexicalists were to claim that the
reference of indexicals is not determined by their semantics in the manner just
alluded to, but that names are like indexicals in some other manner, then my
arguments would have no teeth, and my main grievance with the indexicalists
would evaporate. It may well be that many indexicalists would cease to have
a view on how proper name reference is determined, and would instead, like
many predicativists and variablists, simply be interested in the semantic form
of names. Under such circumstances, I might be inclined to wonder how like
the meanings of indexicals the meaning of names really is, since a number of
indexicals appear to have more detailed meanings than names, but this worry
would depend heavily on just what was being said about the semantics of
indexicals, and indeed semantics in general.
‘
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Chapter 5
Reference as Speaker Reference:
Intention-Based Accounts
Inten[t]ions are creatures of darkness, and I
shall rejoice with the reader when they are
exorcised
W.V.O. Quine, ‘Quantifiers and
Propositional Attitudes’ (modified)
There is a view of proper name reference available in logical space thatis not, strictly speaking, an example of a semantic view, but also doesnot correspond to the pragmatic view I will espouse in part III. Though
it might be considered pragmatic upon some interpretations of the term. This
is the view that proper name reference of the sort generally considered to fall
into the category of semantic reference—reference that contributes to the truth-
conditions of an utterance—is essentially determined by speakers’ intentions,
rather than by factors external to speakers. At its very simplest, such a view
would be use-relative, like indexicalism, and my pragmatic view, and would
simply state that what is referred to by, or with, a name on an occasion of
use is whatever the speaker intended to refer to with their use of the name (if
anything). Whether such a simply-stated position could actually result in a
viable account is unclear since it says nothing so far about what constitutes an
intention to refer. However, even if it did produce an account of reference that
were able to give an indication of what uses of names referred to, it would be
inadequate in accounting for intuitions about the reference of certain uses of
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names. This is because it is essentially just a version of the radical internalist
approach to meaning known as Humpty-Dumptyism. Widely regarded as
wholly untenable, this is the position whereby it is possible for a speaker to
express a thought or proposition using any words they wish—or, in our case,
refer to whatever they like using whatever name they like—regardless of how
those words are commonly used, simply in virtue of their intention to do so.
Such intentions are unconstrained by (beliefs about) how effective the words
will be at communicating the thought, proposition, or reference.
Travis (1980) addresses just this kind of view—that intentions determine
reference—and observes its obvious flaws whilst making an important point
about the external nature of reference:
[D]o a referrer’s intentions always determine what was referred to? Ap-
parently not. Suppose, e.g., those intentions are bizarre. [Footnote
suppressed] Sam walks up to a stranger (Max) on the streets of Azuza,
points at Max’s Afghan and says, ‘The dog is hot.’ with the intention of
commenting on a certain Rottweiler in Arnhem. Or, Esmeralda finally
takes her whippet to the vet’s, after which Herbert, who has been treated
to daily reports on the dog’s health, calls and asks, ‘How’s the dog?’. To
this, Esmeralda replies ‘The dog is fine.’, with the intention of reporting
on her cousin Harry’s spaniel (of which Herbert has never heard). Two
things seem clear: first, Sam didn’t refer to the Rottweiler, nor Esmeralda
to the spaniel (though in one sense each may have been referring to
that intended dog1), and second, Sam did tell Max that his Afghan was
hot, hence referred to the Afghan, and similarly Esmeralda told Herbert
(perhaps without meaning to) that her whippet was fine. With making
references, as with anything else people do, good intentions are not enough.
(ibid., p. 148–149)
To my knowledge, this Humpty-Dumpty view of name reference has never
been seriously defended in print, though Predelli (1998, 2002) comes close to
proposing a Humpty-Dumpty view of the reference of indexicals. Accounts
of names that invoke speaker intentions as referential mechanisms for truth-
conditionally relevant reference (i.e. not ‘mere’ speaker reference) generally
place constraints on the way that intentions can determine reference. This is
done either by specifying that in addition to being the object of a speaker’s
referential intention, a referent must also fulfil certain criteria, or by placing
constraints directly upon the kinds of intention that are relevant to reference.
This latter option is likely to be adopted by advocates of Gricean or neo-
Gricean approaches to meaning, whereby the intentions that are relevant to
1This is the sense in which a speaker can report their intentions or supposed intentions
making use of the imperfect aspect of a verb, mentioned in n. 14, p. 83.
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meaning and communication take a particular reflexive form: the speaker
must intend to express something by their utterance, and intend that their
audience comes to appreciate that that is their intention by means of their
utterance. However, the view that Gricean-type communicative intentions are
the sole determiner of name reference would require a particularly strong
kind of Griceanism.
In this chapter I will briefly discuss the idea that proper name reference
is determined by a speakers referential intentions together with certain
constraints, by addressing the view of names proposed by Michaelson (2013).
I will then, in a digression from the rest of the thesis, discuss the strong kind
of Griceanism not in the context of names, but much more generally. In a
largely free-standing section, I argue against a form of neo-Griceanism found
in certain works by Stephen Neale, amongst others, on the basis of certain data
from experimental psychology. Whilst it is not clear that Neale actually holds
that reference is solely determined by speakers’ communicative intentions in
these works, it is certainly true that a neo-Gricean holding such a view of
reference would have very similar commitments to Neale, and so face the
same problems.
5.1 Constraint-based Intentionalism
5.1.1 Michaelson
Michaelson (ibid.) proposes an account of proper name reference whereby the
reference of a name on an occasion of use is just whatever object the speaker
intends to refer to with that use, so long as that object is a bearer of that name
in the context, and so long as only one bearer is so intended. Nothing will
be referred to if there is no object that the speaker intends to refer to that is
a bearer of the name, nor if there is more than one object that the speaker
intends to refer to that bears the name. Specifically, Michaelson says:
The use of a name N refers to o1 when (i) the speaker intends to refer to
o1, (ii) o1 bears the name N in context, and (iii) there is no object o2 such
o1 6= o2 and both (i) and (ii) also hold for o2. Otherwise, it fails to refer.
(ibid., p. 68)
Michaelson’s account is thus somewhat similar to the account of Recanati
(1993), but with an additional—and foundational—intentionalist element, and
with the difference that, apart from the notion of being a bearer in context,
which Michaelson does not elaborate on, context is not left the task of selecting
between rival bearers.
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Michaelson’s account of name reference appeals to intentions because,
like Griceans, he believes that language can be conceived of ‘as being in
part a system for signalling our intentions for other agents to those agents’
(Michaelson 2013, p. 64). To transmit a thought, then, involves transmitting
information about a speaker’s intentions. And to communicate about an
object, it is necessary for a speaker to get an audience to recognize that
they intend them to entertain a thought about the object (p. 65). Michaelson
maintains that, in using a name, a speaker means to indicate that they have
some object in mind and that it is a bearer of the name. Moreover: ‘by
signalling to the listener that her intended referent bears the name N, the
speaker thereby commits herself to her intended referent bearing that name’
(p. 66). So, Michaelson’s view is that, in using a name, a speaker expressly
commits themself, on pain of misusing the name and potentially failing to
refer to anything, to there being some object that they intend to refer to,
and—as a logical consequence of them succeeding in referring—to that object
bearing the name.
5.1.2 Problems with Michaelson
Michaelson acknowledges that, on his view of reference, there is a gap between
what thought an utterance can be used to communicate in a context, and
its truth-conditional content. This is partly because, according to him, and
unlike on the Gricean picture, a speaker can refer to an object in such a way
that they know that their audience is very unlikely to appreciate what is
being referred to. But the problem will also clearly arise in cases in which,
intentionally or not, a speaker uses a name to communicate something about
an object that does not bear that name. Michaelson mentions a case (the leaf-
raking case from Kripke (1977)) in which interlocutors mistake Smith, who
is raking leaves, for Jones, and one says to the other, ‘Jones is raking leaves’.
According to Michaelson’s account of names, the speaker has semantically
referred only to Jones, and asserted something false of him (assuming he is not
also, quite by chance, raking leaves). This is in spite of the fact that it might
appear that the speaker has succeeded in communicating something true
about Smith to their hearer. Michaelson claims that the speaker’s confused
thoughts may have been communicated, but this is irrelevant to the truth-
conditional content of their utterance. Presumably, in a simpler case in which
a speaker has simply got their intended referent’s name wrong, rather than
mistaking them for someone else, Michaelson would also be inclined to say
that whatever is communicated, reference has failed. Michaelson claims to
leave room for some account by which a speaker’s intention to refer has a
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bearing on communication, even if the intended referent is not a bearer in the
context. However, he does not say what that bearing is, nor does he provide
any clue about how he would account for unintended communication about
non-bearers, or apparently true utterances about non-bearers.
I discussed bearer constraints at length in §4.3, and indicated why limiting
the reference of names just to bearers in context eliminates perfectly good
cases of reference. All such arguments apply to Michaelson as to indexicalists,
if not more so, since his constraint is so strong. Further problems arise
with regard to his claims that speakers’ intentions are inherently relevant to
reference. Michaelson is well aware that his account produces results that
some theorists—myself included—find counter-intuitive, particularly with
regard to cases in which a speaker’s intentions trump the communicative
potential of their use of a name. I will not concern myself here with tub-
thumping about the intuitions surrounding such cases. However, I believe
that there will be cases both in which speakers refer to objects that they do
not intend to, and in which reference fails because a speaker uses a name
in such a way that their intended reference is opaque to their audience.
Michaelson may simply reject that there are such cases, maintaining again
that the communicative potential of an utterance is a wholly separate issue to
the truth-conditional content that that utterance expresses.
Michaelson suggests that it acceptable for communication to come apart
from truth-conditions, given a particular way of understanding the rôle of
truth-conditional meaning, whereby the thoughts that might be transmitted
by means of an utterance need not be directly or literally expressed by that
utterance (Michaelson 2013, p. 74). This leads him to suggest that truth-
conditions enable us to hold one another accountable for the reliableness or
unreliableness of the things we say ‘independent of any particular commu-
nicative aims we might have in context’. This seems to get things the wrong
way round. What is said with an utterance, i.e., what its truth-conditional
(or truth-evaluable) content is, as I conceive of it, is constrained by what it
would be reasonable to expect, or what it would be reasonable to take to have
been said, given the particular circumstances of utterance. A speaker may fail
to say or communicate what they intend to with an utterance because they
are not reasonable. Similarly, an audience may take a speaker to have said
something they did not intend, or that they did not in fact say, because either
speaker or audience is not reasonable. But it does not seem plausible that a
speaker can successfully communicate a thought or thought-like content to
their audience with an utterance except in virtue of having expressed that
content with the utterance. Therefore, it is unclear how we could hold each
other reliable or unreliable independently of the thoughts we communicate,
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or have reasonably tried to communicate.
5.2 Against a Strong Neo-Griceanism
In the last half-century, Paul Grice’s speculative work on the nature of
meaning has been developed, in a variety of ways, into a rich, and apparently
productive, research programme. At the heart of the Gricean and neo-Gricean
programme stands an analysis of meaning that connects our everyday notion
of ‘meaning’ to a particular sort of intentional structure, aimed at conveying
certain information to one’s listener. This analysis appears to provide a
satisfying picture of the connection between meaning and communication,
and a way of distinguishing semantic from non-semantic intuitions about
language-use.
In this section, I argue that the particular intentional structures posited by
Griceans stand in conflict with findings in empirical psychology. Communica-
tion, as conceived of by Grice and his followers, is characterized by various
(more or less complicated) descriptions of an audience’s recognition of a
speaker’s intentions (their speaker meaning2) both to transmit information and
for the audience to recognize that intention to transmit the information (e.g.
Grice 1969; Sperber and Wilson 1986). If that model of communication were
correct, it would entail that, when speakers intend to communicate something,
they must, as a matter of course, intend to make those communicative
intentions transparent to their audience. It would also entail that for there
to be any question of communication, audiences must have the capacity to
identify the intentions of a speaker.
This latter consequence, in particular, has been challenged by linguists,
psychologists and philosophers, on the basis that not all language-users
are capable of the high-level intention-recognition required by Griceans, yet
appear to be capable of communicating (Breheny 2006; Glüer and Pagin 2003;
Gregoromichelaki et al. 2011; Keysar 2007; Laurence 1998; Millikan 2005). I
will appeal to related data in order to attack the former consequence, that
speakers, as a matter of course, form utterances on the basis of intending that
their audience recognize their meaning.
To this end, I initially take Neale (2004), and (ms.), as representative of
the neo-Gricean programme, since they expound one of the best developed
and philosophically sophisticated entries in that programme. These papers
present an interesting and original contemporary approach to Grice, which
the author takes to be faithful to Grice’s own project (Neale ms., pp. 24-
25). They argue for a particular interpretation of how speaker meaning is
2Referred to by Grice himself as ‘utterer’s meaning’.
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determined, and how this relates to other notions that arise in language-
oriented disciplines. A significant tenet of Neale’s project is that speaker
intentions are the sole determiner of what is said with an utterance—its truth-
evaluable, or propositional content. Speaker intentions are thus claimed to
metaphysically or constitutively determine an utterance’s content, in contrast to
mechanisms which merely enable epistemic determination by the audience of
what a speaker said (working out what was said), but play no rôle in fixing it
(Neale 2004, pp. 76, 78, 88; ms., p. 48).
Variations on the this move—placing the burden of providing content on
to a speaker’s intentions—have been adopted by other theorists of language
to similar ends, and so the problem I present for Neale will generalize to
their positions as well. This move presents a problem because it requires that
certain constraints be placed upon a speaker’s intentions such that they do
not fall into Humpty-Dumptyism and have speakers able to express anything
they please with any utterance. These constraints often amount to stating that
a speaker cannot intend to express with an utterance what they believe could
not be communicated with that utterance. For neo-Griceans, this means that
speakers must, as a matter of course, take into account (their beliefs about)
their specific audience’s perspective and capacity to understand what they say.
However, this is precisely what is brought into question by the psychological
data to which I will appeal: Horton and Keysar (1996) and Keysar (2007)
claim that when forming utterances, speakers do not, as a matter of course,
take the perspective of their audience into account. Neale and other neo-
Griceans seem to be trapped, then, between allowing that speakers cannot say
whatever they like with any utterance, and accounting for the way in which
speakers actually appear to form utterances. Having introduced this problem,
I consider various ways in which Neale might avoid it and conclude that none
of them will work. I then discuss how other philosophers in the neo-Gricean
tradition will be affected by the problem in a manner similar to Neale.
Neale (ms.), which contains the most explicit statement of the strong
neo-Gricean view that propositional content is determined solely by com-
municative intentions, does not specifically mention reference. However,
since reference appears to have a bearing on the propositional content of
utterances containing names and other referring terms, we might suppose
that their contribution to this content is also determined solely by speakers’
communicative intentions. Neale (2004) explicitly states:
Who or what A is referring to by uttering some expression X is determined
by A’s referential intentions in uttering X. (ibid., p. 80)
However, he goes on:
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Nonetheless, a distinction between what A referred to and what A
intended to refer to is not one obviously lacking a point. So, in the
first instance we should separate (i) who or what A intended to refer to
by an expression X on a given occasion, and (ii) who or what a rational,
reasonably well-informed interpreter in B’s shoes thinks A intended to
refer to by X on that occasion. In cases where (i)=(ii), we can talk freely
about what the speaker referred to. (In cases where (i) 6=(ii), we could
argue about which of (i) or (ii) or some third thing has the ‘right’ to be
called the person or thing referred to, but what would be the point? First,
what third thing distinct from (i) and (ii) could be of any significance to
a theory of interpretation? There is simply no role for a transcendent
notion of what was referred to upon which (i) and (ii) converge when all
goes well. Second, why is a choice even needed in cases where (i) 6=(ii)?
Conceptually they are distinct, and they are both needed in a theory of
interpretation. When all goes well, they coincide, and it’s just too bad they
don’t always do so. Surely there is no philosophical payoff in bestowing
the honorific ‘what was referred to’ on one rather than the other when
they diverge.) (Neale 2004, p. 80)
These quotations appear somewhat in tension with each other: if what a
speaker is referring to with an expression is determined by their referential
intentions, why is it relevant to what they referred to what a rational, reason-
ably well-informed interpreter in the shoes of the audience takes them to have
referred to? In what way is the latter needed for a theory of interpretation?
Neale clarifies by stating that referential intentions are constrained, just
as general communicative intentions are, by what the speaker believes they
can communicate using the expression in question. Indeed, Neale uses almost
identical language to describe the nature of communicative and referential
intentions. In the case of referential intentions, he says:
A cannot (intend to) refer to some particular person α by uttering some
expression X on a given occasion if [s]he believes it is impossible for h[er]
audience B (or at least any rational, reasonably well-informed interpreter
in B’s shoes) to construe him as referring to α. (ibid., p. 80)
It appears, then, that (ii), from the quotation above, is involved in the inter-
pretation of referring expression in virtue of this constraint upon referential
intentions. However, despite his talk of rational, reasonably well-informed
interpreters, this comes into the account only parenthetically, in an act of
apparent equivocation. Exactly what Neale intends here is discussed for
the general case of communicative intentions below. As I have made clear,
however, I do not intend to suggest that Neale is strongly committed to the
view that proper name reference is determined solely by speakers’ Gricean
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intentions. Rather I claim that anyone making such a claim would likely
be committed to a version of neo-Griceanism at least as strong as Neale’s,
and thus subject to the objections I make to his account of speakers’ general
communicative intentions.
5.2.1 Neale on speaker meaning
For Grice, the speaker meaning3 of an utterance is, at its most basic, what
the speaker intends to communicate with the utterance. It is what follows
expressions of the type ‘Speaker S meant by uttering X that. . . ’ (Grice 1969,
p. 91). The notion is spelt out in various, increasingly complex ways by Grice,
and those who took up his project, but the following vague generalization
incorporates many of them:
“A meant something by x” is (roughly) equivalent to “A intended the
utterance of x to produce some effect in an audience by means of the
recognition of this intention”. (Grice 1957, p. 220)
Neale (2004) makes the following statement regarding the connection
between speaker meaning, and intentions, and what is said:
What [S] meant by uttering X can be factored into what [S] said (or asked)
by uttering X and what [S] only implied. Thus, again following Grice,
what [S] said and what [S] implied are determined by, and only by, certain
very specific interpreter-directed intentions [S] had in uttering X. (ibid.,
p. 78)
He goes on to say, with regard to truth, that
What [S] says and implies are the sorts of things that are true or false.
(ibid., p. 79)
And, with regard to semantic content,
If talk of the ‘semantic content’ of a sentence X relative to a context C is
just a snazzy way of talking about what the speaker said by uttering X
on a particular occasion—the occasion that C is being used to partially
model—then of course we can accept its empirical significance.(ibid., p. 79)
From these statements, it seems very plausible to take Neale to hold that the
truth-evaluable, or propositional, content of an utterance is solely determined
by the audience-directed intentions of the speaker.
Neale (ms.) makes this position even more explicit, providing the following
principles:
3Or the utterer’s (occasion-)meaning.
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T1 Audience-directed intentions [speaker] S had in uttering a sentence
X (on a given occasion) are the sole “suppliers” of any propositional
content there is to what S says and what S implicates by uttering X
(on that occasion).
T2 Thinking that the linguistic meaning of X, the context in which X is
uttered, or indeed, anything other than audience-directed intentions
S had in uttering X (on a given occasion) [are] “suppliers” of any
content there is to what S says by uttering X (on that occasion)
is a mistake typically engendered by (a) conflating constitutive and
epistemic notions of the “determination” of the content of what S says,
and (b) conflating facts that constitutively determine the content of
a communicative intention with facts that formatically determine
it, by which I mean facts that causally contain the formation of a
communicative intention with that content, (c) misunderstanding
how sentence meaning, speaker, saying, implicating, and various
other notions fit together in a nexus of theoretical concepts, or (d)
a misunderstanding of what semantic and pragmatic theories can
plausibly hope to explain.
(Neale ms., p. 28)
The key speaker intentions in Neale’s account of meaning are meaning or
communicative intentions. He characterizes their formation thusly:
S thinks that by producing an utterance of X [she] will likely get [her]
audience, A, to see that S intends A to think that p at least partly on the
basis of recognizing that S uttered X intending A to think that p. (ibid.,
p. 46)
But Neale warns that the formation of such intentions is moderated by the
speaker’s beliefs:
[A]ssuming [s]he is being co-operative S cannot mean that p by uttering
some sentence X if [s]he believes it is impossible for [her] audience A (or
at least any rational, reasonably well-informed interpreter in A’s shoes) to
construe [her] as meaning that p. (Neale 2004, p. 77).
So, communicative intentions are moderated by the speaker’s beliefs about
what it is possible to communicate with their words, which are themselves
moderated (or constituted) by their beliefs about how the hearer(s) will
interpret the speakers intentions, given the conventional meanings of words,
the context of utterance, etc. (ibid., pp. 77, 78; ms., p. 47). It is this idea, that a
speaker’s beliefs moderate their communicative intentions, that is supposed
to prevent Neale’s view from collapsing into Humpty-Dumptyism, and is thus
key to making the account plausible at all.
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By appealing to experimental psychological data regarding the formation
of utterances, I will undermine Neale’s idea that a speaker’s beliefs about
their audience’s capacity to interpret an utterance moderate their meaning
intentions. He is committed to this idea because, according to his account
of speaker meaning, speakers must intend to make their communicative
intentions transparent to their audience. Thus, I will argue that, unless
Neale’s account is significantly adapted, in a manner he is likely to find
unacceptable, it is either incompatible with empirical data, or collapses into
Humpty-Dumptyism. This result will, however, not only apply to Neale.
The idea that Humpty-Dumptyism can be escaped by appeals to speakers’
intentions being moderated by their beliefs about what can be communicated
is also put forward by Donnellan (1968) and Bach (2012), and is appealed to
by Buchanan (2013) and Harris (2014), amongst others. Their accounts will
therefore also be affected by the psychological implausibility of that idea.
5.2.2 Data on utterance formation
Various experimental results (see, e.g., Mitchell, Robinson, and Thompson
1999; Wellman, Cross, and Watson 2001; Wimmer and Perner 1983) have been
taken to show that children do not consider that the mental states of others
might differ from their own (they do not mind-read) until around four years.
One paradigmatic experiment is explicated in Breheny (2006), which surveys
such studies, thus:
1. Puppets Sally, Anne and subject play with sweetie. Sally places
sweetie in container A.
2. Sally departs. Anne moves sweetie from container A to container B.
3. Sally returns. Subject is asked, ‘Where does Sally think her sweetie
is?’ [or ‘Where will Sally look for her sweetie?’].
(ibid., p. 76)
Children under the age of four systematically give the ‘wrong’ answer to
the question in 3., responding that Sally thinks sweetie is in (or will look
in) container B, but after that age, they begin to get the ‘right’ answer
systematically. The researchers carrying out and interpreting these and similar
experiments generally take them to show that the children ‘failing’ the test
do so because they are not yet capable of reasoning about the mental states
of others, as distinct from their own, or do not consider that others may
have different beliefs and mental states, or at least different evidence, from
themselves (cf. Lewis, Hacquard, and Lidz 2012). As is the case for most
(neo-)Griceans (cf. Gregoromichelaki et al. 2011), Neale’s claim that speakers
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intend, when they have communicative intentions, to elicit inferences in their
audience about their intentions already looks psychologically implausible in
light of the data mentioned. Young children, and other speakers who have
a limited theory of mind, seem unlikely to be able to form such complex
intentions about the mental states of others, yet are apparently well able to
communicate, albeit with certain limitations.
However, various studies cited by Keysar (2007) suggest that even adult
speakers do not, as a matter of course, take their audience’s perspective
or ‘shared context’ into account when forming utterances, but rather, form
utterances on an ego-centric basis. Horton and Keysar (1996) present ex-
perimental data supporting the idea that some utterances are formed on an
ego-centric basis. Indeed, Horton and Keysar claim that their data suggest that
speakers plan all their utterances ego-centrically (that is, only taking their own
perspective into account), and then monitor them and update them if they do
not fit the audience’s perspective. However, this update occurs only if there are
sufficient time and memory resources.4 The experiment is designed to test two
contrary models of utterance formation. On the Initial Design model, which is
comparable to the Gricean view, when forming utterances, speakers take their
audience’s perspective into account from the outset. On the Monitoring and
Adjustment model, utterances are initially planned ego-centrically, and then
monitored for consistency with the audience’s perspective.5 The experiment
and its results, are described in Keysar, Barr, and Horton (1998), thus:
[W]e asked participants to describe simple figures to addressees. The
figures were presented in the context of other figures. For example,
the participants described a circle in the context of a larger circle. We
informed some participants that the addressees shared those context
figures, whereas other participants were told that these figures could not
be seen by the addressees (the figures were privileged to the speakers).
The crucial measure was the extent to which speakers’ descriptions relied
on context, which was indicated by their use of adjectives. For example, if
they described the circle as a “small” circle, it suggested that they relied
on the larger context figure.
4Whilst the details of this two-stage account are challenged by some other psychologists
and psycholinguists, notably Susan Brennan and colleagues (e.g. Brennan, Galati, and Kuhlen
2010; Brennan and Hanna 2009), the claim that speakers do not invariably or as a matter of course
take their audience’s perspective into account—as is shown by Horton and Keysar’s data—is not
disputed. I return to this issue below.
5Horton and Keysar (1996) do not go into detail about what mechanisms are involved in
monitoring utterances for compatibility with an audience’s perspective. They indicate that
it involves checking utterances against the common ground, but do not specify, for example,
whether this might involve Gricean-style mind-reading. The precise details will not effect my
argument.
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(a) Time 0
SPEAKERLISTENER
(b) Time 1
SPEAKERLISTENER
Fig. 5.1: An example of a trial in the “privileged context” condition. The lower
object cannot be seen by the listener and constitutes the speaker’s privileged
contrast set. [In Time 0 the speaker described the upper object, which moved
behind the visual barrier into the listener’s part of the screen in Time 1.]
(Horton and Keysar 1996, p.99)
There were 24 subjects, who were asked to describe figures (pieces of
clipart) to a listener who, although believed to be another subject by the
speaker, was always a confederate of the experimenter. There were 16
experimental item sets, which appeared on a computer monitor divided
by a close-fitting perpendicular screen that separated the speaker and listener.
The item sets consisted of a rectangular box, divided vertically into two equal
parts by the screen, the right part visible to the speaker, and the left to the
listener. On the speaker’s side appeared two figures: a moving figure, to
be described, which moved from the speaker’s side, across the screen to the
listener’s side. Below the moving figure was a context figure which differed in
either shape, shade or size from the moving figure. Half the subjects were told
that their listener would never see the context object—privileged context cases,
represented in simplified form by Fig. 5.1—and half were told that the listener
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(a) Time 0
SPEAKERLISTENER
(b) Time 1
SPEAKERLISTENER
Fig. 5.2: An example of a trial in the “shared context” condition. In Time 0 the
speaker described the upper object, which moved behind the visual barrier
into the listener’s part of the screen in Time 1.
(Horton and Keysar 1996, p.97)
could see the context object—shared context cases, represented by Fig. 5.2.6
Additionally, half of each of those groups were told to take as much time as
they liked in describing the figure, whilst the other half were told to begin
describing within 1.5 seconds of the figure’s appearance. In addition to the
16 experimental sets, there were 24 filler sets, identical in set-up except that
when the moving figure crossed the divide, it changed shape (represented
by Fig. 5.3). The listener’s task was to say whether or not the moving figure
appearing on their side was the same figure described by the speaker. The
experiment was divided into two presentations separated by a five-minute
break. Each moving object was presented once in each presentation, though
with a different context object on each occasion (Horton and Keysar 1996,
p.101–104).
The Gricean-type Initial Design model of utterance formation predicts
that when the subject believes their audience shares their visual context, they
6All representations of the item sets are reprinted from Horton and Keysar (1996), with
permission from Elsevier and the authors.
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(a) Time 0
SPEAKERLISTENER
(b) Time 1
SPEAKERLISTENER
Fig. 5.3: An example of a negative-trial filler. The object that moved into the
listener’s screen is different from the one that moved out of the speaker’s
screen.
(Horton and Keysar 1996, p.102)
will describe the moving figure in terms of the context figure, for example,
by saying ‘the smaller circle’. However, when the subject believes that the
audience does not share their visual context, the model predicts that the
subject will not make reference to the other figures. The Monitoring and
Adjustment model makes the same predictions under normal circumstances,
but predicts that if the subject is not given the opportunity to adjust their
initial plan before speaking, if they are under time pressure for example, then
they will describe the figure in terms of their own perspective, demonstrated
by their making reference to other figures, whether or not they have been
told that the audience shares their visual context. This—the prediction of the
second model—is just what the experimenters found:
The results were straightforward. First, speakers relied on context
more often when it was shared than when it was privileged to them. This
result is predicted by both models, and suggests that the final descriptions
were sensitive to the perspective of the addressees. The critical test came
when we asked the speakers to perform under time constraints (i.e., to
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start talking 1.5s after they saw each figure). Under time pressure, their
descriptions were just as likely to rely on a privileged as on shared context.
This is precisely what the monitoring-and-adjustment model predicts:
Under pressure, speakers do not have sufficient time and resources to
monitor and correct their utterances, and consequently they fall back on
their initial plans. These plans are egocentric in the sense that they are
not sensitive to the common ground with addressees: The speakers rely
on their own context regardless of whether it is part of common ground.
(Keysar, Barr, and Horton 1998, p. 47)
The experiment had two context conditions and two initiation speed
conditions. The results were coded according to whether or not the speaker
appealed to context in their description by, for example, using a relative adjec-
tive. Coders were aware of what the context object was for each description,
but unaware of either of the experimental conditions (Horton and Keysar 1996,
p. 106). The results are represented in Table 5.1 and Fig. 5.4, reproduced from
Horton and Keysar (ibid., pp. 107–8).
Initiation speed
Unspeeded Speeded
Context-related
Shared context 0.74 0.48
Privileged context 0.24 0.43
Context-unrelated
Shared context 0.76 0.82
Privileged context 1.35 0.68
Table 5.1: Mean number of context-related and context un-related adjectives per
description as a function of context condition and initiation speed (during second
presentation).
Shared
Unspeeded
Privileged
Shared
Speeded
Privileged
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3
Fig. 5.4: Mean ratio of context-related adjectives to the total number of adjectives plus
nouns per description as a function of context information and initiation speed, for the
second presentation.
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Horton and Keysar’s results convincingly suggest that, between the two
models proposed, the Monitoring and Adjustment model is to be preferred
over the Initial Design model, assuming that they are reliable and general-
izable. Proponents of the Initial Design model, which aligns with Gricean
notions of utterance formation, are unable to explain why time pressure makes
any difference to how likely speakers are to take their audience’s perspective
into account, since they claim that speakers take audience perspective into
account as a matter of course when initially planning utterances. There is
no scope for the position that speakers, by default or as a rule, take their
audience into account when initially planning utterances but, in performance,
sometimes fail to do so for various reasons. Assuming that Horton and
Keysar’s results are not anomalous,7 they appear precisely to show, by the
contrast between the time-constrained and the unconstrained results, that allo-
centric planning—planning involving the perspective of others—is not the
default when forming utterances.
Brennan and Hanna (2009) and Brennan, Galati, and Kuhlen (2010) chal-
lenge the two-stage model of utterance formation proposed in Horton and
Keysar (1996), Keysar, Barr, and Horton (1998), and Keysar (2007), among
others, on the grounds of criticism of the methodology of certain apparently
supportive experiments, and of evidence found in other studies suggestive of
spontaneous interaction between interlocutors (Brennan, Galati, and Kuhlen
2010, p. 325). Brennan and her colleagues accuse theorists who deny that
speakers mentalize about their audiences of being unable to account for
ubiquitous incrementality, co-ordination, and apparent joint action in dialogue.
However, Gregoromichelaki et al. (2011) present a model of dialogue which
is able to account such phenomena—indeed, is entirely driven by them—
whilst being directly informed by the research criticized by Brennan, and
propounded directly in opposition to (neo-)Gricean accounts of communi-
cation. Gregoromichelaki et al. claim that interlocutors develop individual
representations of a dialogue in tandem, without the need for representing
each other’s mental states or creating joint structures (ibid., pp. 225–6).
However, even if we were to lend weight to the worries of Brennan and
her colleagues, their specific criticisms of the two-stage model, and the details
of Brennan’s positive views, will not affect the thrust of my attack on the
(neo-)Gricean framework. The two-stage model involves the strong view that
all initial utterance formation is wholly ego-centric, modular, and encapsulated
against consideration of information about audience perspective, and it is this
strong claim that Brennan and her colleagues attack. However, they do not
7Keysar (2007) cites similar findings in other studies.
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claim that findings such as that of Horton and Keysar (1996) are not evidence
of ego-centric utterance formation, they merely claim:
[P]rocessing need not be encapsulated from relevant partner-specific
information that is straightforward and known in advance. Under some
circumstances, speakers can adjust immediately to their addressees’
needs or perspectives, even when different from their own. (Brennan,
Galati, and Kuhlen 2010, p. 335, my emphasis)
This limited claim, that speaker’s awareness of their audience’s perspective
can play a rôle in utterance formation, is significantly weaker than that being
made by Neale and other neo-Griceans. Neale requires that a speaker’s beliefs
about their audience’s perspective moderate their communicative intentions
as a matter of course. The data presented by Keysar (2007) suggests that
speakers do not take the perspective of their audience into account as a matter
of course when forming utterances. Therefore, their beliefs about what their
audience will infer seem irrelevant. This is a significant problem for Neale. In
§5.2.3, I consider ways in which Neale might try to avoid this problem, and in
§5.2.4 I expand the problem to other neo-Griceans.
5.2.3 Ways Out for Neale
Consider a speaker, Elaine, who is taking part in an experiment like that
of Horton and Keysar (1996). On her monitor is displayed a grey boot (the
moving object), with a paler grey boot below it (the context object). Elaine is
told that her listener, George, does not have the context object on his screen.
Elaine is asked to start describing the moving object within 1.5 seconds of it
beginning to move. When it does begin to move, Elaine describes the object as
‘the darker boot’, even though she knows George does not have a lighter boot
to compare it to. She is sincerely attempting to enable George to correctly
identify whether or not the moving object on his monitor is the same as that
on her own. We know from Horton and Keysar’s results that such a situation
can occur. Call this scenario the ‘ego-centric case’.
Neale and other neo-Griceans are unable to account for such a case because
it appears that Elaine’s beliefs about her audience’s perspective have not
affected the formation of her utterance. There are at least three things Neale
could say with regard to his intention-moderating beliefs in response to the
the ego-centric case. I will consider each in turn.
Co-operative and Ego-centric Utterances
One approach would be to simply observe that on many occasions (when
there is sufficient time and memory) speakers do take their audience into
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account—Neale mentions in the quotation from (2004, p. 77), given above,
that he is assuming S is being co-operative. On those occasions, speakers’
beliefs about what they can get the audience to construe them as meaning
are precisely relevant. However, Elaine is not being unco-operative in the
ego-centric case, and speakers are generally not being unco-operative in real
life cases, though this may not entail that they are being co-operative (cf.
Gregoromichelaki et al. 2011). It is unclear what Neale intends when he says
“assuming [S] is being co-operative” (Neale 2004, p. 77). He might mean to be
stipulating a definition of what it is to be a co-operative speaker, so specifically
ruling out the ego-centric case. So it seems ‘ego-centric speakers’ fail to have
any communicative intentions (and thus can’t express propositional content).
Then the account is lacking since these ‘unco-operative’ cases appear to be,
if not the standard, as Keysar and his colleagues claim, then at least not
exceptional. Alternatively, he might be offering a characterization just of
co-operative speech, in which case his results are extremely limited with
regard to communication as a whole, since, again, ego-centric communicative
behaviour appears not to be exceptional.
Neale appears to be allowing that his account might not incorporate all
communicative intentions when he says
The question of what constitutively determines what S means on a given
occasion and the question of what is involved in epistemically determining
(i.e. ascertaining or identifying, or at least forming a hypothesis about) what
S means on that occasion are conceptually distinct, even though the
formation of S’s meaning intentions is typically formatically determined
[their formation is causally constrained], in part, by S’s conceptions of the
sorts of things S may reasonably presume to be potentially involved in the
process of A’s forming a hypothesis about what S means. (Neale ms., p. 48)
His use of the word ‘typically’ suggests that sometimes a speaker’s beliefs
about how their audience is likely to interpret them do not determine their
communicative intention. But again, if Neale is intending to give an account
only of communication in which speakers take their audience’s perspective
into account, then he is simply choosing to ignore a significant facet of human
communication. If Horton and Keysar’s two-stage interpretation of their data
is taken seriously, he is ignoring the default means by which speaker’s form
utterances, as well as, arguably, all the communication of small children and
autistic people (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, and Frith 1985; cf. Yergeau 2013). Neale
is, of course, free to account only for a specific sub-class of communication,
but it certainly appears that he is trying to provide a general account, and
a general account of communication that fails to account for a significant
portion of examples is not a general account of communication. Moreover, if
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there were a plausible account of communication and utterance content that
could account for all occurrences, that would be preferred to a partial account.
Intentions towards a general audience
A second approach would be maintaining that a speaker’s intention-mod-
erating beliefs are not (or need not be) aimed at a specific audience, but
rather are about how one might in general best communicate. This would
be a significant departure from the traditional (interpretation of the) Gricean
picture, although one might think it is hinted at in a parenthetical remark of
Neale’s: ‘or at least any rational, reasonably well-informed interpreter in A’s
shoes’ (Neale ms., p. 46). Whether or not this really is a hint at the approach
under consideration would depend on how generally we took the idea of being
in A’s shoes. Intention-moderating beliefs are specifically supposed to be
about context, topic and linguistic conventions (presumably word meanings),
etc. According to certain alternatives to the Gricean picture of language (e.g.
Gauker 2008; Travis 1997), these are the kinds of thing that directly affect what
is said, because they are what effect in general how utterances are interpreted.
Even if a speaker is ego-centric in their formation of an utterance in the
sense that they do not take their specific audience’s perspective into account,
their utterance presumably will be sensitive to linguistic convention, and
various non-audience-specific contextual mechanisms, such as topic, their
own purposes, and environment. In the ego-centric case, it is specifically
reliance on contextual comparison that indicates a lack of allo-centrism, as the
particular visual cue Elaine appeals to is unavailable to George.
To make this (hypothetical) interpretation of Neale explicit we might have:
S thinks that by producing an utterance of X she will likely get compe-
tent users of the language to whom the same contextual information is
available to see that S intends them to think that p, at least partly on the
basis of recognizing that S uttered X intending them to think that p.
and
Assuming she is being co-operative, S cannot mean that p by uttering
some sentence X if she believes it is impossible for any rational, reasonably
well-informed interpreter to whom the same contextual information is
available to construe her as meaning that p.
These adapted characterizations of a speaker’s communicative intentions seem
to allow for the ego-centric case, at least given certain assumptions about it.
Since it is stipulated that the general intended audience has access to the same
contextual information as the speaker, the fact that a speaker fails to attend to
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their actual audience’s perspective, and bases their utterance formation only
on their own, does not rule such a speaker out of the account.
However, in allowing for the ego-centric case, the general audience ap-
proach threatens to exclude some allo-centric cases. The position, as stated,
will have trouble dealing with cases in which an audience does not share
certain elements of the context with the speaker, and the speaker takes account
of this and moderates their utterances appropriately, but, in the process,
renders it inaccessible to a general audience who shared more of the speaker’s
context. Moreover, even if the approach under discussion were to overcome
this dilemma, the rôle still played by intentions about others’ intentions may
make the account implausible for pre-theory of mind children, though Neale
may be inclined to accept this result, ruling them a special case.
There is good reason to think that the general audience approach is not
the path that Neale or other neo-Griceans take, or would take. The position
is at odds with Griceanism, and in tension with his descriptions of audience-
directed intentions. Neale very much has in mind beliefs about a specific
audience’s ability to construe the speaker’s meaning.
Dispositions
A third interpretation of Neale, to account for the ego-centric case, would be
to appeal to a competence/performance distinction, and claim that speakers
are always disposed to take audience’s perspective into account, but in some
circumstances, such as when under time pressure, they fail to actually do
so. Thus, when speakers act competently, they act just as Neale suggests. In
the ego-centric case, in which Elaine fails to act as Neale suggests, she can
succeed in expressing propositional content in virtue of her disposition to act
in the correct way: she would have taken George’s perspective into account
had she had sufficient time to adjust her utterance. In order to assess this
position, we need to clarify how intentions fit into it, since these are essential
to Neale’s framework. It appears that there are two ways of clarifying the
position: either (i) the speaker has the communicative intention just in virtue
of having the disposition, or, less plausibly, (ii) they have the communicative
intention only in allo-centric cases, but, nonetheless, can express content in
the ego-centric case in virtue of their disposition to be allo-centric. Both of
these options represent a significant departure from the position stated in
Neale (2004, ms.).
Clarification (i) would involve adapting Neale’s characterization of com-
municative intentions so that S’s intention to communicate p to A with an
utterance X does not require that S believes it is possible to do so, but merely
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that S be disposed to use an utterance with which it would be possible. To
see why, consider the ego-centric case: Elaine is presumed to believe that
George does not share her visual context, on the basis of having been so
told. Yet that belief does not affect whether or not she appeals to the visual
context in describing the boot figure. Thus, given clarification (i), Elaine had
a communicative intention to describe the figure to George by appealing to
another figure, even though she believed that George couldn’t see that other
figure.
This puts a great deal of pressure on a central premise of Neale’s paper:
that one cannot intend to do what one believes to be impossible. Of course,
we do not have a direct contradiction of this premise; it may be that Elaine
believing that George cannot see the other figure does not entail that she
believes that George cannot understand a description that appeals to the
other figure. However, the spirit of the premise is certainly undermined. The
premise that seems to replace it, given clarification (i)—that one cannot intend
what one believes would be impossible if one acted as one is disposed to
act—is much less convincing. As a constraint on communicative intentions it
allows too much. It entails, when slotted into Neale’s broader account, that a
speaker can express any propositional content using any words or sounds, as
long as they are disposed to use words which they believe can express that
propositional content. So if, in a stupor, a speaker named ‘Sheila’ mutters some
incomprehensible sounds—or even says ‘Marjorie’—when asked what her
name is, assuming that she is disposed to say ‘Sheila’, then her sounds have in
fact expressed that her name is Sheila. I find this result highly implausible; we
have essentially arrived once more at the Humpty-Dumpty position whereby
a speaker says (expresses) whatever they intend to, regardless of the words
they actually use, so long as they have certain dispositions to use appropriate
words. It may be possible to constrain the kinds of dispositions that allow
intentions to come apart from beliefs about the possibility of their fulfilment,
but I cannot see how this would be achieved, particularly in a non-ad hoc
manner.
Clarification (ii), that speakers have the communicative intentions only
in allo-centric cases, would involve Neale giving up another central premise
in order to accommodate the ego-centric cases, namely T1 of Neale (ms.)
(stated on p. 142), that a speaker’s communicative intentions are the sole
suppliers of propositional content. If this premise remained, utterances formed
without taking the audience’s perspective into account could not have any
propositional content since, ex hypothesi, the speaker has no communicative
intention in these cases. It is not entirely clear what T1 could be replaced with.
Perhaps something like “A speaker’s communicative dispositions are the sole
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suppliers of the propositional content of an utterance” or “An utterance’s
propositional content is solely supplied by the communicative intentions the
speaker would have had, had they spoken in ideal circumstances”. The former
looks unpromising because it says very little—presumably a speaker has
many diverse communicative dispositions at any time—and the latter looks
unpromising because it threatens to radically shift the propositional content
of all utterances, unless a precise and workable spelling-out of ‘ideal’ is struck
upon. Moreover, even though embracing clarification (ii) and jettisoning T1
would allow Neale to retain the intention/belief premise lost with clarification
(i), T1 is a major thesis of Neale (ms.), and is at least strongly intimated in
Neale (2004), and it seems highly unlikely that he would be willing abandon
it.
The dispositional interpretation of Neale, then, faces two related problems.
Firstly, there appear to be severe difficulties in working out a plausible account
of it whilst attempting to stay within the spirit of Neale (ms.). Secondly, even
whilst attempting to stay within the spirit, major elements of Neale’s project
have to be dropped or radically altered in a manner which would presumably
be unacceptable to him.
5.2.4 Conclusion
I have considered three routes Neale might attempt to take in order to make
his account of the rôle that speakers’ beliefs play in moderating communicative
intentions consistent with psychological evidence about how speakers actually
form utterances. All have either been found wanting, or to be undesirable for
Neale.
1. The idea that the account is only dealing with co-operative cases of
speech results in a dilemma: either it is willfully ignoring the non-
exceptional, ego-centric cases of utterance and communication, or it is
failing to account for these cases, though it means to.
2. The idea that a speaker’s communicative intentions are moderated by
beliefs about a general audience, rather than their actual, specific audi-
ence produces a problem for dealing with utterances which specifically
do take a particular audience into account. This route also appears to be
in tension with Neale’s Gricean commitments.
3. The idea that speakers are disposed to act in the way Neale specifies,
and the data regarding ego-centric utterance formation can be explained
away as an issue of performance rather than competence, faces severe
difficulties. It is unclear how the idea can be fully spelled out without
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falling into Humpty-Dumptyism. It also appears that, even if it were
workable, it would involve Neale giving up major premises of his view.
As an innovative and influential member of the neo-Gricean programme,
Neale is well-placed to represent and defend its core analysis of meaning
and communication as involving recognition of speakers’ intentions. I have
endeavoured to show that Neale’s interpretation of this core analysis will not
stand up to empirical data regarding utterance formation without abandoning
either plausibility or significant Gricean assumptions. Given that Neale is
incapable of accounting for Horton and Keysar’s findings, I suggest that
they provide a very serious challenge to the Gricean programme in general.
Daniel Harris commits himself to a Neale-style position about the nature of
communicative intentions, so his work will be affected by the problem I have
put forward for Neale, as will be the work of Ray Buchanan and Kent Bach,
other prominent neo-Griceans.
In showing that a variety of strong neo-Gricean accounts of meaning are
unable to account for psychological data about the formation of utterances,
I hope to have shown that any Gricean account of proper name reference
that attempts to claim that the reference of names is determined solely by
speakers’ referential intentions is very likely to be undermined in the same
way. In order to avoid falling into the Humpty-Dumpty position with regard
to name reference, someone putting forward such a Gricean account of names
would have to place constraints on what referential intentions a speaker could
have. Doing so in the manner that Neale does for communicative intentions
generally—and appears to for referential intentions in Neale (2004)—seems
the most likely option, especially when it is observed that other Griceans
attempt similar strategies.
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A Pragmatic View of Reference
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Chapter 6
The Pragmatic View Stated
And this can be expressed as follows: I use the name “N”
without a fixed meaning. (But that impairs its use as
little as the use of a table is impaired by the fact that it
stands on four legs instead of three, and so sometimes
wobbles.)
L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations
Preceding chapters have attempted to show why certain existing viewsof proper name reference are deficient in various ways. Through theseattempts, the general form of my positive view will have become clear. In
this chapter I will go into more detail about the pragmatic view of proper name
reference that I propose is superior to those views I have already discussed.
In order to reinforce the impression of the view provided in the previous
chapters, I begin by providing some general principles of the view before
going on to discuss it in more detail. In my discussion, I cover each of the
principles, offering either reason, motivation, or argument for it.
I begin by discussing reference and its relation to names in §6.2. I reiterate
and elaborate on my thoughts on the connection between reference and truth
from §2.1, and briefly cover empty reference and reference over time, which
present potential complications to an account of reference. In §6.3, I move
on to the context-sensitivity of names and their reference, and the relation
between semantics and reference. I make clear, in §6.4, why I do not think
that semantics determines reference, and why it is that name reference cannot
have any necessary and sufficient conditions. The lengthiest section of the
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chapter, and that containing perhaps the most significant work, §6.5, deals
with names and bearers, and continues the discussion from §4.3. I cover why
it is that I claim that bearer relations are not required for name reference, and
argue that my conception of the rôle of such relations can better account for
our use of and intuitions about them. I also observe that there is a rôle within
my view for some kind of defeasible, probabilistic constraint that also helps to
account for the appeal of naming-using practices. §6.6 moves away from the
principles of §6.1, and briefly covers what can be said about the individuation
of names on my pragmatic view of their reference. In §6.7, I return to Travis,
and spend some time comparing my view of reference to his more general
account of occasion-sensitivity. I deal with the apparent similarities and
differences, covering the contribution of names to thought, and the possibility
of Travis cases for names. Finally, in §6.8, I consider two likely objections
to my view: that it fails to make predictions about name reference, and that
it is implausible and unworkable for there to be no systematic criteria for
reference. I show that neither objection is especially troublesome.
The view I present cannot be said to be wholly novel, though I believe
no one has ever argued for it at such length, or with engagement with the
contemporary literature before. In the early Eighties, Travis wrote at least two
papers (Travis 1980, 1981a) in which he engaged specifically with reference,
largely in response, so it seems, to the influence Kripke was having at that
time (Kripke 1977, 1981). In these papers, Travis attacks what I have described
as semantic views of reference—those that propose that there are stateable
conditions that determine the reference of a referring term—and proposes
the idea that such systematic conditions are not necessary either for terms
to be used to refer, nor for language-users to recognize what they have been
used to refer to. However, Travis provides little detail about this proposal,
and says very little specifically about proper name reference. My view then,
although influenced by Travis’s arguments in those papers, is developed
largely independently, and in much greater detail.1
Although his work has not influenced me directly, in the way that Travis’s
has, Wettstein (1984) addresses a very similar question to that addressed by
this thesis, though applied to the reference of indexicals and demonstratives,
rather than proper names, and interpreted slightly differently: What bridges
the gap between the lexical meanings of referring terms and their reference?
Like me, Wettstein’s answer is that features of the context of utterance bridge
the gap, thus determining reference. Specifically, his answer is that the
1Travis has briefly addressed the reference of proper names in particular in a much more
recent paper (Travis ms.). In it, he appears to endorse a view similar to mine, but, again, he
provides little detail.
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same features that make the reference of a term apparent to an audience
determine its reference (Wettstein 1984, p. 64). It is clear that Wettstein
intends that a variety of extra-linguistic, contextual factors—or what he calls
‘extra-contextual cues’—can come into play to contribute to the reference of
demonstratives and indexicals, though it is less clear to what extent this is
supposed to be represented in the semantics. It appears that Wettstein is,
unlike me, conceiving of reference as a semantic phenomenon, rather than
considering that his claims about what determines reference push it into
the realm of the pragmatic. Another difference between Wettstein’s claims
about indexicals, and mine about proper names, is that Wettstein says that
the contextual cues that determine reference are those that convey a speaker’s
intended reference, and which the speaker is responsible for and appears
to be exploiting. On my view, the contextual factors that audiences rely
on to appreciate what has been referred to will very often be those that
determine reference, and for good reason—this is clearly an effective way to
work out what is being referred to—but I do not specifically claim that those
factors determine reference because the audience uses them to recognize the
reference. Furthermore, unlike Wettstein, I do not claim that the referent of a
use of a name is, or must be, the object that the speaker intends to refer to
with it.
6.1 Principles of the Pragmatic View
These principles are intended to offer a broad introduction to my pragmatic
view. They should not be viewed as axioms or seen to represent a manifesto.
Rather, they are something akin to a precis of the most significant aspects of
the view, and in particular those points at which it differs from other views.
1. Names, as used in a certain syntactic manner—in English, in subject or
object place, without an article—carry an expectation of reference.
a) This expectation of reference does not require that objects of refer-
ence exist.
2. If an utterance contains a referential use of a name, then the truth of that
utterance will turn, in some manner, on the way that the object referred
to by the name is. This is part of the nature of reference.
3. Names are context-sensitive expressions. Their reference depends upon
the context in which they are used.
a) Thus, names do not refer tout court. Only uses of a name, or a name
as uttered on an occasion, or speakers using names, can refer.
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b) The context-insensitive semantic value of a name is not constituted
by its reference.
4. The semantic rules governing the language are silent with regard to the
reference of names.
a) There may be certain probabilistic constraints on the use of names,
which could plausibly hold across occasions of use. But these are
essentially different to context-insensitive, determinate meanings,
and are, by their nature, defeasible.
5. There are no necessary and sufficient conditions for the reference of
proper names.
a) The reference of a name is determined on an occasion of use by
pragmatic factors of the context.
b) There is no systematic way to specify in advance what specific
factors will effect the reference of a use of a name. They may well
vary significantly from occasion to occasion. Though this is not
to say that certain factors will not be relevant significantly more
frequently than others.
c) There is no determinable collection of all determinate pragmatic
factors that can effect the reference of a name.
d) Neither speaker nor hearer have any special authority over what
a name refers to on an occasion of use: speakers’ intentions do
not constrain the reference of names they use, so they can refer by
mistake if they fail to appreciate the vagaries of context; hearers
can fail in the same way, and so fail to understand what has been
referred to with a name.
6. Whilst it might be true that names are used to name things, and that this
is a discriminating characteristic of names amongst referring expressions,
it is not a feature that governs their referential use.
a) Name bearing is an extra-linguistic, social phenomenon that can
bear on contexts of utterance. This is not to say that such social
conventions cannot arise as a result of a name being used to refer
to an object.
b) Names can have huge social significance. There might be significant
social or moral consequences for transgressing the social norms of
name use, but this is a social or moral issue, not a semantic issue.
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7. There are no analytic truths of the form ppNNq refers to NNq, where pNNq
is a name mentioned.
a) A true utterance of the form pNN is Fq does not entail pNN is a
bearer of pNNqq.
The reference of an utterance of a name is determined by pragmatic factors
of the context. These pragmatic factors are not specified in advance by the
semantics of the term. There are no necessary and sufficient criteria for
reference independent of an occasion of use, and on an occasion of use there
is just what is referred to. If singular reference occurs, it is because the weight
of pragmatic factors determine that there is a way to best understand the
utterance such that the speaker, or the name they used, counted as having
referred to a particular object.2 There is no way to stipulate a set of all the
factors that might, on any occasion, affect reference, nor how they might
affect it, though we can point to some factors that are likely to play a rôle
in a range of circumstances. For any particular utterance of a name, we
may be able to point to some or all of the factors that contributed to the
determination of the reference of the name, but this will only be relevant to
that particular utterance. It need not be the case that any of those factors
would contribute to an utterance of that name having the same reference
under different circumstances on a different occasion. Nor that further factors
might not have changed or undermined the effect of the original factors, had
things been different.
The reference of a proper name cannot be made sense of independently of
the broader utterance containing it. This is because the appropriate way to
understand an utterance, which includes interpreting any referential terms,
is dependent upon the complete context of utterance, which will include the
linguistic context.
6.2 Names and Reference
Principle 1. says that when singular proper names occur in utterances referen-
tially, in a grammatically referential position, as in sentences such as
Lucy did indeed go to Texas;
Tom drove around Swindon for three hours;
The story touched Luke and Kate in new ways;
2See Travis (2008, p. 9) for the way in which these considerations bear on truth rather than
reference.
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Have you seen Jupiter recently?;
Bruntsfield is part of Edinburgh;
they carry a certain expectation that they refer in some manner. This has
certain consequences for the truth of the utterances containing them, as
made clear in principle 2. Principle 1. is perhaps the least controversial of
all, and would be accepted by most of the theorists discussed in this thesis.
Exceptions might be Russell (1905), who thought that, as disguised Russellian
definite descriptions, proper names found in ordinary language do not, strictly
speaking, refer. Others who are influenced by Russell in various ways may also
deny that, in a certain sense, names refer. Bach (1987, 2002) and Katz (2001)
hold that names are equivalent to Russellian descriptions of the form pthe
bearer of NNq, but that in the case of any name that is shared, the uniqueness
condition of the Russellian description fails and so the name fails to literally
(semantically) refer. Barwise and Cooper (1981) also treat names (and all
nouns) as quantifier expressions, and so not referential in a certain sense, but
their interest is primarily model theoretic, not in analyzing how words of
English actually function.
6.2.1 Reference and Truth
As I discussed at the beginning of §2.1, I take proper name reference to be
the phenomenon that leads utterances containing uses of proper names to
be about a particular object (or objects, where an utterance contains multiple
uses of names). So, the names ‘Lucy’ and ‘Texas’ in an utterance of ‘Lucy did
indeed go to Texas’ refer to the things that the sentence says something of,
namely that the former went to the latter. Something is the referent of ‘Lucy’
in that sentence if and only if the truth of the utterance turns on whether
that thing in particular did indeed go (or counted as going) to Texas, and
something is the referent of ‘Texas’ if and only if the truth of the utterance
also turns on whether the referent of ‘Lucy’ did indeed go (count as going)
to that thing in particular. This idea that, if an utterance contains a name or
other referring term (and is not reporting upon someone’s belief or attitude),
then the truth of the utterance turns on how the particular thing referred to
is, gives us what is sometimes known as direct reference: The way in which
the reference is determined does not appear to play a rôle in how the name
contributes to the truth of the utterance.
The fact that we can state, in more or less vague terms (what is it for truth
to turn on the way an object is?), what the relation between reference and truth
is for any given utterance containing a proper name is not an indication that
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we have something approaching a definition of reference. Reference enables
us to say things about particular objects, but it is not something separate
from saying something about a particular object. We can say things about
particular objects, and to do so is, generally, to refer to them. If I say something
about a particular object, then whether or not I have spoken the truth will
depend upon whether things are the way I said they were with regard to the
object. None of this is very deep, but then, neither is the connection between
reference and truth—which is not to say that truth is not essentially connected
to reference.
Utterances containing more than one name, such as the one mentioned
above about Lucy and Texas, provide one reason that we cannot create a
general rule of the form
pa name NN refers to an object x on an occasion of utterance if and
only if the truth of the utterance containing NN turns on how x
isq3
since the truth of sentences containing multiple names is likely to rely on
how more than one object is, and we do not want ‘Texas’ to refer to Lucy just
because the truth of an utterance containing ‘Texas’ turned on how Lucy is.
Something like
pa name NN refers to an object x on an occasion of utterance if
and only if the truth of the utterance containing NN, p. . . NN . . .q,
where the content of p. . . _ . . .q is φ(_), turns on whether φ(x)q
might work as a general principle or heuristic for how to create descriptions
of the relation between reference and truth of the kind given above, but the
inadequacy of the formalization of disquotation, and of the content of an
utterance, mean that this could not provide any thing like a definition of
reference in terms of the truth of utterances, nor should we expect it to.
The relationship between reference and truth, although significant, and
useful for elucidating reference and its importance in using language to
express thoughts, does not explain everything that there is to explain about
proper name reference. Proper names can, of course, be used in a whole range
of utterances for which truth is not a relevant condition of evaluation because
they do not aim at expressing truth evaluable thoughts. Names can be used
to refer in questions, jokes, imperatives, wishes, and a variety of other non-
declarative utterances. What all these uses have in common, however, is that
3Read as a plain conditional from left to right, however, we do get a true schema: pa name
NN refers to an object x on an occasion of utterance only if the truth of the utterance containing
NN turns on how x isq.
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the name will make the utterance about its referent in some way. If there is
some condition of correctness or evaluation, that will turn on the referent.
There are also declarative (and other) utterances that contain referential
uses of names in such a way that it is unclear that the truth of the utterance
turns on the referent, even if we allow that the notion of truth turning
on something applies to the objects of multi-place predicates as well as
their subjects. For example, complex referring terms that contain names
may present a quandary: does the truth of ‘Greenberg’s girlfriend went to
Edinburgh’ turn on how Greenberg is? In a sense, no, it turns on how his
girlfriend—and Edinburgh—are. Such an utterance is not obviously about
Greenberg. But it still seems that the occurrence of ‘Greenberg’ refers to
Greenberg (whomever he is), indeed, it must do so in order for the description
containing it to refer to his girlfriend. Although such a sentence is not
equivalent to something like ‘Greenberg is such that (the person described
as) his girlfriend went to Edinburgh’, something like this does seem to be
entailed by the initial utterance.4 The truth of this utterance certainly does
turn on how the referent of ‘Greenberg’ is.
6.2.2 Reference and Empty Names
The somewhat more controversial part of principle 1. is part a), which says
that the referential expectation of names does not require that their referents
exist. I include this in order to allow for the use of names to talk about non-
existent things, including fictional characters, within a unified account of
names. As Sainsbury has widely observed (2005, 2009, 2015), names that have
an accepted empty use within a community, such as fictional names, or names
such as ‘Vulcan’, can be used and understood in very similar ways to the
names of existent objects. My interpretation of this feature of names will be
that names can be used to talk about things that do not exist5 in just the way
that they can be used to talk about existent objects. Exactly what to say about
such cases is unclear to me, however. These look like case of reference, but
we might not want to say that the uses of names in question refer. Certainly,
my conception of reference is not one of metaphysical connection between
word and object, as it has been for some reference theorists, and this might
4The nature of reference using descriptions means that the referent of ‘Greenberg’s girlfriend’
may not be the girlfriend of someone named ‘Greenberg’, and indeed need not be anyone’s
girlfriend. We must therefore imagine that the context of utterance can be maintained such that
whomever was the referent of ‘Greenberg’ in ‘Greenberg’s girlfriend went to Edinburgh’ is also
its referent in ‘Greenberg is such that (the person described as) his girlfriend went to Edinburgh’.
5My use of the word ‘thing’ should not be taken to have any kind of existential import.
By using the expression ‘things that do not exist’, I am not meaning to commit myself to a
Meinongian realm of the non-existent.
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make things easier for me. I will touch on uses of empty and fictional names
with regard to my pragmatic view of name reference again in §8.3.3.
6.2.3 Reference Over Time
Another controversial claim about reference that bears consideration is that
it need not be thought of as one-time, momentary relational event. Refer-
ential terms such as names may be what brings reference into a sentence
or utterance—what makes them apt for being singular referential sentences
or utterances—but this does not entail that the reference comes exactly at
the same time as the occurrence of the referential term and is thereby fixed
indefinitely. Gregoromichelaki et al. (2011) argue that there is linguistic
and psychological evidence that, in dialogue, anything that resembles (what
philosophers think of as) propositional content tends to emerge incrementally
over the course of the dialogue, rather than being expressed by each single
utterance. They appeal, in particular, to split utterances (one utterance
being split between two or more interlocutors) and clarification requests (one
interlocutor asking another to clarify a previous utterance). If the propositional
content of an utterance can emerge over the course of a dialogue, in virtue of
the interaction between speakers (who, for Gregoromichelaki et al. are each
constructing their own representation of the content), rather than all at once
with each speaker’s utterance, then perhaps the referential content can also
emerge incrementally.
Consider the following plausible dialogues:
A: I saw Lucy today.
B: Which Lucy?
A: Lucy Horowitz.
A: What do you think of Lucy. . .
B: Brown? I don’t like her. She’s so mean.
A: No, no. Lucy Horowitz.
In both these cases, whilst one could maintain that the first speaker
succeeded in referring, given the rôle of their interlocutor in bringing out who
is being talked about, I think it makes as much sense to consider the reference
as having emerged during the dialogue, rather than at any particular time. If
this idea is taken seriously, then the initial utterances of speaker A should not
be considered as individual utterances for the purposes of interpretation, or
rather, interpretation is incremental over the course of the discourse or split
utterance. So, just as we might not think that anything truth-evaluable has
been expressed until someway into a discourse, we might think that what the
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utterance is about, and thus what has been referred to by the occurrences of
names, does not emerge until after the speaker B has spoken. This position is
clearly at odds with those views of names that maintain that they refer tout
court, or entail that the reference of a name essentially occurs just at the time
it is uttered.
6.3 Context-Sensitivity
I mentioned briefly in chapter 3 that there was no obvious reason for assuming
that names refer tout court. This arises partly from the idea, influenced
by Wittgenstein, Austin, and Strawson, amongst others, that reference is
something that is done with words, not something that words somehow carry
with them. I have talked throughout the thesis of names, or uses of names,
or utterances of names, referring. When I am talking about my own view, or
about what actually happens with name reference, rather than outlining a
rival view, these locutions should all be taken to be reducible to something
that a speaker is doing with a name, just as a bucket carries water only to
the extent that an agent uses it to carry water. Certainly, and very obviously,
names cannot be used to refer independently of a particular utterance or
inscription (or, just perhaps, something like a mental tokening), and so it is
unclear what would be lost by denying that names refer independently of
either a particular referential use, or when playing a part in a larger referential
expression that requires them to pick out an object.
The idea that names refer tout court appears to be simply an artifact of a
certain assumption about what their semantics must be like. That assumption,
based in truth-conditional semantics, is that words have meanings that are the
kinds of things that can be composed into a truth-condition for a sentence. If
one assumes that names are not context-sensitive, and that all they contribute
to the truth-condition for a sentence is their reference, then it makes sense
to think of a name’s reference as its meaning. As was made clear in §2.3, I
do not think that the meanings of words compose into truth-conditions for
sentences. Thus, even if I do think that a name contributes just its reference to
the truth or correctness of an utterance in which it is used, there is no need
for me to maintain that its semantics specifies what its reference should be.
I have not argued for the position that word meanings are not truth-
conditional, nor will I, though I discuss it further in §6.7. I have argued
and indicated, however, that names are context sensitive. The most obvious
argument for this is that names are shared, as I argued in §3.1 (at least,
in virtue of arguing against its converse). My arguments for that position
were not definitive, since they essentially amount to arguing for a particular
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conception of names on the basis of intuitions. A stronger argument for the
context-sensitivity of names is found, I think, in the generally problematic
nature of both of the most plausible and prominent types of accounts of proper
names that maintain that they are not context-sensitive: causal-homophonism
and intention-based accounts. Whilst I do not claim, in chapter 3, that I
have refuted causal-homophonism, I do show that it is a substantially more
complicated and less attractive account than its supporters claim. If we reject
causal-homophonism on this basis, as I believe we should, being, as it is,
both counter-intuitive and overly complicated, we are left with little option
but either to accept an intention-based account of proper name reference, or
to accept that names are context-sensitive with regard to their reference. In
chapter 5, I discussed intention-based accounts and found the two most
prominent versions of such an account—constraint-based intentionalism
and neo-Griceanism—to be implausible, either as accounts of proper name
reference, or in general. Again, my arguments here were not definitive, but
raised significant enough concerns about plausibility that another account of
name reference is to be preferred. This leaves us with just one option: that
proper names are context-sensitive: principle 3. The question we must then
ask is: in what manner they are context-sensitive?
In chapter 4 I considered indexicalism, the most prominent family of views
of proper name reference according to which it is determined in a context-
sensitive manner. I argued that, whilst indexicalists are quite correct that
it is only upon particular occasions of utterance that names refer, and that
the reference of an utterance is determined by features of the context of the
utterance, they are wrong to suppose that the way in which this happens is
specified by the semantics of the name. In §6.4, I will discuss the relation
between semantics and reference further, and reiterate my arguments that
there is nothing in the semantics of a name that determines the reference of
its uses.
6.4 Semantics and Reference
My arguments against indexicalism in chapter 4 took the general form of
arguing that there is no way of constructing a semantics for a proper name
such that it will be able to determine the reference of the name on every
occasion of use. This provides principle 4. Whatever features of context are
appealed to to determine reference, they will be either too general, such that
they cannot predict what the referent of a name will be on an occasion, and
will not decide between potential referents in all cases, or they will be wrong,
such that they predict the wrong referent on some occasions. As I made clear,
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it is very hard, if not impossible, to make a general argument to this effect.
The best that one can hope for is to point out the ways in which any proposed
account that claims to provide a semantics for names that determines their
reference falls foul of the dilemma just posited.
It is worth noting that my position is not essentially a sceptical or pes-
simistic one. My proposal that the reference of proper names is determined
on each occasion of utterance by pragmatic mechanisms in a way that is
not specified by their semantics is a positive thesis. As I observed in §2.3,
I have positive motivation for my view: providing an account of proper
name reference that is consistent with a radical contextualism such as that
proposed by Travis. It so happens that the correctness of this kind of radical
contextualism, about both language and thought, is most clearly seen against
the backdrop of a mainstream of truth-conditional semantics and propositional
conceptions of thought.6 But this does not mean that rejecting the notion that
there are necessary and sufficient conditions for the correctness of words and
thoughts is motivated primarily by a pessimistic meta-induction on failed
attempts to provide them. Of course, it is by observing the way that language
is used, and how it relates to the world, that one reaches conclusions in the
Wittgensteinian, Austinian, or Travisian vein, but it would be quite wrong to
think that, in doing so, one must have postulated and rejected categorial rules,
as if that were the only way to do philosophy of language.
My claim that the semantics of names does not determine their reference
stems from the idea, stated at the beginning of §2.3 that semantics does not
aim at providing the kind of content that is subject to correctness conditions.
So, whatever the semantics of the words of an utterance provides, it is not
anything truth-evaluable, or fit for expressing thoughts about the world. Since
the reference of a name is something that contributes directly to the truth- or
correctness-evaluability of an utterance containing that name—or a thought
expressed by such an utterance—it seems reasonable to think that the reference
of proper names is not determined at the semantic level. Moreover, semantics
also does not appear to be in the business of specifying the way in which
words are to be understood, given particular contexts, and so it does not
specify how the reference of proper names is determined. As I made clear
in §2.3, I have not argued that these premises are correct, or that my claims
follow from them in the ways I assume. Rather, I have argued for my claims
by arguing against all the ways that it has been proposed that semantics
determines reference, or specifies how reference is determined.
I discussed, in §6.3, how I have argued for the claim that proper names are
context sensitive in respect of their reference by rejecting causal-homophonism
6The kind of views Travis (2006b) calls psychologistic.
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and intention-based accounts of names. Indeed, in chapter 3, I argued that
detailed consideration of causal-homophonism should lead one to think
that there is no one particular way in which the reference of proper names
is determined: pluralism about proper name reference. Discussion of a
whole range of accounts of how the reference of names is determined, and
the observation that each account does indeed work in a range of cases—
frequently different kinds of case—might well lead one further towards
pluralism about the determination of proper name reference. This leaves
us with the position that the reference of proper names is context sensitive,
and that it can be determined in a variety of different ways. In chapter 4, I
considered indexicalist accounts of proper names, which I took primarily to
be accounts that maintained that the reference of names is context sensitive,
but it is still determined in a way specified, or at least constrained, by their
semantics.7 As I mentioned at the beginning of this section, my approach to
these views was to work through the literature and show that none of it is
successful in showing that the semantics of names determines their reference,
and then work through the most relevant and plausible contextual factors that
might affect reference, and show that none of them could either determine or
constrain reference on all occasions.
Given my view of semantics, as the context-insensitive contribution that
words make to each utterance of them, if semantics were to determine or
constrain the reference of names, and names were occasion sensitive, then
some particular contextual factors would have to constrain or determine the
reference of every utterance of a name. Thus, having shown that none of the
contextual factors that seem relevant to proper name reference do constrain
or determine the reference of every utterance of a name, I have shown that
it is implausible that the semantics of names do determine or constrain the
reference of names. But, since I also claim to have shown that it is highly
plausible that name reference is context-sensitive, then it must be determined
on each occasion by pragmatic mechanisms, independently of semantics.
6.4.1 Necessary and Sufficient Conditions
The positions regarding proper name reference that I am opposed to are
essentially those that maintain that there are necessary and sufficient con-
ditions for it. I regard one of the primary problems of philosophy—that
is, a stumbling block for the discipline, rather than a major object of its
investigation—to be the assumption that there are necessary and sufficient
7As discussed in that chapter, Rami (2014) seems to be an exception to this characterization
of indexicalism.
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conditions for membership of the extension or satisfaction of terms, concepts,
properties, etc. If we want to capture the way in which speakers actually use
proper names to refer to things, then we must attempt to observe just that,
and claim just what the evidence allows. We should not develop a theory (in
the sense of providing conditions) about what names refer to, based on a few
limited cases, or a conception of what reference should be like, given certain
preconceptions, and then try to make all cases fit the theory, dismissing those
that do not as deviant or defective. There may be problems with the evidence
available, as noted in §2.2, but this does not justify picking and choosing
within it. As made clear by principle 5., It is my strong positive thesis that
there are no necessary and sufficient conditions for proper name reference,
and I believe the evidence bears this out to the extent to which it is able.
As I have made clear elsewhere, in claiming that there are no necessary
and sufficient conditions upon the determination of proper name reference, I
am not claiming that there is nothing to say about what determines reference
in particular cases. Nor am I claiming that all we can say about cases is that
context or pragmatics does the job in some wholly opaque manner. Indeed,
my claim is that both speakers and hearers are sensitive, albeit not necessarily
consciously, to the factors that determine the reference of an utterance of a
name on an occasion. Travis (1980) expresses this position with regard to
reference determination well, having the following to say about the idea that
there are statable conditions that determine reference on every occasion of
utterance:
[It] may well be that for any particular case of reference making, there
is some identifiable (and finite) set of facts about it such that it can be
said correctly that, in virtue of those facts, such-and-such a reference was
made, and such-and-such referred to. It may further be that when we
have recognized those facts, or factors, we can also be in a position to
be certain that, in that case, there aren’t any more relevant facts to be
recognized—none, at least, that might alter the results we could otherwise
reach. Nevertheless, there may be novel cases in which all those facts
hold, but where we can, e.g., learn that there are other things one ought
to attend to in figuring out what reference was made. In other words,
though we may be finite organisms with creative capacities, perhaps the
finite devices we actually rely on simply don’t determine, by themselves
at least, what we will (or ought to) do in every case. (ibid., pp. 154–155)
6.5 Reference and Bearers
I discussed bearers at length in §4.3, and offered there reasons why name-
bearing relations should not be considered essential to proper name reference,
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and cannot play the rôle of contextual parameters that contribute to the
determination of name reference. Indeed, since names can be used to refer
to things that do not bear them, either at all, or in the particular context
of utterance—as was made clear by various examples, such as those of
‘Leningrad’, and Lucy’s introduction of Harris to John—it cannot be necessary
that the referent of a name bears that name. However, clearly, in many cases
of proper name use, the referent will be a bearer of the name, in some manner.
We do use names to name things, and complex social structures have grown
up around this, such as having a stock of names which are used and re-used to
name things. Frequently, different names are used to name male- and female-
gendered people, settlements, other geographical features, planets, buildings,
etc., and such practices are highly culture- and community-dependent. None
of these things are encoded in the semantics of names. I am in agreement with
Recanati (1993) that naming practices are social, non-linguistic conventions.
However, contrary to Recanati, I maintain that such practices do not provide
non-defeasible limits on reference, and are not specifically appealed to by the
semantics of names.
6.5.1 Social Practices
Learning
I find convincing Recanati’s arguments that naming and name-using practices
are social, rather than linguistic conventions, mentioned in §4.1.1. He observes
that, in learning to be a competent speaker of a language, one need not learn
the particular bearers of any particular names, but just how, in general, to
utilize names to refer. This is in contrast to other kinds of word: in learning
how to use the word ‘shoes’, one must learn that it names shoes, but in
learning how to use the name ‘Harry’, one need not learn that it names any
one in particular. A parallel point can be made by observing that dictionaries
do not contain proper names with lists of their bearers, nor would it seem
appropriate for them to, although they contain attempts at characterizing
the ways that most other types of word are used. It is worth noting that it
seems very likely that children in fact do learn how to use names by exposure
to particular objects that bear them. However, by the time they are mature
speakers, they will (in general) be able to recognize when words are proper
names, and how to use any proper name, even if it is novel to them—either
a novel name, or a novel referent or bearer of the name. As I mentioned in
§4.1.1, it is conceivable—though very unlikely—that a generally competent
speaker might never have been exposed to any naming practices at all, and
thus not use names to refer to any bearers of them at all.
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Complexity
A further argument that name bearing and naming practices are social
phenomena that are not encoded in semantics might be found in their
complexity. As indicated above, the ways that names are used to name
things—to create continuing practices of use—involve complex and contingent
social factors. If naming practices were linguistic conventions, then these
complexities would have to be contained within the language. The fact that
the boundaries of London substantially changed in 1923 would have to be
reflected by a change in the English language, and whatever governmental
body that made the decision to revise the boundary was unwittingly also
ruling on the language. Indeed, it was not merely English that was ruled
upon, but every language in the world, since they all have the capacity to refer
to London, and so must have a linguistic convention associating a word with
the place.
Apparently, in Denmark, and, until recently, in Germany, it was a legal
requirement that a person’s assigned gender be ascertainable from their
given name. According to the view under consideration, these would be
laws governing the German language, rather than laws governing social
practices. Of course, there being such laws would not mean that, in Danish, it
is impossible to create a linguistic convention of using a traditionally male
name to name a girl, merely that such a move would be illegal. It might
mean, however, that, as a matter of the way the language is used, the language
itself does entail that certain name-bearers are male and certain name-bearers
are female. In the same way, a propounder of the linguistic convention
position would maintain that the language of the Wagera Indians, discussed
by Evans (1973), and mentioned in §3.3,8 allows one to infer a speaker’s
name by knowing certain facts about their family. It seems clear that such
inferences are not about linguistic conventions. They are not of the same kind
as inferences that if somebody says that something is dry, then, according
to them, it is not wet, which would seem to be an inference about linguistic
conventions. Rather, they appear to be inferences involving the social practices
of a community. Names that have previously always been given to boys can
be used to name girls without changing the function or meaning of the names.
Furthermore, names that are usually assigned only to places, or have, as a
matter of fact, only been used to name male dogs, can be used to refer to
people, given the right circumstances. This brings me on to further arguments
to the point that not only are name/bearer relations and naming practices
8Note that the internet seems to contain no mention of Wagera Indians, except in relation to
Evans’s discussion of them.
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social, rather than linguistic phenomena, they are not encoded in any way into
the semantic meaning of names. And here I depart abruptly from Recanati.
6.5.2 Nicknames and One-Off Names
Though, like me, Recanati (1993) claims that practices that associate particular
proper names with particular objects are social conventions, he also claims
that there is a general linguistic convention such that, for any use of a name,
the referent is, in virtue of social convention, a bearer of that name. It is this
latter linguistic convention, contained in the meaning of each name, that I
deny exists. In addition to the arguments I provided in §4.3 for the position
that bearer relations cannot play a rôle in the semantics of a name such that
they contribute to or constrain the determination of the reference of the name,
I now consider how the use of nicknames might also lead one towards such a
position.
How Nicknames are Introduced
Many nicknames appear to function in the same way as more official forms
of proper name. Though a nickname could have a different grammatical
form to most proper names in English, for example, by having the form
of a definite description, many are bare nominals like paradigmatic proper
names (of people), and can be used referentially, vocatively, and probably
even predicatively, just like other proper names. Like other proper names
too, nicknames can be introduced in a range of different ways: by conscious
and intentional naming, by simply starting to use the name referentially, and
by various forms of accident. However, bearing a nickname does seem to
involve an established practice of the name being used to refer to an object.
This makes them somewhat different to, say legally bestowed names, because,
arguably, simply having been assigned a legal name is enough for it be an
object’s name, whether or not it is used to refer to it with any frequency.
Indeed, it appears to be part of what makes a nickname a nickname that it
is unofficial in some sense, and receives its status as a name for something
from the fact that a practice of using it has arisen. This does not mean that
a nickname must have arisen without an explicit dubbing—it is perfectly
conceivable that someone might say to someone or something else ‘I’m going
to call you “Squirt”’—but, unlike a parent filling in a birth certificate, or a
civil servant filling out a town charter, a practice of using the nickname must
emerge in order for the dubbing to have made a bearer of the object. Or so it
strikes me.9
9See Ziff (1977, p. 320) for a related discussion of nicknames.
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How Can a Nickname be Borne?
This is what might be involved in an object having a nickname: there being
an established practice of using the name to refer to the object. This, in itself,
presents a problem for accounts of proper name reference that maintain that
the referent of a name must bear that name. If an object must bear a nickname
in order for it to genuinely be used to refer to it, then how is a practice of
using the name to refer to the object ever supposed to emerge, such that the
bearing of the name is grounded. This kind of problem has been addressed at
various points previously, most obviously in §§3.2.3 & 4.1.1. The answer is
generally that speaker reference takes care of these cases by providing a means
for speakers to refer to things with names—in some sense of ‘refer’—even if
an account of the meaning of the name doesn’t allow it. Indeed, nicknames,
thought of as I have suggested, at first appear to suit the producer/consumer
dichotomy put forward in Recanati (1993) rather well: those users who initiate
the use of a nickname to refer to a particular object are speaker referring
to it, and when their practice becomes ingrained enough, they become the
producers of a practice within a community, and the object comes to be a
bearer of the name. Anyone who subsequently comes to use the name because
it is a name for the object is a consumer, whose use gets its reference in a
context because of the practice.
However, it is very unclear that this picture really gets right what actually
happens when a nickname is initiated and then crystallizes into a naming
practice such that the referent of the nickname can be said to bear it. Suppose,
one evening, one friend calls another ‘Julio’, no one ever having done so
before. Suppose this use is vocative, rather than referential in the sense I
have been using ‘referential’ up to now. The addressee of a vocative use of
a term is often easy to ascertain, since they must generally be pragmatically
perspicuous. Now imagine that another friend, who is present that evening,
and enjoys this use of ‘Julio’, also uses it vocatively to address the same friend.
A couple more friends, having observed these vocative uses, join in, and ‘Julio’
is used both vocatively and referentially for the rest of the night. The use
of ‘Julio’ might stop there. If it did, we would probably not say that ‘Julio’
was now a name for its referent, or, perhaps we might say that they bore it
briefly, just for that evening. But certainly the name was being used to refer to
a particular person on that night, and it was being used in that way because
other speakers had already used it in that way. We might say that everyone
on that night was merely speaker referring, but if they were, their speaker
reference looks pretty similar to the reference of people using ordinary names
to refer to established bearers.
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Now suppose that the ‘Julio’-use does not stop there, but carries on.
Friends who were not present for the first uses observe the use of the name
and begin using it to refer. At some point, though very obviously not at any
definite point, we can say that a name-using practice is established, and ‘Julio’
is now a nickname for the object of the practice. They now bear that nickname.
Are we to suppose that, at that point, everybody’s use now changes from
speaker reference to semantic reference? Or perhaps just those initiated to the
practice after it is established refer semantically, and those who were there at
the beginning continue to speaker refer. Even before that can be said to have
happened, however—when the practice is still nascent—someone who does
not know the referent can hear it being used when the referent is not present,
and, under the right circumstances, can use ‘Julio’ parasitically to refer in the
way that the existing users do. An established bearer is not required for such
reference.
One-Off Names
The uses of nicknames, or nickname-like terms present further problems for
the idea that proper names require bearers and established practices, however.
In a way similar to that in which ‘Julio’ was used on the very first occasion,
words that strongly resemble proper names in their grammatical form and
use can be used referentially without there being any pre-established practice.
Indeed, names that do already have bearers can be used to refer to other things
without simultaneously ‘semantically’ referring to their bearer. Consider
someone wearing a t-shirt that says ‘BROOKLYN’ on it. The inscription refers
to the place, Brooklyn, a borough of New York City. Suppose someone else,
seeing the t-shirt wearer across the room, says to a third person, who can
also see the t-shirt wearer, ‘Brooklyn’s got a silly haircut’. They can refer to
the t-shirt wearer using the name ‘Brooklyn’, making use of the perceptual
circumstances they share with their interlocutor. Despite the fact that they
are using a name that is borne by a borough of NYC, they do not also refer,
in some different way, to that borough. This is also not a case of deferred
reference, referring to the person in the t-shirt via the borough, in the way
that it is postulated that one can refer to the US Federal Government using
‘Washington’ via the city in which the centre of that institution is based. Of
course, it seems that it is largely a coincidence that it was an existing proper
name used to refer in the scenario. Any term could have been used. For
example, the speaker could have said ‘Look at Mullet’, making use of another
mutually-perceptible attribute of the object they are trying to bring to the
attention of their interlocutor. But, whether or not a word that already exists
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as a proper name is used, it appears that the reference occurs—or does not—in
just the same way.
Devotees of semantic views of proper name reference will claim that these
kinds of case are simply of a different kind to the use of proper names to
refer to bearers of those names in line with established practices. In the
cases I have provided, they will say, what I am calling reference is simply
the communication of the speaker’s intention to refer. Uses of established
names refer not merely because of a speaker’s intention, but in virtue of a
conventional meaning of the name, whether that meaning is the reference
itself, or it is a character that achieves reference by selecting a social practice
with a reference. I do not deny that there are social conventions and practices
of using certain names to refer to certain objects. To do so would be absurd.
People and pets and pubs and places and a variety of other kinds of things
that are significant and worthy of repeated identification, are given names, or
achieve names, in some way. And those things having those names enables
speakers to refer to those objects in certain circumstances more easily than
they otherwise would have. However, this does not mean that there is a
special kind of reference consisting of using names in accordance with these
practices.
Recanati argues that name-using practices are features of contexts of
utterance. I agree. But, unlike Recanati, I do not think that the meanings of
names need to appeal explicitly to these particular contextual features. Rather,
I claim that names are referential terms whose reference is determined by
the context of utterance in a way not pre-specified by their meaning. Various
different pragmatic mechanisms and features of the context can contribute
to the determination of the reference of a use of a name. In the ‘Brooklyn’
case, the speaker was able to use a visual cue available both to them and
their interlocutor in order to refer to a particular person, together, perhaps,
with their direction of gaze, or other demonstrative cues, and the fact that the
purpose of their utterance was clearly not to refer to any bearer of the name
‘Brooklyn’. In the initial ‘Julio’ case, the fact that all interlocutors had observed
the name being used vocatively to obviously address a particular object
enabled those interlocutors to use the name to refer to the same object. In cases
in which a name is used to refer to an established bearer, a range of pragmatic
mechanisms may still play a rôle in determining reference, but existing
practices of using that particular name to refer to particular objects will,
very probably, be prominent amongst them. As I have stressed throughout
this thesis, naming practices cannot be the only pragmatic mechanism at work,
because there are shared names. But, the fact that names are so often used in
line with established practices, means that naming practices are very likely to
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be a prominent factor in the determination of the reference of many referential
uses of names.
6.5.3 A Defeasible Constraint?
One thing that my discussion of the relation of bearers to the use of names
raises is that names lend themselves rather easily to reuse. In the example of
‘Julio’, once the name had been used with a particular reference, it was natural
for it to be used again to refer to the same object. In the ‘Brooklyn’ case, it’s
easy to see how a similar, albeit short-lived, practice could have arisen. This
seems to be the intuition behind the causal-picture of reference: once a name
has been used to refer to something once, or a few times, the very fact that it
has been used before in that way seems to make it easier to use again in the
same way. Unlike for the causal-theorist, however, my claim is that this fact is
not in itself either sufficient or necessary to determine reference, nor does the
fact have an effect on the kind of reference that speakers or their words can
exhibit.
As I have tried to show, there is no requirement that the referent of a name
is a bearer of it, or even that it has been used to refer to it before. However, it
is also clear that established social practices of name use frequently do play
a rôle in determining the reference of a use of a name, together with other
contextual factors. As just indicated, ‘Julio’-type cases also indicate that it is
not just established name-using practices that can affect the reference of names:
short-term practices can arise in which a name gets used to refer to an object
for a short time, in virtue of having been introduced by one introductory use.
These cases are rather reminiscent of the introduction of a discourse referent
in Discourse Representation Theory (Kamp and Reyle 1993), or even the use
of anaphoric pronouns. It should be noted, however, that the phenomenon
is not limited to proper names, as is indicated by the reference to discourse
referents and anaphora: once a particular definite description, for example,
has been used to refer to a particular object, even if—perhaps especially if—it
does not provide a particularly accurate description of its referent, then that
definite description can be reused to refer to the same object in part in virtue
of the initial use of the description.
If this feature of proper names—that one use with a particular reference
sets things up for further uses with the same reference—cannot be accurately
captured either with appeals to bearers and social practices in the semantics,
or by simply putting referents in the semantics, then we might look for another
way to characterize it. So far, my line has been that we should not try to
characterize such things in any kind of systematic way. It is a fact about the
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way we organize our societies, not our language, that we give some objects
proper names and then make use of those practices in referring to those objects.
It is a fact, I claim, about language that proper names can be used to refer to
things, and what they refer to is determined by the context of utterance in
a way not specified by their semantics. If we wanted to capture the feature
of names I have been discussing, we might want to add to this fact about
language in the following way: Proper names can be used to refer to things.
What a name refers to is determined by the context of utterance in a way not
specified by their semantics, but is likely to be something that it has been
used to refer to previously, as repetition increases correlations between names
and particular referents and particular situations.10 This is the idea indicated
in principle 4. a). This likelihood is not limited simply to what has been
referred to with the particular name in the immediate linguistic or temporal
context, as is the case for anaphoric pronouns, but can accommodate previous
uses within the linguistic community or simply any prior use, given the right
context. This additional caveat, about what is likely, captures something
of the idea that uses of names are apt to be repeated, but does not impose
anything resembling necessary or sufficient conditions or constraints upon
their reference. Such a caveat will help explain the expectation of the repeated
use of names with the same reference in Julio-type cases, but also the existence
of name-using practices, which not only can arise through repeated use of a
particular name with a particular reference, but enshrine in social conduct
that a particular name has been used with a particular reference before, and
so is apt for repetition.
However, such a caveat about what is likely cannot be captured by
traditional truth-conditional semantics. There is no way to effectively express
that something is likely or unlikely in classical model theory or the (categorial)
semantic frameworks that have emerged from it and around it. There are only
indefeasible rules, and meaning postulates to constrain the admissible models.
Although I am not presenting my views within any particular semantic
framework or formalism, my assumptions about what a semantics can look
like have so far assumed that it will make binary distinctions, as it appears that
my opponents have. If those assumptions are maintained, then I claim that the
semantics of a name goes no way towards determining its reference. If those
assumptions are relaxed, and I can move towards probabilistic semantics, then
I believe that it is plausible that the semantics of a name make it more likely
that a use of it refers to something it has been used to refer to previously.
Though discussion of it is beyond the scope of this thesis, work is being done
in developing semantic frameworks that would allow for the meanings of
10Thanks to Peter Sutton for highlighting this feature of names to me.
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names to incorporate probabilistic ‘constraints’ on their reference (e.g. Cooper
et al. 2014, 2015; Sutton 2013, 2015). Sutton (2013), in particular, discusses
at length how his particular Bayesian approach to semantics and pragmatics
can provide a non-truth-conditional picture of language in which a Travisian
approach to language and meaning can be accommodated, and is even to be
expected (pp. 211–212). Sutton observes, with regard to the effect of repetition
on the likelihood of particular reference determination:
[R]epeated uses [of a name (or other word)] entrench correlations, and
correlations between uses of words and described situations give rise to
streams of information that can be used by language users to perform
certain communicative actions. (Via correspondence)
6.5.4 Analytic Truths
There is an apparently widely (though, of course, not universally) accepted
adage or axiom that, for any proper name pNNq,11 it is true, or analytically
true that pNNq refers to NN (see, e.g. Sainsbury 2005, p. 73). There may be
good reason for thinking that utterances with this kind of form are (or can
be) frequently true. For example, one can easily imagine an utterance of
‘When I said “Alex”, I was referring to Alex’ being true. As I have discussed
widely, a referential use of a name usually licenses further uses with the
same reference (given the right circumstances). So, if someone is using the
name ‘Katharine’ to refer to someone, other speakers can use ‘Katharine’ to
refer in the same way, and then, from their perspective, ‘Katharine’ refers
to Katharine. According to causal-homophonism, which is largely inspired
by these parasitic uses, as long as it is a specific name with a referent (i.e.
not empty) occurring inside the quotation marks, then such sentences will
always be true, because each name refers to a particular object tout court.
However, whilst these kinds of utterances can be be true, and perhaps often
are, according to the pragmatic view of proper name reference, they have
nothing of the analyticity that some theorists have ascribed to them. Indeed, if
they are true, it is entirely contingent upon circumstance. This is principle 7.
On any view that maintains that names only refer upon occasions of use,
rather than tout court, if ppNNq refers to NNq is to be true, it must be interpreted
as meaning something like pWhen pNNq refers, it refers to NNq, or pUses of
pNNq refer to NNq. However, if the second occurrence of the name, outside the
11Note that this term is inside quotation marks, such that, whilst any name may be substituted
for the term, the double ‘N’ variable itself ranges over referents of names. Often, the double ‘N’
notation is used without quotation marks as a variable ranging over names themselves, rather
than their referents, however, that use of the notation provides no way of moving from mention
to use of a name.
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quotation marks is supposed to be referential—as it appears to be—then such
sentences seem at odds with the idea that names are context-sensitive, a view
held at least by indexicalists and myself, and presumably some constraint-
based intentionalists. If the name occurring within the quotation marks is
capable of referring to multiple objects, then it cannot always be true that it
refers to one particular object. There are at least two ways that proponents
of context-sensitivity about names might get around this, though I think
neither of them work. One way might be to claim that upon any particular
utterance of the sentence ‘“Katharine” refers to Katharine’, the context will
fix a referent of the use of ‘Katharine’, and so it will be true that, in that case,
the name ‘Katharine’ referred to the object that was the referent of the use
of ‘Katharine’, who is, trivially, in that situation, Katharine. But this reading
does not make the sentence or the utterance an analytic truth, at least, not
in the right way. Indeed, if it renders it true at all, it is probably because it
simply expressed the idea that the use of the name referred to what it referred
to. The simple present tense of ‘refers’ suggests a habitual relation that is
absent in the example. A more convincing case of this type, that does not
suggest analyticity, might occur when discussing an inscription of a name,
the reference of which, might be taken to be habitual: ‘“Mike”, here, refers to
Mike. You know: Mike!’.
A more likely route for a proponent of context-sensitivity who wanted to
maintain the analytic, or axiomatic, or logically true nature of the sentence
would be to claim that, in its timeless, sentential form, the occurrence of the
name outside the quotation marks is not properly referential. Rather, the
whole sentence presents some kind of schema that reflects the fact, as claimed
by Recanati (1993), Pelczar and Rainsbury (1998), and Michaelson (2013), that
names refer to bearers of those names. Thus, it will always be true that a
(non-empty) referential use of ‘Mike’, will, for some Mike, refer to Mike. This
principle is indeed enshrined as analytic or axiomatic by some theorists. It
is clear from Recanati’s account of the meaning of names that it is entailed
by a use of the name ‘Clare’ that the referent of that use is a bearer of that
name. Katz (2001) also maintains that there is an analytic entailment from
‘John Stuart Mill wrote A System of Logic’ to ‘a bearer of “John Stuart Mill”
wrote A System of Logic’ (p. 139). However, as I have argued at length, it is
possible to use a name to refer to an object that is not a bearer of that name,
and so there cannot be an analytic entailment of the sort just mentioned from
a use of a name. Rami (2014) also argues against such entailments on the
grounds that they are unwarranted.
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6.6 How to Individuate Names
In chapter 3, I considered a way in which not to individuate names: by
causal connection to the baptism of a single object. There must be a way
of individuating names, otherwise there would be no non-trivial notion of
having the same name. However, so far I have simply assumed that intuitions
about names can provide all that I need. In this section, I will briefly consider
what there is to say about the individuation of names.
As for the individuation of anything, that of names is not a cut-and-dried
matter. As I have argued, there are reasonably clear cut cases of names
being the same, and there are clear cut cases of names being distinct (for
example, ‘Patrick’ and ‘Donnatella’). But there are also grey areas, in which
we sometimes might say names are the same, and sometimes might not. For
instance, do Peter, Pieter and Pierre share a name? In some circumstances
the answer might be ‘yes’, and in some ‘no’. In others it might be ‘who
cares?’. Kaplan (1990) provides some good reasons for not individuating
words by phonological or orthographical similarity, which might be a natural
starting point. We might usually want the phonologically identical ‘Jeffrey’
and ‘Geoffrey’ to be the same name with distinct spellings, but perhaps the
phonetically similar surname ‘Joffrey’ to be a distinct name. We usually also
do not want differences in pronunciation of orthographically identical names
to entail differences in identity. For example, I have had some difficulty in
making my name, which I pronounce /"pi:t@/ (‘peetuh’), understood in parts
of the US, where it is pronounced /"pi:t
ˇ
@~/ (‘peedurrr’). But this difference in
pronunciation does not make for two distinct names.
Etymology seems to provide a more workable guide to the identity of
names.12 Whilst speakers are often not aware of the detailed etymological
history of the names they use, close etymological ties frequently line up
with closeness in phonology and orthography. These are things considered
by ordinary speakers, and etymology will shut out the misleading cases.
Appeals to etymology can therefore allow that, in some sense, ‘Peter’, ‘Pieter’,
and ‘Pierre’ are the same name, whilst there is a sense in which two names
that just happen to sound very similar, but are from entirely unconnected
languages, are not. And, since etymological closeness is a matter of degree, it
can account for the variable standards employed in individuating names—on
some occasions names may be required to have a high degree of etymological
relatedness to count as being the same, and on others, a lower degree.
Employing etymology in such judgements also ensures that individuation
12Thanks to Peter Sutton and Dolf Rami for early discussion of this idea. I believe it was
Peter’s suggestion.
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is about the words employed, and not about the reference of any particular
utterance of a name. Of course, it may emerge that etymology cannot, in fact,
account for the ways in which people generally individuate words. But once
the notion is separated from the determination of reference, it seems likely to
be of little philosophical interest.
6.7 Names and Occasion-Sensitivity
The picture of proper names and their reference that I have now painted is
heavily influenced by Travis, as I have previously indicated it would be. The
way that I am claiming name reference is determined—in virtue of pragmatic
mechanisms that cannot be systematically codified—is essentially the same
way that Travis claims throughout his work on philosophy of language that
the truth of utterances, and, most famously, the extension of predicates on an
occasion, is determined. As I discussed in §2.3, the determination, in this way,
of truth-values, predicate extensions, and other correctness conditions, on an
occasion, is what Travis terms ‘occasion-sensitivity’. My position is effectively,
then, that the reference of proper names is occasion-sensitive.
Occasion-sensitivity is a phenomenon that affects the truth-relevant assess-
ment of linguistic items: Sentences are occasion-sensitive because the truth-
values (or other correctness-values) of utterances of them are determined by
occasional pragmatic factors, and predicates are occasion sensitive because
whether or not their application is correct—whether or not something falls
within their extension—is determined by pragmatic factors on an utterance-by-
utterance basis. Being able to tell whether or not a predicate is being correctly
or appropriately applied on an occasion is something that requires domain-
general knowledge about the ways the world is on the occasion, not merely
knowledge of the semantics of the predicate. If proper names are occasion
sensitive, then their reference should be determined by pragmatic factors
on an occasion of utterance, as reference is a truth-relevant phenomenon
associated with names. In this section I will consider further what it is for a
name to be occasion-sensitive, and the way in which they are, as compared to
other things.
6.7.1 Occasion-Sensitivity in Thought
So far, both here, and, largely, in §2.3, I have described occasion-sensitivity
as if it were a phenomenon that only applied at the level of language: to
linguistic expressions such as predicates, sentences, and names. Such a
position about language would be consistent—at least up to a point—with
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a form of contextualism that maintained that word meanings do not specify
what the world must be like in order for uses of those words to correctly
describe it or apply to it, but that, on an occasion of utterance, words can
still express that the world is a particular, fully determinate way. That is, that
there are determinate, proposition-like thoughts that fully describe the world
as being a certain way, and that, on an occasion, an utterance can express
such a thought. But this would mean that there are fully determinate, discrete
ways that one could say that the world is, and that the world would be, if one
were correct in so saying: Consider an assertion that some particular leaves
are green. Even if we were to claim that exactly what that assertion asserts
or expresses depends upon the context of utterance in a way not specified by
the semantics of its words, if we were to claim in addition that, in the context,
the utterance asserted that the world (or a part of it) is a certain determinate
way—expressed a determinate and discrete thought—then there would have
to be a particular, discrete way for something to be green that it was asserted
that the leaves were. But if there were such discrete ways to be green, we could
presumably enumerate them, and observe that on this particular occasion, the
word ‘green’ meant green276, and it now appears that the contextualism that
was being proposed can be redescribed as a mass-ambiguity type view like
that I compared to causal-homophonism on p. 59.
Travis explicitly rejects the view that there are determinate, discrete
thoughts expressed by utterances, and that there are particular determinate
ways that things must be for an assertoric utterance to have correctly described
them (e.g. Travis 1990). He says:
When Pia said ‘Sid grunts’, she spoke on a certain understanding of
being a grunter. When Sid said ‘The room is dark’, he spoke on a certain
understanding of a room being dark. ‘What understanding?’, one might
be inclined to ask. Which may seem to call for an answer of the form, ‘The
understanding such that. . . ’, where what filled the blank would uniquely
identify some one understanding there is to have of being a grunter, or of
a room being dark. ‘It is that understanding on which someone would
count as a grunter just in case (he were) such-and-such.’[. . . ]
There is another way of understanding ‘a certain way [to understand an
utterance]’. On it, understanding being a grunter in a certain way would
just be understanding it as it was to be understood on Pia’s speaking of
it—understanding it so as to be that of which she spoke. When would
one be doing that? Just when one was understanding it as it ought to
have been understood in the circumstances of her speaking of it. There
is determinacy in what one would have to do to be doing that. In the
circumstances, some things would be misunderstandings, others would
not. It would be a misunderstanding, say, to think that anyone would
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be a grunter on the understanding on which Pia spoke of this if, hit
hard enough in the solar plexus, he would grunt. One understands
Pia’s words in the right way—as they ought to be understood—if one
does not lapse into misunderstanding. What one would have to do to
do that, on the present story of a truth-bearer, is fixed by nothing less
than the significance of the circumstances in which she spoke: that is, by
their having the significance they did. Fine. But which understanding is
that certain one on which Pia spoke of being a grunter? On the view I
recommend, this last question is ill-formed. It has no answer. One cannot
count understandings like that. (e.g. Travis 2008, pp. 7–8)
Occasion sensitivity is, then, essentially, a phenomenon that arises not just at
the level of language, but at the level of thought.
6.7.2 Names’ Contribution to Thought
However, with respect to occasion sensitivity at the level of what (utterances
of) words express or how they say things are, it might appear that proper
names, as I have characterized them, are different from expressions such as
sentences and predicate terms. Throughout this thesis, I have focussed on
proper name reference in the sense that names refer to particular objects (of
various kinds), and I have argued that each proper name is capable of referring
to multiple objects, and that what object a name refers to on an occasion of
utterance is determined by pragmatic mechanisms. If we consider the way in
which ‘green’ is occasion sensitivity, we can say that whether or not something
counts as being green is fixed only on an occasion of utterance by the context,
but there are not discrete ways of counting as being green such that we could
systematically say ‘it’s green in these ways, but not these’. The case of names
is different, at least superficially. We can also say that what ‘Lucy’ refers to is
fixed only on an occasion of utterance by the context, but in this case there
are discrete things that could be referred to as ‘Lucy’, and thereby be Lucy,
at least in the sense that we would usually have an idea of how to count the
kinds of objects to which we give names. There is a certain sense in which
it must be settled what object I am referring to with a name before it can be
assessed whether what I am saying about that object is a correct thing to say.
And, moreover, that once the reference is settled, which, I claim, requires a
certain understanding of an utterance, the contribution of the name does not
obviously depend on further nuances of understanding.13 But this does not
quite seem to be the case for predicates: it is not necessary to fix upon some
particular understanding of ‘green’ before assessing whether something is
13Travis (1995) makes a similar point (p. 253), but goes on to argue that it is wrong in a certain
way. I will consider ways in which things are more complex in subsequent paragraphs.
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green. So, perhaps proper names are occasion sensitive with regard to their
reference at the level of language, but not of thought, because once we know
what an utterance of a name refers to, there is a particular object that is related
in a predictable way to the truth or correctness of the utterance or the thought
it expresses.
Is the way that the reference of proper names is fixed therefore significantly
different to the way in which the correct understanding of the use of other
terms is fixed? It does appear to be different in a certain respect, but I do not
think that this difference is so significant that we should think of it as a wholly
different phenomenon. It is not surprising that reference and predication
should interact differently with the thoughts to which they contribute the
capacity for correctness, since they play different rôles.14 Similarly, one would
expect utterances of sentences to behave differently to utterances of sub-
sentential parts of speech. But, in fact, there are more ways that names
might be considered to be occasion-sensitivity than the way that I have so
far considered. Individual objects of the sort that we give proper names,
as they are differentiated from one another, are relatively determinate, but
the ways that they can be are less determinate. If the occasion-sensitivity of
‘green’ is characterizable as there being ‘many ways to be green’, then one
may attempt to simply apply this characterization to names, and maintain
that there are ‘many ways to be London’. However, such a use of the name
‘London’ appears to be referential, and so we would presumably be saying
that there are different ways to be the particular geographical or political
entity referred to (cf. Lewis 1993).
Intra- and Inter-Object Occasion-Sensitivity
This is a different kind of variability from the variation of discrete referents
of a name. This is the idea that a name, even as it refers to one object, or, at
least, closely related objects, can be used to refer to slightly different things,
or different portions or parts of the same thing, or one thing under different
understandings of it, and that this variation is determined pragmatically.
As Travis (2006b) maintains, ‘every interpretation admits of interpretations’
(p. 38). For example, London is a city, but its name can refer, correctly and
truthfully, to the geographical area the city occupies, or its population, or both,
or its government, or its infrastructure, or just Inner London, or Inner London
plus a bit. It does not appear that all this is encoded in the semantics of the
14Travis (2006b), following Wittgenstein (1953), is clear that predicates should not be thought
of as behaving like proper names, where names are thought of as straight-forward labels of
objects, but this in itself need not rule out that proper names in fact behave more like Travis’s
conception of predicates.
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name, even on homophonist accounts. We might call this phenomenon ‘local’
or ‘intra-object’ occasion-sensitivity. This variability in the reference of names,
unlike the inter-object determination of reference that I have so far focussed on,
need not admit of determinate, discrete fixings at the truth-evaluable level.
Whether these two levels of occasion-sensitivity for names are viewed
two distinct phenomena, or a degrees of the same phenomenon, and, indeed,
whether one accepts that either or both exist, may depend on how one wishes
to properly individuate names. Homophonists, who individuate names in
such a way that no name has more than one bearer, may accept local occasion-
sensitivity, and this would presumably be consistent with that individuation,
although it may put pressure on it at edges. Indeed, homophonists presumably
must accept that, at least in some sense, the reference of some names varies in
the manner indicated for London in the preceding paragraph. Although some
uses of place names to refer to their administration or population, for example,
may be put down to metonymy, which is often considered a systematic case
of deferred reference (cf. Nunberg 1993), not all variation in their use can be
so described, and metonymy, as it is standardly understood, requires a core
object of reference.
Whether ‘London’ refers to the whole area inside the administrative
boundary of the London Authority, or the built-up area inside it, or that
area separated from the distant centres of population that have a lasting
identity independent of London, such as Croydon and Dagenham, or just
the inner boroughs, cannot be addressed by metonymy. Since, according
to homophonists, the semantics of a name consists just of its reference, any
variation in that reference may be accounted for either by positing more
names, or by pragmatic mechanisms, though these pragmatic mechanisms
need not be of the un-systematizable variety described by proponents of
occasion-sensitivity. The variable extent of London, for example, which might
be used to provide Travis-style cases, appears to be similar to widely accepted
cases of the vagueness of proper names. Vagueness is not deemed to be a
threat to the truth-conditional semantics of names, because there’s a sense in
which it does not affect what a name refers to (Schiffer 2010). However, there
is also clearly a sense in which it does—there are several possible answers to
the question ‘what is the population of Los Angeles?’, for example, because
the question could be understood as being about the City of Los Angeles, Los
Angeles County, or some portion of the wider metropolitan area (cf. Lewis
1988).15
15Chomsky (2000) makes a somewhat similar point about London, though to rather different
ends.
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Identity and Occasion-Sensitivity
Travis himself provides an example of what I have called intra-object occasion-
sensitivity in his (1995), though for referential descriptions rather than names.
He uses the example to show that, counter to Frege’s view of the effects
of different senses on co-referring terms in non-opaque contexts, referring
terms, with particular referents, do admit of different understandings that
can impact upon the truth-value of utterances containing them, and in
particular, upon identity statements. In claiming that referring terms admit
of different understandings, even after they have had their reference fixed
upon a particular object, Travis is claiming precisely that referring terms are
occasion sensitive in a way comparable to predicates and sentences, or, put
another way that amounts to the same thing, but clarifies where this particular
occasion-sensitivity lies, that the identity of objects, or the concepts of objects,
is or are occasion-sensitive. Travis’s example is as follows:
In the seventeenth century, Vermeer painted a picture, ‘Het Straatje’,
whose central subject is a house. Call it Vermeer’s house. Around 1980,
rubble was discovered in the cellar of a house. Call this Kok’s house.
Kok’s house looked nothing like what Vermeer painted. The rubble,
though, was shown to be the old façade of Vermeer’s house. Kok’s house,
it seems, though different in nearly every respect, was the result of a series
of renovations of (at the start at least) Vermeer’s house. The intuitive view,
I think, is that there are two views one could coherently take (though
not both at once) as to whether Kok’s house was Vermeer’s house. One
could view it as Vermeer’s house, and would sometimes speak truth in
saying so (as long as one’s words were rightly understood as describing
how things are on that view of the matter). Equally, one could view it as
not Vermeer’s house, and similarly sometimes speak truth in saying that
(again, in words bearing a suitable understanding of what they thus say).
(ibid., p. 256)
Travis’s proposal is that on some occasions, given certain understandings
of the words, the identity statement ‘Kok’s house is Vermeer’s house’ can be
true, and on others, given certain other understandings, it can be false. In both
kinds of case, the reference of each respective referring expression is the same,
that is, ‘Kok’s house’ refers to one particular thing, and ‘Vermeer’s house’
refers to one particular thing, and in one case that is the same particular thing,
and in the other it is not. It might well be that exactly what constitutes each
house, materially or otherwise, differs on the different occasions—presumably
it must—but that does not appear to mean that there are different houses.
Travis is very clear, however, that this apparent occasion-sensitivity of identity
does not pose a threat to Leibniz’s law, or other standard principles of the
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logic of identity. Rather, they simply require clarification that they can only
be applied within particular occasions, understandings or perspectives (Travis
1995, p. 270): It will never hold on any one occasion of utterance, in any one
context, according to any single perspective, both that Kok’s house is and
isn’t Vermeer’s house. Thus it cannot be inferred that Kok’s house isn’t Kok’s
house, or Vermeer’s house isn’t Vermeer’s house, as it could be if one was
held to be both the other and not the other simultaneously.
As Travis’s example employs descriptions, one might reasonable wonder
(prior to having read the whole paper) whether it turned on an ambiguity
between referential and non-referential uses of descriptions, or on non-rigid
reference. However, an analogous example can be created using proper
names, as will be required anyway for my purposes, simply by replacing
the descriptions with names: Consider an apparently lost ancient city called
Sreemrev, known from ancient texts to have existed, but whose precise location
has long been forgotten. Suppose it is discovered, through archeological
excavation in the modern city of Skok, that the remains of ancient Sreemrev lie
under Skok, and that, in fact, contrary to received historical wisdom, Sreemrev
was never abandoned for any significant period, but rather, was simply
developed and rebuilt over the millennia in the manner of any continuously
populated city. It seems reasonable to apply exactly the same reasoning that
Travis applied to his Amsterdam houses to Sreemrev and Skok. Under certain
circumstances it will be absolutely correct to say that Sreemrev is Skok: It was
discovered that this was the case. There is clear evidence of near constant
occupation, and of the continuous rebuilding and development typical of
a single city. But under other circumstances, and for different purposes, it
would be correct to say that the ancient city and the modern city are distinct:
they are populated by different and entirely unrelated civilizations (say), one
adopting the site and its structures a few years after the other abandoned it,
and the two have distinct and disjoint administrative histories; one lies under
the other, which is significantly larger; and the location of one was forgotten
for a thousand years, whilst the other is a well known holiday location.
Reference and Identity
I will not spend time rigorously defending the position that identity is
occasion-sensitive, as it is not essential for the wider purpose of this thesis.
Clearly, I agree with Travis that there is intra-object occasion-sensitivity, and
that the pragmatic mechanisms that effect the understanding of a particular
use of ‘Vermeer’s House’ or ‘Sreemrev’ may well be the same kinds of
mechanism that effect what metonymic or vague understanding a use of
189
6.7. Names and Occasion-Sensitivity
‘London’ or ‘LA’ or ‘Princeton’ receives. But one need not accept this kind of
position in order to accept that pragmatic mechanisms determine the reference
of a name between wholly distinct objects in the way that I have described.
Assuming we do accept the position, however, it might be reasonable to
ask whether or not inter-object and intra-object occasion-sensitivity are one
and the same phenomenon, or distinct phenomena. The answer to this
question, if it is even well-formed, is that it is unclear, but it probably
doesn’t matter very much. Certainly, the two kinds of thing can be described
differently: one as the determination of reference on an occasion, and one
as the determination of identity. But determination of identity presumably
involves or is involved in the determination of reference—consideration of
the city-type cases certainly suggests so—simply at a more fine-grained level.
It may be that, on an occasion, different mechanisms are involved in fixing
upon a referent amongst objects and fixing upon a particular understanding
of that object, but given pluralism about reference determination, this does
not entail that these are different kinds of process or two completely separate
phenomena. What the idea of intra-object occasion-sensitivity, or occasion-
sensitivity of the concepts of objects, shows is that, if one does buy into the idea
of occasion-sensitivity being ubiquitous to both language and thought, the
kind of occasion-sensitivity I have described for reference is not distinguished
from that of predicates and sentences (for example) by being limited to
language. Names provide a referent for a thought, but that referent, at the
level of language, is not thereby presented with a fixed understanding.
6.7.3 Reference and Travis-Cases
If proper names are occasion-sensitive with regard to their reference, then
we might expect there to be Travis cases illustrating this, just as there are
for predicates, and for the intra-object variability of proper names. What
would such cases be like? As I discussed in §2.3.1, Travis cases designed
to demonstrate the occasion-sensitivity of predicates hold the meaning of
an expression constant demonstrating that the truth-value of utterances
containing the expression can be varied by shifting an element of context
that is not connected to the meaning. However, there is little or no intuitive
grasp on what the meaning of a proper name is, such that it could be held
constant whilst the reference is varied. Moreover, the idea that (intuitively)
single names can refer to multiple objects is extremely familiar, so generating
interesting cases that mirror those for predicates is difficult.
Given a slightly different way of understanding the familiar Travis cases for
predicates, however, things seem slightly easier. The meaning is held constant
190
6.7. Names and Occasion-Sensitivity
while the truth-value varies, which is supposed to show that meaning doesn’t
determine truth-values or -conditions. But, exactly what holding the meaning
constant means depends on what kind of view is being attacked. If it is
the view that meanings are contents (see p. 48) that is at issue, then the
intuitive idea of the content of the expression in question is held constant.
And if it is the view that meanings are characters (see p. 50), then whatever
contextual parameters that a particular proposed character for an expression
states contribute to its truth-conditions are held constant. The idea is to use
cases to attack more or less particular ideas about what the truth-conditions
for particular expressions are. In the case of names then, the task is not to
simply hold their meaning constant whilst varying their reference, but to hold
whatever a particular theory says determines their reference constant, and
then still vary their reference. This is precisely Travis’s strategy in his papers
that discuss reference (primarily Travis (1980) and (1981a)). This is a fairly
familiar task and, although presenting explicit and fully-formed cases may not
have been my primary mode of argument, examples and arguments following
this pattern can be found throughout part II of this thesis.
For good measure, here is another case that aims both at causal-homophon-
ism and indexicalism: Consider a supervisor at a provincial sorting office who
calls out ‘Do we have all the post for London?’. She refers to a very particular
area with her use of ‘London’: the London postal area. This is because of her
particular post-specific purposes. The boundaries of the London postal area
are (mostly) within the administrative boundaries of London, but distinct from
anything like Inner London, or London-minus-the-less-Londony-bits. Though,
they are themselves quite specific: every address either has, or does not have,
a London post code. Now imagine that the supervisor has, as a result of Royal
Mail’s privatization, gone to work for Father Christmas in Lapland. She is now
in charge of getting all the presents into the right sacks on the sleigh. She calls
out ‘Do we have all the post for London?’ (not having got used to the idea that
packages and parcels are anything but post). Since Father Christmas pays no
heed to post codes or post towns, ‘London’ here has a different referent to the
supervisor’s previous use. Perhaps, for Father Christmas’s purposes, London
is everything inside the m25, or even all of southeast England. Whether or
not one thinks that the fact that the name ‘London’ can refer to the London
postal area as well as smaller and larger areas of the UK can be explained by
vagueness or by metonymy, it is clear that it did so refer in this case because
of the context in which it was uttered. Unless London the city and the London
postal area are conceived of as completely distinct bearers of ‘London’, then,
for a homophonist, any such context-sensitivity must be extra-semantic, and
it seems likely that this would be the case too for an indexicalist.
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6.8 Objections to the Pragmatic View
Having described the pragmatic view of proper name reference in some
detail, I now turn to two potential objections that might be made to the
account. Although the objections might appear significant initially, once they
are carefully considered, they do not present a significant problem for the
view.
6.8.1 Prediction
One objection that seems likely to be leveled at my account of proper name
reference is that it says almost nothing about proper name reference, at least
in the sense of saying what actually goes on. Rather, it says that proper
name reference is not determined in a variety ways that other people have
suggested, and then essentially just says that it happens, and that’s all we
can say about it. To some extent, this kind of objection is accurate, I simply
deny that it presents a problem for me. My position is exactly that there
can be no theory of name reference, where that means a list of determinate
criteria—necessary and sufficient conditions—for when a name will refer to a
particular object. The reference of an utterance of a name depends entirely
upon the circumstances in which it is uttered in a way that cannot be specified
in a systematic way in advance. But that is not to say that there is nothing
to be said about it. For any particular use of a name, or imagined use, we
can point to a range of factors and mechanisms within the circumstances that
will contribute to the determination of reference. We can even observe that
certain kinds of factors are very frequently relevant. Factors such as relevant
social name-using practices, the aims, interests and purposes of the speaker
and audience, the topic of conversation, the objects that interlocutors or other
relevant agents are attending to, or have been attending to, the actions and
demonstrations of interlocutors, etc. It is thus not true that my pragmatic
account of name reference says nothing about name reference, it simply says
something different to what other accounts aim to say. But possibly the most
significant part of my account is that what those other accounts set out to do
is unviable.
A related objection, and possibly the root of the thought that I say
nothing about reference, is that, by its nature, my account has no predictive
power. Such an objection may assume that theories of proper name reference
should be able to make predictions about reference, for, if they do not,
they cannot be judged to be accurate or inaccurate. This objection strikes
me as rather misplaced, or at least, to hold philosophy of language up to
unrealistic standards that, in fact, my opponents also do not meet. It is true
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that, by its nature, faced with a scenario in which a name is used under
particular circumstances, my account does not provide a theory such that
those circumstances can be fed in and a conclusion produced about what the
name referred to, or would refer to. In this way, my view appears to be unlike
causal-homophonism and indexicalism, because they have the resources to
say things like ‘the referent of the use of the name is the referent of the name,
which is the object of the baptism that the name is causally connected to,
unless the referent of the name has shifted’, or ‘the referent of the use of the
name is the most salient bearer of the name in the context’. However, these are
clearly only de dicto descriptions that go very little way to actually identifying
a referent, and provide little that could, in a genuine case, indicate whether a
proposed referent actually fulfilled the criteria.
My pragmatic view of name reference can, in fact, produce de dicto
descriptions of the referent of name that are not significantly less informative
than those just provided: ‘the referent of the use of the name is the object that,
in the context of utterance, given the particular circumstances of the occasion,
is best understood to be what the speaker referred to with that name’. Like
the homophonist and indexicalist cases, this goes little way to identifying a
particular referent, but unlike those, it seems like it might offer some idea of
whether it was fulfilled by a particular candidate for referent in a real case,
even if it cannot itself select candidates.
There is another, closely related, way in which my pragmatic view of
proper name reference also behaves differently to other accounts. And this
could be viewed either as a flaw or a feature of the view. Whilst, as I have
pointed out, other accounts have limited genuinely predictive power, especially
in real cases, one can of course construct cases in which it is specified that a
particular object fulfils their criteria, and one can then attempt to construct
cases in which their criteria come apart from an intuitive notion of what is
referred to in the case. As I argued in §2.2, ordinary speakers’ judgements
about what is referred to in any particular case is the best data about reference
that is generally available, even if it has its flaws. In such a case, the theorist
proposing criteria for reference has two options. They can either accept that
their theory has produced an incorrect prediction, and attempt to modify it, or
they can stick by their theory and insist that their prediction is in fact correct,
given the notion of reference they are describing—this is often the motivation,
or a large part of the motivation, for the distinction between semantic reference
and speaker reference—and that any intuitions that something else has been
referred to are either mistaken, or they are tracking a different notion of
reference. However, if we were to ask what my account of reference says
about the very same cases, it would be difficult to know exactly what to say.
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The most accurate answer would be that, if the cited intuitions about what was
referred to tracked what rational language users who were actually involved
in the case as interlocutors or observers would judge, then whatever those
intuitions judged to be the referent is the referent. However, my pragmatic
view provides no way to judge whether any particular ordinary speaker
judgement about a hypothetical case does line up with what language-users
actually in the case would judge. Indeed, by the very nature of these kinds
of case, and as discussed in §2.2, there is no way to tell what language-users
actually involved in the case would judge, because there are no such people.
It looks, then, rather like whatever our best data says the reference of a name
is, that’s what my account must be assumed to say it is. So it is hard to see
how my account could be tested.
There are two points to consider with regard to this result. The first is that
this is not so unusual a position to find an account of proper name reference
in. The second is that this is not actually a bad result for my account, since,
although it may not make predictions about cases, it offers an explanation both
for why reference is as it is, and why speakers judge things to be as they do,
and this will explain why it gets all the cases right. The first point is related to
my claim that other accounts of reference are also bad at making predictions.
Indexical accounts, in particular, tend to offer a very minimal description of
the character or mode of presentation that they ascribe to names, such that,
whether or not it is imagined that it could in principle be fleshed out into a
complete and determinate truth-condition, they in fact provide rather slim
constraints on reference. For example, for Pelczar and Rainsbury (1998), the
only constraint that could really be applied to a case is that the referent should
have been dubbed using the name in question. The notion of a dubbing being
in force (or being prominent) is a largely unexplained contextual mechanism
that must be assumed to track language users’ judgements about which objects
that are presented in a context are likely referents. Similarly for Recanati
(1993): he provides the constraint that the referent of a name must bear that
name, but the idea of being the bearer in a context and how to distinguish
between multiple bearers in a context are left for context to explain.
So, in terms of making predictions about cases, both these versions of
indexicalism can distinguish between possible referents of a name on the basis
of whether they have been dubbed with or bear the name—and, as I have
made clear, this is hardly a categorical distinction—but beyond that, they
must rely on an unspecified assessment of the context of the case to judge
which of those objects that are dubbed with or bear the name are the referent.
And presumably those judgements are going to be based on the same kinds
of things that language-users are basing their intuitive judgements on. So, it
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looks like these indexicalist accounts of names are only going to differ from
the data in their predictions about cases if the data says that the referent is a
non-bearer, or is not the object of a dubbing. Their ability to make predictions
is thus only very slightly better than that of my account.
The second point to be made with regard to the fact that my account
appears to be untestable, is that it is unclear whether this really is a point
against it. I have acknowledged that it does not have the capacity to make
predictions, except by the same means that any data is produced, which
leaves nothing to judge it against. However, even if the account doesn’t
have predictive power, it does have explanatory power. It has an explanation
for why what names refer to is likely to coincide with the judgements that
language users make about what names refer to. What names refer to,
and what we expect them to refer to, given the circumstances in which
they are used, are inextricably linked. Speakers, generally, use the names
that they do to refer to particular things in particular situations because
those are appropriate names to use to refer to those things in the particular
circumstances of those situations. Suppose a speaker uses a name, and that
name refers to a particular object upon that use. That it refers to what it does
is determined by pragmatic mechanisms of the context, such as the speaker’s
purposes and interests, and those of their audience, and relevant name-using
practices.
These mechanisms are what determine the reference of the name because,
as a matter of fact, they are what affect members of the linguistic community’s
expectations of what the world is like given that certain words—in this case
a name—have been used in the circumstances of those mechanisms. The
speaker used the name knowing, in some sense, that particular factors would
affect its reference, and how, and they used it for that reason—because it
would refer to the object they wanted to refer to in the circumstances. The
audience is also attuned to the factors that will determine the reference of
the name, and are able to recognize the effect that they have, and thus they
can appreciate the reference of the name as it was used by the speaker. Note
that this claim is not that the reference of a name is determined by whatever
factors allow a hearer to appreciate what was referred to, or not because those
factors play that rôle, but rather, hearers are, in general, attuned to particular
factors in particular contexts because those factors are likely to contribute
to the determination of reference. Given all this, it is unsurprising that the
intuitive judgements of language-users about cases of proper name reference
are likely to track the same kinds of factors that determine reference, and so
be a good guide to what has been referred to in those cases. The fact that my
account of name reference cannot provide independent criteria that can be
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tested against those intuitions in every case is not a fault with the account,
given that the account maintains that there are no such criteria.
6.8.2 Do We Need Criteria?
A criticism levelled frequently at the idea that there are no determinate criteria
specifying what words contribute to the content of utterances of sentences
containing them is that it somehow makes language excessively mysterious,
or makes communication impossible. Travis (ms.) quotes Stanley (2007) in
this regard:
On the pessimistic view, there is stability to word meaning and the
significance of the syntactic structure of sentences. But in general there is
no systematic way of going from the meanings of the words in a sentence
and its syntactic structure to the intuitive truth-conditions of its various
utterances.[. . . ]
If any version of the pessimistic view were correct, significant facts about
linguistic communication would be inexplicable.[. . . ]
The pessimistic view is difficult to accept because language users (even
at very young ages) smoothly grasp information about the world from
sentences they have never previously encountered. Furthermore, they do
so given only knowledge of the meanings of a (relatively) small number of
individual words and their modes of combination into sentences. If there
is no systematic way of proceeding from knowledge of the extra-linguistic
context and knowledge of the meaning of individual words and modes
of combination into sentences to a grasp of the information about the
world that is conveyed by an utterance of a sentence, it is mysterious how
language users could so smoothly move from linguistic comprehension
to action. In short, if the pessimistic view were correct, the connection
between speech and action would be inexplicable. (Stanley 2007, pp. 10–11,
quoted in Travis ms., pp. 28–29)
This general criticism could be applied to my pragmatic account of names in
the following way: if there were no determinate criteria for the determination
of proper name reference such that there is a systematic connection between
(a use of) a name and its referent, then it would be inexplicable that language
users could recognize the reference of names.
One initial observation about this objection to my view is that it is only
available, on pain of hypocrisy, to those whose own accounts of proper name
reference—if they have them—maintain that reference is determined in ways
that are recognizable to language users. This rules out proponents of causal-
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homophonism and intention-based views on the grounds that neither causal
chains of name uses nor speakers’ intentions are inherently, or even generally
perspicuous to audiences (or speakers, in the case of causal chains). Both
these kinds of accounts maintain that it is factors other than those that actually
determine reference that allow audiences to identify the reference of speakers’
uses of names. However, I have committed myself, in my discussions of
communication, to the idea that whatever determines the reference of names
should be perspicuous to language-users. So the objection at hand is one that,
by my own lights, should be of concern to me.
Assuming the objection is brought in good faith, then, there are two ways
to respond to it. One is to offer, or indicate, an account of the ways in which
word meaning and pragmatics works, upon which the objection is misplaced
with regard to the kind of thing my account of name reference might be. The
other is to offer an explanation of what can be expected of an account of
meaning with regard to communication, appealing to Travis’s own response
to the objection. I will briefly appeal to both options, which are, I think,
perfectly compatible, and represent different kinds of presentation of different
aspects of a correct view of language and communication.
The first option is to observe that there are statistical, probabilistic accounts
of semantics and pragmatics that are specifically intended to explain how
communication can be possible given minimal word meanings that specify
very little information about how they can contribute to the content of an
utterance in a context. As mentioned in §6.5.3, Sutton (2013) explicitly ex-
plains how learning and communication are entirely consistent with occasion-
sensitivity, given the probabilistic account of semantics and pragmatics that
he presents. Again, I will not go into the details of Sutton’s account here, but
it will suffice to observe that the kind of objection Stanley presents only arises
given a particular conception of communication that goes hand-in-hand with
a categorial, truth-conditional semantics. Once that is abandoned in favour of,
for example, the information-theoretic view of communication presented by
Sutton, together with a probabilistic conception of how utterances should be
interpreted that abandons anything resembling traditional propositions, the
objection ceases to have teeth.
The second option is related, in that it involves observing that, given
a different view of the nature of how language is used to communicate
thoughts, the objection no longer arises. Indeed the view of language that
Travis provides to counter the objection is, I believe perfectly consistent with
Sutton’s, though I will not attempt to show that here in any detail. One
similarity between Sutton and Travis is the appeal to language users as
rational agents for whom utterances can form evidence, not just for what a
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speaker is trying to do with their words, but, through that, for how things
are. One key point with regard to this, which I have mentioned before, is that
interpreting what was said with some words involves not just knowledge of
what those words mean, but also general knowledge about how the world
is: the circumstances surrounding an utterance, but also the ways in which
circumstances might affect how things might be described as being. For
example, it might be relevant to understand that a botanist requires different
things from a green leaf than a photographer does in some circumstances of
recognizing that a leaf is green. Although, in other circumstances, it may not
be.
In at least three papers in which Travis discusses reference (1980, 1981a,
ms.), he appeals to Descartes’s assertions that humans are rational. Travis
states:
[A] rational being has an unbounded capacity to recognize and evaluate
novel ways of accomplishing goals, of solving problems. Suppose one
stated a determinate, executable, method for discovering such ways; some
set of principles fixing how solving some given domain of problems
is to be done. Then a rational being would be able to consider, and
evaluate rationally, alternative ways of doing that, and to recognize the
need for such should need arise. [. . . ] [S]uch flexibility, or plasticity, in
our thought about the environment in which we find ourselves—in our
ways of making thought mesh with the things there are in it for one to
think about—is central to an ability to have coherent thought about the
world at all. (Travis ms., p.29).
Travis maintains that it is this kind of capacity that allows language-users
to recognize what a term has been used to refer to, or whether a particular
object is correctly described in the way that it was, without there being any
systematic set of determinate conditions that determine these things. Rather,
as rational beings, we are able to employ domain-general knowledge, and
general capacities, in order to solve specific problems of recognition. And,
moreover, we are able to apply relevant knowledge and methods to specific
cases, even though that specific knowledge and those specific methods may not
be suitable for other, similar recognitional problems. Whether or not certain
methods or areas of knowledge are relevant under certain circumstances is
not something that is specified in advance by, for example, the semantics of
words.
In chapter 7, I provide an example of a class of referring terms, apparently
very similar to proper names, for which it is hard to see, when their use is
considered, how their semantics could provide conditions that determine their
reference, so it must be fixed entirely pragmatically. Consideration of this
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class of terms should therefore make it plausible that the reference of a range
of terms can be fixed wholly pragmatically. This should allay worries that it is
implausible that the reference of proper names could be determined in this
way.
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Chapter 7
Who’s Mum?
Seal up your lips and give no words but mum.
Henry VI, Part 2
In this chapter I will attempt to show that the pragmatic view is coherentand plausible as an account of proper name reference by consideringanother class of referential terms, namely familial terms such as ‘Mum’.
These appear to be examples of what Pelczar and Rainsbury (1998) call
‘quasi-names’ and possibly what Recanati (1993) calls ‘pseudo-names’. I will
suggest that the most obvious account of the determination of their reference
is something like the pragmatic view, whereby nothing in their semantics
determines their reference, nor strongly constrains it.
7.1 ‘Mum’
Words such as ‘Mum’ and ‘Dad’ are, at least superficially, similar to proper
names in that they can be used bare (i.e. without being preceded by a
determiner or possessive pronoun) to refer to objects (I will exclude vocative
uses from my discussion, because it appears to be relatively easy to address
someone using almost any term). However, unlike names, their use is
generally not connected to a dubbing-type event, but rather is connected
to satisfying the common noun ‘mum’ or ‘dad’ just in virtue of being a parent
(in some sense).
In Southern British English there is a convention to use (or be able to
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use) ‘Mum’ to refer to one’s mother, and ‘Dad’ to refer to one’s father.1 I
propose that these referential uses can very plausibly, or even most plausibly,
be accounted for in a manner in which their reference is determined by
purely pragmatic means. ‘Mum’ can be used as a common noun that is fairly
synonymous with ‘mother’, but a common noun is not the type of thing that
can easily refer to a particular object, when used bare. ‘My mum’ is a very
commonly used referential term to refer to a particular mother, but it cannot
be that all uses of bare ‘Mum’ are elliptical for ‘my mum’, since, as I’ll argue,
speakers can use it to refer to other people’s mothers. ‘The mum’ might be
a more plausible candidate, but this simply pushes the problems into the
semantics of so-called incomplete definite descriptions. A Kaplanian indexical-
type view is an alternative, but it is very hard to see what kinds of contextual
parameters would do the work required, unless they are very indeterminate.
Moreover, it is clear that there are not multiple, homophonous terms ‘Mum’,
each of which refers to a different person, as homophonists maintain is the
case for names.
7.1.1 Constraints
There are some constraints on the reference of uses of ‘Mum’. Generally, it
refers to a mum. And one wouldn’t expect it to be able refer to just any
mother—the mother must, presumably, be related in someway to the dialogue
or utterance, but just how it must be related seems to be very much a matter
of context. It is also not a necessary condition upon reference that the referent
be a mother. One can well imagine cases where a non-mother is referred
to as ‘Mum’, perhaps for humourous purposes, though it seems likely that
doing so will be highlighting some property or other the referent has that
is, in some sense, motherly. There are other kinds of quasi-names, such as
‘thingumybob’ and ‘what’s-their-name’, mentioned by Recanati (1993), that
appear to have almost no constraints on their reference. Some such terms may
be more suggestive of (e.g.) an animate or inanimate referent—‘what’s-their-
name’ versus ‘thingumybob’ and ‘whatsit’—but these appear to be largely
defeasible.
1There are parallel conventions to use related terms for the same purposes in other dialects
of English. Many other languages have equivalent terms that can be used both bare, referentially,
and as common nouns.
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7.1.2 My Mum or Yours?
Anecdotal evidence suggests2 that bare, referential ‘Mum’ is used primarily to
refer to the/a mother of a speaker when the speaker is addressing members of
their close family, particularly siblings and (other) parents, but also amongst
wider family, and people well-acquainted with the mother. When addressing
others, it seems that ‘my mum’ would often be a more appropriate way of
referring to one’s mother, although, in many contexts it is likely that bare
‘Mum’ could still succeed in referring to the speaker’s mother. All this is
suggestive that ‘Mum’ refers to the speaker’s mother. But this is not always
the case. It is entirely normal, at least in my dialect (or perhaps just my family),
for parents to refer to mothers of their children as ‘Mum’ when addressing
those children (particularly if the parent also has a familial relationship with
that mother).3
It is also quite possible for non-parents to refer to the mother of their
addressee using bare ‘Mum’, though in my experience this type of use is
suggestive (though not perhaps requiring) of a high degree of familiarity with
the referent, and is far more common if the speaker is of the same generation
as, or previous to, the referent. For example, if I’m at my parents’ home and a
friend of my mother calls, they might say ‘Is Mum in?’, though note this is
somewhat infantilizing (to me). However, it’s unlikely that I would succeed
in referring to anyone if I walked into my supervisor’s office and asked him
‘How’s Mum?’, since neither my supervisor nor I know each other’s mothers,
and, in this context, ‘Mum’ would be a very unusual way for me to try to
refer either to my mother or to his, suggesting undue familiarity with both
him and her. It is implausible that a reasonable language-user would recover
a referent from such a use.
These phenomena appear to be very contingent social conventions, that
may well differ in other communities, without the meaning of ‘Mum’ differ-
ing.4 Thus, I find it highly implausible that these kinds of social contextual
factors play a rôle in determining the reference of a use of ‘Mum’ as part
of its semantics. To demonstrate how much context sensitivity is at play in
the referential use of ‘Mum’, consider the expression ‘How’s Mum?’, when
spoken by a person addressing her sororal niece. If the utterance occurs
in a context in which the niece is more likely than the aunt to have salient
information regarding the wellbeing of the niece’s mother, it is likely that the
2Unfortunately, I do not have the resources to carry out any rigorous data collection to
support my assertions of anecdote, but I hope readers will not find my assertions unfounded.
3Though generally such a parent would not, unlike their children, use ‘Mum’ vocatively.
4Eliot Michaelson, who grew up in California, tells me that his parents would not refer
to each other using bare ‘Mum’-type expressions, preferring ‘your mum’-type constructions,
something that to my ear would be suggestive of a lack of familial-ness.
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referent is the niece’s mother. However, in a context in which, for example,
the aunt’s own mother is ill, and staying with the niece, then it is likely that
the speaker’s mother is the referent. Of course, many other contextual factors
are likely to affect the reference, such as what terms the aunt has previously
used to refer to each mother in particular situations. It can also be the case
that ‘Mum’ refers to someone who is neither the speaker nor the addressee’s
mother. Consider the sentence ‘My boyfriend’s parents are coming to visit.
Mum wants to go to the Museum, but Dad wants to visit the Gallery’. Whilst
such a sentence might strike one as slightly odd, it is easy to see that, in
certain contexts, it is the boyfriend’s parents that are being referred to by
‘Mum’ and ‘Dad’. Alternatively, consider a doctor who attends the hospital
bed of a woman who has recently given birth. Suppose that the new mother
is dozing, but her partner is sitting by her bedside. The doctor might say to
her—the partner—‘How’s Mum doing?’, referring, very clearly, to the woman
in the bed, who is neither the speaker nor the addressee’s mother.5
7.1.3 No Parameters
In each case of ‘Mum’ usage, whilst what it is reasonable to infer about the
speaker’s purposes seems to be playing a rôle in what she refers to, it does
not seem to be that it is anything like ‘the most salient mother’ being referred
to, as might be proposed by a theorist who takes salience to be very important
in reference determination (e.g. Mount 2008). In a situation in which both
interlocutors have mothers, and both know each other’s mother, no mother
need be more contextually salient than the other in a way that is significant
for reference. Consider a case in which someone is talking to their boyfriend
about his (the boyfriend’s) mother and father coming to town. The speaker
says ‘So, we’re having dinner with your mum and dad on Saturday. And
Mum’s going to be around in the morning too.’ Although the referent of
‘Mum’ in the second sentence could be the boyfriend’s mother (as in the
previous example), I think it is clear that it can also be the speaker’s mother,
particularly if the speaker is in the habit of referring to his mother, but not
his boyfriend’s mother using bare ‘Mum’. This is in spite of the fact that the
boyfriend’s mother has been made salient in the first sentence.
It may be that there are understandings of salience according to which
there is no reference without salience, as discussed in §4.2.1, p. 122, but I
think that these understandings are explanatorily insignificant with regard to
reference, since they turn out to be either circular or redundant with regard
5I believe that this example was suggested by a colleague at the King’s Advanced Research
Seminar.
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to explaining it: A sure-fire way of making an object salient, in one sense, is
to refer to it. Thus it may be true that the referent of ‘Mum’ is always the
most salient mother at the time the word is uttered, but this salience clearly
cannot be involved in determining the reference, on pain of circularity. In
a similar vein, it might well be that the kinds of pragmatic factors that go
towards determining the reference of an utterance of ‘Mum’ are also the kind
of factors that are likely to make an object more salient than others. If that
is the case, there will certainly be a strong correlation between reference and
salience, but it does not entail that salience is itself involved in determining
reference.
Given all of this anecdotal data, it seems very reasonable to conclude that
context must play a very great part in determining the reference of ‘Mum’.
Plausibly, to the extent that it cannot be supposed that the kind of necessary or
sufficient conditions are recoverable that could play the rôle of a determinate
semantic character. But the problems for semantic determination are larger
than this. The reference of a use of ‘Mum’ can vary not just between the
unitary mothers of the interlocutors, but also between different people who
might count as being the mothers of the interlocutors, or who are called ‘Mum’
by the interlocutors. For instance, someone might have two mothers in virtue
of having one biological, and one step-mother, both of whom they sometimes
refer to as ‘Mum’, or they might have three fathers, all of whom can plausibly
be referred to as ‘Dad’ in certain contexts. This shows that even if it were
settled which interlocutor’s (or other person’s) mother was at issue, something
more may well be needed to settle upon who in fact is the referent.
7.1.4 Familial Practices
It may well be that people tend to develop particular practices for using
words like ‘Mum’, either individually or within a family unit. In a family
unit with more than one father or mother it is easy to imagine two colloquial
forms of ‘mother’ or ‘father’ being used, one for each parent, e.g. ‘Daddy’
and ‘Papa’, as reported in Guasp et al. (2010, p. 6). This is also seen with
terms for grandparents: different grandparents may be assigned different
colloquial forms of ‘grandmother’ or ‘grandfather’ in order to more easily
unambiguously refer to them. These kinds of established practice make the
terms seem, on the lips of practice-inducted family members, more like proper
names. However, it is important to note that even when these practices exist,
they are not insurmountable. Suppose someone has two mothers and calls
one ‘Mum’ and the other ‘Ma’. Whilst it might be hard for her to refer to
Ma as ‘Mum’ amongst others who are familiar with the practice, it would
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clearly be possible for her to so refer amongst non-inductees, given the right
context, just as it is still possible for her to refer to other people’s mothers
with ‘Mum’ in the kinds of circumstances described above. Note also that it
is very easy for people unfamiliar with such family-specific practices to refer
using different terms. Consider an undertaker who consistently refers to a
deceased matriarch as ‘Mum’ when addressing her children. Reference can
succeed perfectly well in such a situation, even if none of the children have
ever referred to their mother as ‘Mum’.6
7.2 From ‘Mom’ to ‘Tom’
I have now argued that there is good reason to take seriously the idea that
familial terms such as ‘Mum’, when used bare, have their reference fixed
wholly by pragmatic means. The primary aim of this chapter has not been to
show that words like ‘mum’, when used referentially, are the same as names in
every way—clearly they are not—but rather to show that it is not implausible
that a class of referential terms can have their reference determined solely by
pragmatic mechanisms that are not encoded in semantics. Though, of course,
if it were true that names and terms like ‘mum’ have more in common than
meets the eye, this can only be grist to my mill.
One superficial difference between names and familial terms is that, whilst
the most common way in English to refer using a name is to use it bare,
it seems the most common way to refer using a familial term is to use a
possessive pronoun, or the possessive form of a name, preceding it. Using a
proper name preceded by a possessive is rare in English, but it does occur
in Northern English dialects, where (e.g.) ‘our Rita’ or ‘my George’ are
common ways of referring to family members (Wales 2006). The second-
person possessive (‘your Mavis’) also appears to occur, though perhaps less
frequently, and the third-person might also be acceptable (‘Vera’s Ken’). Such
constructions are easily understood by speakers of other dialects, and even
seem natural and likely to occur, where both speaker and audience have
a close friend or family member of the same name and ambiguity would
otherwise ensue, just as one would use ‘my mum’ where ‘Mum’ would be
inappropriate or unclear. For example, my girlfriend’s name is ‘Katharine’,
and my sister’s name is ‘Kathryn’. This obviously has the potential to result
in confusion when speaking to my parents, and so they frequently attempt to
make use of constructions such as ‘your Katharine’ and ‘our Kathryn’.
6Thanks to Robyn Carston for this example.
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7.3 Conclusion
I have argued that it is highly plausible that a certain class of referential terms
have their reference determined wholly pragmatically. If it is the case that
reference can be determined in this way for one class of terms, it is possible
that something similar is true for other classes of referring terms—reference
can be a pragmatic phenomenon. Whether or not they are precisely the same
kind of term, it is clear that there are some significant similarities between
proper names and familial terms, even if there are some differences in their
use. It is therefore not implausible to think that the reference of both types of
term might be determined in a similar fashion, and since, as I have argued,
it is implausible that familial terms have their reference determined in the
ways specified by prominent semantic accounts of name reference, it is at least
plausible that proper names have their reference determined pragmatically.
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Chapter 8
Conclusions and Considerations
A good name is better than precious ointment
Ecclesiastes, 7:1
In this, the final chapter, I will offer a summary of what has gone before,highlighting those parts that I believe are most significant, or that containthe most original contributions to the debate. I will also discuss briefly
some topics pertaining to proper name reference that have not arisen at any
length previously, but that offer scope for further work in developing my
pragmatic view. In several cases, I will suggest the options and directions
for this further research that seem most promising. The first is what the
semantics of proper names might be like, and what can be said about it, given
my pragmatic view. The second topic I will discuss in this regard is how my
pragmatic view can respond to various classical problems and issues relating
to proper names.
8.1 Summary
In what has preceded, I have made some preliminary remarks about the
methodology and philosophy that are assumed by the thesis; I have offered
extensive criticisms of various semantic views of proper name reference. I
have introduced and discussed at length a pragmatic view of name reference
that attempts to do justice to the insights garnered from both my background
philosophical assumptions, and the problems of semantic views. Here, I
recapitulate my findings.
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8.1.1 Background
Chapter 2 introduced the question of the determination of proper name
reference that is addressed by the rest of the thesis. It then went on to
discuss what could count as data by which to judge an account of proper
name reference, and compare it to other accounts. I noted that judgements
about what had been referred to in cases of name use, real or imagined,
provide the most plausible, usable data on name reference. However, there
was a significant debate over whether the judgements of so-called experts,
i.e. philosophers of language and other semanticists, or the pre-theoretic
judgements of ordinary language-users were to be preferred. I concluded
that the judgements of ordinary language-users about cases of proper name
use were significantly preferable to the judgements of experts, if experts’
judgements were affected by their theorizing. In order to be genuinely
significant, such judgements would have to be collected carefully, making
use of rigorous experimental methodology. However, unfortunately, such
methodology is largely beyond the capacities of most philosophers, and is
certainly unavailable to me. Throughout most of the thesis therefore, although
I made extensive use of cases designed to draw the pre-theoretic judgements of
my readers, the conclusions I drew from them were largely my own, without
the support of experimental data, rigorous or otherwise, since it was simply
unavailable to me. I believe that my judgements were not unduly influenced
by my theoretic commitments, though, as for any work making use of such
judgements within arguments, the success of those arguments will depend on
the acquiescence of my readers.
Following the discussion of data, in chapter 2, I introduced my thoughts
on the semantics/pragmatics divide, which played a key rôle in my claim that
proper name reference is a wholly pragmatic phenomenon. I suggested that
the contribution that words make to every utterance in which they occur—their
context-insensitive contribution—is their semantic content, and that anything
that words contribute to an utterance that goes beyond this, anything that
depends upon the context of their utterance, is pragmatic. Being heavily
influenced by Travis, I take any truth-evaluable content to be pragmatic, on
this understanding of pragmatics. I did not argue for this general claim,
but I spent some time outlining and discussing Travis’s general account that
makes this claim: that the semantics of words and sentences—their meanings—
radically under-determine their content, or what is said or expressed with
them. Following this exposition of Travis, I briefly discussed communication,
and its rôle with regard to language and reference.
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8.1.2 Semantic Views
Part II introduced the semantic view of proper name reference: those accounts
that maintain that the reference of names is in some way semantic, because
it is determined by, or constitutes, their semantics. I considered two main
groups of accounts within this view: causal-homophonism and indexicalism. I
also discussed a third group of accounts, intention-based accounts, some, but
not all of which might be considered to fall within the semantic view of name
reference. I did not, generally, attempt to offer refutations of any of these
types of account, as such, but rather, argued that each is subject to significant
complications and limitations that damages its credibility, particularly when
compared to an account that is better able to deal with the problems I present
for those accounts, as I claim my pragmatic view is. I approached each of the
three types of account differently. Chapter 3 provided four, largely distinct
arguments against causal-homophonism, which I treated as a single, cohesive
account of name reference. Against indexicalism, in chapter 4, I proposed
a single, over-arching form of argument, but then discussed in detail the
accounts of three different indexicalists, before applying my general argument
form to some specific cases. I discussed two distinct forms of intention-
based accounts of name reference in chapter 5. With regard to the first, I
simply demonstrated some significant problems. With regard to the second, I
offered an extended argument to the effect that the kind of broad approach to
language that must contain it, is essentially problematic.
Causal-homophonism is the view that the reference of a proper name
just constitutes its semantics, such that there is nothing more to its meaning
than what it refers to. Just what it is that a name refers to is determined
by a causal chain that connects each use of it to an initial baptism of the
referent with the name. In order to square this view about meaning with
the truth-conditional semantics espoused by its proponents, it is required
that each name can only have one referent. Thus, it is claimed that any
case of a single name having multiple referents, which appears to be a
ubiquitous phenomenon, is in fact a case of homonymy or homophony:
there are multiple names, each with a distinct referent, that simply sound the
same and have the same orthographic form. I presented four main arguments
against this view in chapter 3: the argument from shared names, the argument
from communication, the argument from family names, and the argument
from pluralism about reference determination. The argument from shared
names was, perhaps, the least effective, just because it is unlikely to convince
anyone already inclined toward accepting the homophonist individuation
of names. I appealed to ordinary language claims that proper names are
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shared, in order to reject the contrary claims of the homophonist, and argued
that any attempts they make to accommodate the ordinary language claims
as being anything other than simply false will fail. I maintained that we
should attempt to accept the ordinary language claims, and thus should be ill-
disposed towards the homophonist individuation of names. The argument
from communication took aim primarily at the causal explanation of the
determination of name reference. I claimed that it fails to properly account
for the way that language-users use names, and in particular, how they use
them to communicate. Perhaps the most original argument against causal-
homophonism that I presented was that from family names, since very little
has previously been said about what homophonists can or should say about
family names. I observed that family names have at least two primary rôles,
at least in English-speaking communities in the West. The first is to refer, in
various ways, to families. The second is to refer to individuals whose full
names incorporate the family name that names their family. Although there
are various routes that the homophonist could take in order to accommodate
these different rôles, none is simple, and each adds significant complications
to the homophonist picture. My final argument, from pluralism, drew on
the previous arguments, particularly that from communication, to observe
that there appear to be a variety of ways that names are used, and their
reference determined. Whilst the causal theory lends itself well to explaining
one particular way of using names, it fails to do justice to others.
Indexicalism is a group of views that suggest that proper name reference
is in some way akin to the reference of indexicals, that is, it is context-
sensitive, but in a way specified by the meanings of names. Thus, their
semantics determines their reference because it provides a rule that specifies
the reference, given certain contextual factors. My broad form of argument
against indexical views about names in chapter 4 owed much to Travisian-
style arguments against similar views about the meanings of words generally.
I maintained that, for any particular specification of how context affects the
reference of a name, it will have one of three serious problems: it will be too
general, such that it will fail to distinguish between rival possible referents;
or it will specify the wrong contextual factors, such that it returns the wrong
referents; or it will be incomplete, such that it fails to provide any specific
account of reference determination. I discussed the indexicalist accounts
of Recanati (1993), Pelczar and Rainsbury (1998) and Rami (2014) in depth,
finding significant problems with each, primarily that they were, essentially,
incomplete, and failed to provide a fully truth-conditional account of proper
name reference, despite this being a clear intention. I then went on to discuss
the general problem of trying to specify particular contextual factors that
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might effect the reference of a name upon every use, and attempted to indicate
that several factors that seem plausible candidates will fail; in particular, I
discussed salience. I then discussed in detail why appealing to name bearing,
and name-using practices, as a necessary or sufficient condition for proper
name reference is a doomed endeavour. The complications and nuances
of what counts as bearing a name and being part of a name-using practice
are brought out in this section. These discussions of the very possibility
of providing criteria-based rules for the reference of names form a novel
approach to the question of proper name reference.
Chapter 5 discussed two different forms of intention-based account of
proper name reference: constraint-based, and (neo-)Gricean. These have
in common that they incorporate the intentions of the speaker into the
determination of (semantic) reference in some manner. As I had made clear
in chapter 3, intentions per se are not on their own suitable as determinants of
reference, as it appears that speakers can refer to things that they do not intend
to using names, and that simply intending to refer to something goes very little
way towards actually referring to it. Constraint-based intentionalism denies
that speakers can refer without intending to, and maintains that speaker
intentions do determine name reference, but that what a particular name
can refer to is constrained. I associated this view primarily with Michaelson
(2013). I argued both that the determining rôle of speaker intentions, and
the involvement of particular constraints, especially involving name-bearing
relations, renders the account highly problematic. The kind of Gricean
intentionalism about name reference that I envision places constraints not
on what a name can be used to refer to, but on what referential intentions a
speaker can have, in line with the kind of strong neo-Griceanism espoused
by Neale (2004, ms.). I argued against this type of view by attempting to
show that the general account of the constraints on communicative intentions
required by Neale and other Griceans are implausible in light of data from
experimental psychology.
8.1.3 A Pragmatic View
Part III, and chapter 6, contained a detailed exposition of a pragmatic view of
reference, the primary positive original contribution of this thesis, that had
begun to take shape through the criticisms I offered of semantic views in
part II. I began by mentioning how my view has been influenced by Travis’s
work on reference. I then introduced seven broad principles that covered the
major points of the view, and went on to discuss these principles in detail. I
discussed my general conception of names and name reference, and how this
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relates to truth, touching on empty names and reference over time. I then went
on to deal with what the mechanisms of name reference might be, and what
they are not. I discussed the context-sensitivity of name reference, highlighting
the reasons for holding reference to be context-sensitive that I have provided
throughout the thesis, and the rôle of semantics in the determination of name
reference. As I have made clear, the claim that the semantics of proper names
do not play a significant rôle in the determination of their reference is the
primary claim of this thesis. A significant part of this claim is that there are
no necessary and sufficient conditions for proper name reference, such that a
list of determinate criteria could ever be enumerated. This point also received
elucidation. Perhaps the most controversial claim of my pragmatic view is
that the referent of a proper name need not be a bearer of that name. This
claim also received the most extensive discussion of the chapter, in which I
detailed why I make it, and how the intuitions that generally lead theorists
of name reference to make the converse claim can be better accommodated.
One better way of accommodating such intuitions about bearers, as well as
the apparent feature of names that they can be reused, repeated, and passed
on, is to maintain that the referent of a name is merely likely to be something
that has already been referred to with that name.
Having provided discussion of the major features of the view, I then moved
on to some clarifications. I mentioned how names might be individuated, giv-
en my conception of their reference, and I related that conception at length to
Travis’s conception of occasion-sensitivity. I focussed, in particular, on whether
the occasion-sensitivity that I appear to be proposing for name reference
extends beyond the level of language, to thoughts, as Travis maintains it does
with regard to other kinds of expression. I suggested that there was a good
sense in which it did, although the comparison raised some interesting issues.
Finally, in chapter 6, I considered some likely objections to my pragmatic
view, concluding that they do not present significant problems for it. One of
these objections, that it is implausible that there are no determinate criteria
for proper name reference, is taken up again in chapter 7, where I considered
referential uses of familial terms such ‘Mum’—a variety of term that, like
family names, seems to have received very little attention in the philosophical
or linguistic literature. I argued that observation of the ways that such
terms can be used referentially makes it highly implausible that there are
criteria contained in their semantics that determine their reference. This
lends significant plausibility to my claim that proper name reference can also
function without there being necessary and sufficient criteria encoded in their
semantics.
I have made a strong case for the claim that the reference of proper names
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is a pragmatic, and not a semantic, phenomenon, and developed a detailed
account of proper name reference based upon that idea. I have shown the
weaknesses of other accounts of name reference, which maintain that reference
is determined, as least in part, by the semantics of names, and contributes
to the semantics of larger linguistic structures. I hope I have shown that my
pragmatic view is a worthy competitor to these semantic accounts, and that,
given their weaknesses, it is plausibly to be preferred to them. Having thus
discussed what I have done over the course of the thesis, I now turn to what
I have not yet done, and what will need doing in the future to shore up my
view.
8.2 Semantics
An issue that I have frequently gestured at and passed over in this thesis
is what the semantics of proper names can be like, given my view of their
reference. If there is to be some kind of compositional logical form at the level
of semantics, what is it that names contribute? This question, rather than how
name reference is determined, appears to have dominated discussion of names
in the last few years, spurred on by renewed interest in predicativist, or neo-
descriptivist, accounts of names. I will, very briefly, say what the semantics of
names cannot be, given my view of their reference, and then what they could
be. As I discussed in the introduction to part II, accounts of proper names can
be divided into accounts that take a stand on the semantics of names; those
that take a stand on the determination of reference; and those that take a stand
on both. So far, I have discussed only those views that take a stand on the
determination of reference, whether or not they also take a stand on semantics.
I rejected causal-homophonism, which states that the reference of each proper
name is determined causally, and that their semantics is constituted just by
their reference. In terms of semantics at the logical or morpho-syntactic
level, causal-homophonism most naturally adopts the view that proper names
behave like non-logical constant terms. I also rejected indexicalism, which
maintains that names have a semantics like that of indexicals, which, in some
way, specifies the way in which context is to contribute to the determination of
reference. This could be done in a variety of ways, but most obviously would
be modelled within a representation of logical or morpho-syntactic form as
the value a function.
It is clear from the nature of my view about proper name reference that
I cannot accept a story about the semantics of names which involves either
the determination of their reference, or an assumption that their reference is
already determined at the semantic level. In common with many proponents
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of semantic views, I maintain that a name contributes just its reference to
the truth-evaluable content of whatever larger structure is the bearer of
that content—it is directly referential. However, whilst for them, this is
a contribution to truth-conditional semantic content, for me, all content of
this kind, including reference, occurs at a pragmatic level, which presumably
operates in some way on whatever comes from the semantics of uttered
expressions. Thus, assuming that there still is a compositional semantic level,
which is what I am calling ‘logical form’, whatever names contribute must just
allow that, for example, it can be composed with predicates, and that reference
can be attached to it at the pragmatic level. In the introduction to part II, I
mentioned two views on the semantics of names that did not assume anything
objectionable about reference determination: predicativism and variablism.
I suggest that either of these accounts might provide what my pragmatic
view of reference needs from semantics, though variablism might prove the
most natural. However, working out in detail how either a predicativist or
indexicalist semantics would work together with my pragmatic view of proper
name reference, and whether one should be preferred to the other is clearly a
task for further research.
8.2.1 Predicativism
Predicativism is the view that proper names are predicates. Their semantic
type is that of a common count noun, and this is observed most clearly in
sentences such as ‘I know four Michaels’, and ‘I’ve never met a mean Giulia’, in
which the occurrences of names are clearly predicative rather than referential.
But predicativists maintain that even when occurring referentially, proper
names are predicates. Most contemporary versions of the view maintain that,
when names are used referentially, they occur—at the morpho-syntactic level—
with a definite article preceding them, whether or not this is pronounced
(Fara 2015; Gray 2014, forthcoming; Matushansky 2008). I will consider here
just descriptivist versions of predicativism. In English, in many—though not
all cases—names occur without any apparent determiner when used to refer
singularly, though there are several natural languages in which a definite
article is either permissible or obligatory with uses of proper names that
would be bare in English. There has been much said on the topic of whether
or not predicativism is plausible, and whether it can account for uses of names
as well as accounts of names that treat them as essentially referring terms. I
will not get into this debate in any detail here, but will just consider how well
the predicativist view of name semantics would fit with my pragmatic view
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of their reference.1
I claim that predicativism is not a view about proper name reference
because it simply pushes the question of how reference is determined into
how it is determined for definite article expressions. There is much debate
over the nature of definite descriptions, whether they ever are referential, and
how their reference is determined if so. I am of the opinion, as I have indicated
previously, that descriptions can refer, and that this reference is the same kind
of phenomenon as that of proper names, for example, it is not merely ‘speaker
reference’, in contrast to the ‘semantic reference’ of names. Furthermore, as
was also clear from my mention of Donnellan cases, I maintain that definite
descriptions can refer, in the robust sense that names refer, to objects that do
not satisfy their descriptive element. These claims are, of course, controversial,
and I will not argue for them here. However, I suggest that they would be
required of definite article expressions in order to square my pragmatic view
of name reference with predicativism about name semantics. The standard
view of the meaning of name predicates, in the sense of what is required to
satisfy them, is that they are satisfied just by bearers of the name in question.
So, the predicate ‘Lucy’ is applied correctly to objects that bear the name
‘Lucy’ (Fara 2015; Gray 2014). This seems to borne out by the way that
names are used in predicate position, non-referentially: If I say ‘I know four
Michaels’, this seems to mean something closely akin to ‘I know four people
named “Michael”’. I have made a great deal of fuss about the fact that a
name such as ‘Katharine’ can be used to refer to objects that do not bear
that name. But this is consistent with referential uses of ‘Katharine’ having
the morpho-syntactic form ‘thenull Katharine’, which is equivalent to ‘the
bearer of “Katharine”’, if definite descriptions can be used to refer to things
that do not satisfy them. Indeed, one might even think that this treatment
provided a nice explanation of why ‘Katharine’ need not refer to a Katharine,
and of the apparent symmetry between Donnellan-type cases and cases of
name reference to non-bearers. I could claim that the descriptive portion of a
definite description simply provides another pragmatic factor that can, but
might not, affect the reference of the term in some manner.
There would, of course, be some problems with adopting the predicativist
view of semantics. Firstly, I am unhappy with the notion of there being
unarticulated determiners and denuded definite descriptions. This seems to
be an unduly theoretical posit that is difficult to make sense of: what are
these null articles? In what manner do they exist? It may be that I can
simply say that when used referentially, ‘Katharine’ behaves just like a definite
1Thanks to Delia Graff Fara for highlighting to me that predicativism might be compatible
with my view.
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description of the form ‘the Katharine’, where ‘Katharine’ is a predicate of the
kind described. However, this story might well run into complications.
A further problem would be incorporating my suggestion that the seman-
tics of a name should include that it is likely that a referent has been referred
to with the name before. I could argue that name predicates are not satisfied
just by bearers of the names, but by things that have been referred to with the
name before. However, this does not seem to be justified by predicative uses
of names: something does not become a Lucy just because it has been referred
to with that name once, though it might be that it becomes more likely to be
so described the more often it is so referred to. An alternative would be to
claim that this is simply a feature of the reference of definite descriptions. This
seems to have some plausibility. It is, at least, true that within relatively small
communities, or contexts, or discourses, referential definite descriptions can
set up practices of repeated use. For example, if a friend says to me one day,
‘I think the man in the hat over there is following me’, referring to a mutually
apparent man in a hat, then the next day she can say ‘I saw the man in hat
again today’, and succeed in referring in virtue of having used the description
to refer the previous day. This phenomenon seems even more likely if a
description has been used to refer to something that does satisfy it: the mere
fact that it has been used to refer to that object makes it easier to refer to that
object again with the same description. However, the phenomenon seems
much more localized than that that applies to proper names, since my thought
with regard to proper names—which may well require modification—is that a
use of a name is likely to refer to something that it has been used to refer to
before, at some point ever, with almost no constraint.
8.2.2 Variablism
Variablism is the view that proper names have the semantic form of variables,
or are like variables in some significant way, and when they are used referen-
tially, they behave as free variables. It is propounded most prominently by
Dever (1998) and Cumming (2008). Such a view can be contrasted, primarily,
with the view that names are like non-logical constant terms. A major
difference is that constants have their value assigned by an interpretation
function that is part of a model, whereas variables have no specific denotation
with regard to any particular model, but only upon a particular variable
assignment, which is distinct from the model, and can be varied with regard
to it. This makes indexicalism a natural semantic story for contextualist and
pragmatic accounts of name reference, connecting names with certain (uses
of) pronouns that are frequently treated as variables. Indeed, to the extent
216
8.2. Semantics
that Dever and Cumming put forward views about how the reference of
names is determined, it is largely pragmatic (in some sense) or contextual.
Treating proper names as variables at the semantic level has, for me, the
major advantage that there is no suggestion that a variable has a particular
reference, without some assignment being applied, which can be at the
pragmatic level, given a particular utterance. This will give us enough to say,
as Dever and Cumming do, that (natural language) sentences containing (non-
bound) proper names are effectively open sentences that require some kind of
completion in order to express truth-evaluable content, just as expressions of
first-order logic containing free variables have no interpretation on a model
without being relativized to a variable assignment. I can then claim that,
given an utterance of such a sentence, pragmatic factors provide a variable
assignment (or a partial assignment) in the ways I described in chapter 6.
The question now arises of what the variables are like. The simplest
explanation would be just that each name is a variable, but this would create
the problem that any two occurrences of a name in the same utterance, if
they were deemed to fall within the same context, occasion, or circumstances,
would be co-referential. But, as I have mentioned previously, it appears that if
the same name is used multiple times within a short linguistic space, then,
in many contexts, it will be likely that the uses are not co-referential. For
example, if I say ‘I haven’t seen John for ages, but John said he’ll be at the
party tomorrow’, rather than ‘I haven’t seen John for ages, but he said he’ll be
at the party tomorrow’, then there is the impression that the second occurrence
of ‘John’ refers to a different person to the first. I can adopt Rami’s (2014)
solution to this problem, and add a sequential index to each occurrence of a
name, which can be represented as an integer. Every occurrence of a name
is now effectively a distinct variable. This means that we no longer have the
notion of co-reference at the level of semantics (at least between occurrences of
names), but this might be fine—even in cases in which the fact that a name has
already been used in a dialogue contributes to the determination of reference,
this is a factor effecting its reference at the pragmatic level. A consequence
of this will be that certain inferences will not be possible at the logical or
semantic level, for example, but this shouldn’t bother us. Given my Travisian
claim that everything truth-evaluable occurs at the pragmatic level, this is
where we should expect truth-functional inferences to be evaluable.
A further question, and potential problem, for this variablist view arises
when we consider binding. If referential proper names are free variables at the
semantic level, then it might be reasonable to suppose that they can be bound
by placing a quantifier at the beginning of a sentence containing a name.
Dever (1998) does not consider binding in the case of names, but Cumming
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(2008) views the possibility of binding as feature of the account, allowing
explanation of various predicative uses of names, such as ‘I’ve never met a
mean Giulia’ or ‘All the Johns were there’. However, Cumming considers
more complex examples, such as ‘There is a gentleman in Hertfordshire by
the name of “Ernest”. Ernest is engaged to two women’, which he regards
as a case of a bound anaphoric use of a name (Cumming 2008). Elbourne
(2005), a predicativist, also suggests that names can be bound in ways not
generally appreciated; for example, uses of names that resemble uses of D-
type pronouns or definite descriptions: ‘Every woman who has a husband
called John and a lover called Gerontius takes only Gerontius to the Rare
Names Convention’ (ibid., p. 181). I have mixed feelings about such binding
of names. The non-quoted use of ‘Ernest’ in Cumming’s example strikes me
as a straightforwardly referential use, not a case of anaphora. If that’s so, then
we may not want names to be bound unrestrainedly. However, ‘Gerontius’, in
Elbourne’s example, clearly cannot be referential. It appears that it needs to be
explained as a bound use. It seems plausible that, if proper names are treated
as variables, there is no need to assume that they must be unrestrainedly
bindable. They might be treated as terms that behave like free variables, but
cannot be bound. Or they might be bindable only in particular ways, by
particular quantifiers, assuming that there is a systematic explanation for the
way in which binding is acceptable.
8.3 Problems of Names
It would be fair to say that, with regard to problems for accounts of proper
names, the major preoccupation of this thesis has been the problem of shared
names, both in being posed to other positions, and in showing how my view
can deal with it better. I have spent almost no time discussing the kinds of
problems that have traditionally been posed for, or inspired, accounts of names.
I will now very briefly address four of these issues, pointing out whether or
not they present significant difficulty for my pragmatic view, and indicating
how they might be approached in future research, if so. These problems are
rigidity; name change and reference shift; puzzles about attitudes and beliefs;
and fictional and empty names. The first two of these, I am able to deal with
fairly easily, simply in virtue of the nature of my account. The latter two
deserve more consideration, and I will provide some thoughts on the issues.
However, they certainly present no more of a problem for my view than they
do for a range of orthodox accounts, so even if it were to emerge that my view
does not provide any simple solutions, this should not be seen as a particular
disadvantage.
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8.3.1 Rigidity
Rigid designation, as characterized by Kripke (1981), is reference to the same
object in all possible worlds, i.e. regardless of the world of evaluation. In
modal logical terms, this means that there is no scope interaction between
rigid terms and modal operators, so all scope readings are equivalent. I
certainly acknowledge that proper names, or their reference, exhibit the
property that Kripke was alluding to with his characterization of rigidity,
and which has been so-called ever since, and so my pragmatic view of name
reference must account for it. However, I think that Kripke’s description
of rigidity is somewhat unhelpful to understanding what the phenomenon
really consists in. Indeed, it maybe unhelpful to think of it as a phenomenon
at all. In particular, I think that Kripke’s emphasis on the modal contrast
between proper names and definite descriptions is unhelpful, an opinion
that he himself seems to hold when, in the preface to Naming and Necessity
he observes that rigidity is not essentially a modal notion, and that proper
names exhibit it even in non-modal settings (ibid., pp. 10–12). My view will
be that rigidity is simply a feature of reference, and, as observed by Dever
(1998), it essentially falls out of the kind of characterization of reference that I
have provided. To refer to an object using a name is to pick out a particular
object, and then presumably say something of that object. There is not really
anything more to rigidity than is contained in that idea.
On my pragmatic view of proper name reference, rigidity cannot be a
property of names per se, but must be a feature of their reference (which only
occurs on an occasion). As I discussed in §6.2, if a name refers to a particular
object, then the truth of an utterance containing (a referential use of) that
name turns on how that object is. This fact about reference just comes with
rigidity: If we want to know the truth of an utterance of ‘Frances might have
been a famous architect’, then, since ‘Frances’ is a referring term, we look at
whether the referent might have been a famous architect, and this depends
upon her modal properties, not on what the referent of the utterance might
otherwise have been. Indeed, if things had been such that the reference of an
utterance of the same name at the same time and place had been different, the
occasion of utterance would have to have been different, and so the utterance
itself would have been different. So, there is a trivial sense in which particular
referential uses of a name have the reference they do essentially.
In modal logical terms, the scenario I’ve just described is basically that of
a name taking wide-scope over a modal operator. This seems very plausible
where modal auxiliaries are concerned, such as in ‘Frances might have been a
famous architect’, because the English syntax already makes it appear that
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the name is out-scoping the modal. For name reference to be rigid in the
received modal-logical sense, my account must also show that uses of names
within the scope of ‘sentence’-modifying modal adverbs are rigid. Take a
rather un-idiomatic example: ‘Necessarily, Frances is the height she is’. From
a modal-logical point of view, this is true just in case the embedded sentence
‘Frances is the height she is’ is true in every possible world, and on the view
that the semantic content of ‘Frances’ is just Frances herself, the name has the
same reference in every world (if it is treated as a constant term with the same
interpretation at every world, say). From my point of view, we can consider
whether what was said with a particular utterance of ‘Frances is the height
she is’ would have been true in counter-factual situations. This gives us the
correct result. Something an utterance of ‘Frances is the height she is’ might
plausibly say is that some particular person, Frances, is the height that she
is. We can now ask whether that is necessarily true. But, of course, this is to
apply modal reasoning to an object that has already been obtained, just as for
the ‘wide-scope’ case, and the truth of the utterance turns on how that object
is, not on any other merely-possible referents of the names. This answer was,
of course, fairly obvious if we think about natural language rather than modal
logic: ‘Necessarily, Frances is the height she is’ is intuitively equivalent to ‘It is
necessary that Frances is the height she is’, and in this sentence it is clear that
we are talking about Frances, the referent, and what she is like. This gives us
rigidity in both an intuitive sense—the reference of a use of the name stays
the same, whatever modal reasoning we apply—and in the modal logical
sense—a wide-scope reading of a name over modal operators is equivalent to
a narrow-scope reading.
8.3.2 Name Change and Reference Shift
Cases in which the name of an object changes, or the reference of a name
appears to shift have been significant to debates about proper name reference
since Evans (1973) introduced the Madagascar case as an alleged counter-
example to Kripke’s (1981) causal picture of reference. Sainsbury’s (2005)
discussion of names is also riven with examples involving reference shift, and
one of the primary motivations for the position he presents in his (2015)
appears to be accounting better for such cases. Madagascar-type cases
generally take the following form: There is an existing practice of using
a particular name to refer to a particular object. Whilst appearing or intending
to be following that practice, and using the name in accordance with it,
speakers begin to use the name to refer to a different object, which eventually
becomes the object of the practice, or develops into a new practice, depending
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on how one thinks of such things. Such cases are well known to present
problems for causal-homophonism and related views, for obvious reasons.
But they also present potential problems for other accounts, such as some
versions of indexicalism, that rely on bearer relations. This is because, at the
point where the reference is shifting, the new object may not be a bearer of
the name in question (though it may become one), and because the story one
tells about how it is determined which bearer of a name a speaker is referring
to might appeal to their intentions to be using one name-using practice or
another.
Such cases are significantly less problematic for my pragmatic view
of proper name reference as it stands, however, which gives me a major
advantage over other accounts. Because, on this view, a whole range of factors
can contribute to the determination of reference; there is no requirement that
there be a particular name-using practice or bearer relation that determines
that a name refers to a particular object. Moreover, there is no requirement
that a speaker refers to what they intend to with a use of a name. So, even if a
speaker has certain intentions to refer to whatever other people are referring
to with that name, they may refer to something else, or vice versa. It also
does not matter if the speaker has muddled intentions about what they are
referring to: the circumstances of utterance may make it clear that one object
is the referent of the use of a name, even though it does not currently bear
that name, and there are salient naming practices that pair that name with
other objects. I have said relatively little in the rest of the thesis about what
constitutes naming or name-using practices, except to indicate that they are
social conventions of using particular names to refer to particular objects, the
existence of which can be a factor in determining that utterances of that name
refer to that object. I am content to leave further questions about the nature
of these practices open. Describing exactly what is going on in Madagascar
and other reference and use shift cases may still present some problems for
my view, to the extent that describing what is actually occurring in each case
may be complex, and it may be that a very thorough description of each case
would be required in order to provide that detail. Nevertheless, my options
for undertaking this task, given the flexibility of my pluralism about reference
determination, are significantly better than those of many other accounts of
names.
8.3.3 Attitudes and Beliefs, Fiction and Empty Reference
At its core, my view of proper name reference is a direct reference view, like
most, if not all, of the other rival positions I have discussed: it maintains that
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reference allows talk about objects in the world by, in some manner, making
objects themselves part of the interpretation of utterances containing names.
As such, my view is subject to the problems that tend to affect such views.
Two well known problems for such a view are propositional attitude reports
and related puzzles about belief, and fictional names and uses of names with
empty reference. Whereas my account, as I have stated it so far, has no
particular obvious recourse with regard to these problems, it also does not
do any worse than other direct reference accounts, and, in general, any broad
approaches taken to these problems by the purveyors of other accounts will
also be available to me. My view also has an advantage in being flexible and
pluralistic, which makes it naturally ecumenical in the solutions it can adopt.
I will briefly introduce each of the problems for the purposes of identifying
further areas of research, but I will provide no more than a cursory suggestion
of how my pragmatic view of reference might approach them.
Puzzles about reporting beliefs and attitudes containing proper names,
and other referring terms, have been central to the discussion of names
and reference ever since Frege, arguably the originator of such discussion,
introduced the puzzle about the morning star and the evening star (Frege
1892). These puzzles usually revolve around co-referring terms, and the fact
that it appears that a rational person, who appears competent in the use of two
co-referring terms may, nonetheless, fail to realize that they are co-referring.
This presents a problem for direct accounts of reference, because they appear
to entail that any co-referring names can be inter-substituted in an utterance
salva veritate. After all, if the purpose of a name is just to make the truth of
an utterance turn on how its referent is, then it shouldn’t matter what name
one uses, as long as the right reference occurs. However, it is clear that an
utterance of ‘The ancients believed that Hesperus appears in the evening sky’
can be true in the same context in which an utterance of ‘The ancients believed
that Phosphorus appears in the evening sky’ is false. Thus, it is not true that
all occurrences of co-referring names can be inter-substituted salva veritate.
The kinds of utterance in which this kind of substitution fails—opaque
contexts—appear to be almost entirely those that report something about the
mental lives of thinkers. Moreover, the names must be being used as if the
report is of something that the thinker would ascent to containing the name.
If we rephrase the report in the last sentence as ‘The ancients believed of
Hesperus that it appears in the evening sky’, then we can substitute the co-
referring name and get a true utterance: ‘The ancients believed of Phosphorus
that it appears in the evening sky’. This appears to suggest that in these
opaque (linguistic) contexts, the names are not behaving in the same way that
they usually do. Indeed, Frege’s solution was to claim that in such contexts,
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names refer to their senses, rather than their usual referents. However, it
is usually thought that, in order to have a sense in the appropriate manner,
names must have a semantic meaning that goes beyond their reference, such
as that proposed by indexicalists and denied by causal-homophonists. So far,
I have suggested that the meanings of names are extremely sparse, so it is
unclear whether this option is open to me, or what it would entail. However,
since I claim that the reference of names is distinct from their meaning, I
certainly have more avenues open to me than the homophonist. Exactly what
I can and should say about the use of names in opaque reference contexts and
attitude reports must be the purview of further work on my pragmatic view
of name reference.
The felicitous use of names to talk about things that, apparently, do not
exist is also a potential problem for direct reference accounts of proper names,
and a frequent concern of their authors. If reference essentially involves objects,
what is going on in the case of utterances containing names that appear to
behave like other names—they are meaningful—but have no referent? The
most obvious uses of so-called empty names are to talk about fiction of various
kinds, which is strewn with proper names that do not appear to refer to objects
that exist in the manner of those that populate the real world, and to talk about
things such as ‘Vulcan’, Le Verrier’s theoretical planet postulated to explain
perturbations in the orbit of Mercury, which turned out not to exist. These
kinds of uses of names present me with two desiderata for my pragmatic
view. Firstly, that they be accounted for as felicitous and explicable uses of
proper names of the same kind as those that refer—indeed, it must be possible
that a single name can be used on different occasions to refer to real things
and to talk about fictional things. Secondly, it should not involve positing
additional ways of using proper names that are of an essentially different kind
to ordinary uses, as this would fail to explain why such uses appear so similar
to ordinary uses, and indeed, why speakers and hearers need not realize that
they are talking about non-existent things. Given my views on the nature of
language generally, I also think that it is desirable that an account of these
kinds of uses of names should not entail that all such uses simply result in
false utterances. Empty uses of names are made use of in a great variety of
meaningful and productive discourse, and it is simply implausible that all
such utterances are literally false, especially since they can express things that
are clearly considered to be true.
The resources of occasion-sensitivity appear to provide the scope for being
able to say more nuanced things about the truth of utterances about fiction
and other non-real things. For example, one might think that being a fictional
kangaroo is one way to be a kangaroo so that, although Skippy isn’t a real
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kangaroo, there is a sense in which she is a kangaroo, albeit a non-existent,
fictional one. However, this still leaves the problem of what is happening with
regard to reference: how can the truth of an utterance turn on the referent of
a name if there is no such referent? One response would be suggest that there
is a way to be a referent, such that truth can be turned on one, but that this
doesn’t entail existence in the same way that real things exist. Whether this is
a plausible route to take or not remains to be seen. I would not particularly
want it to devolve into a realist account of fictional characters, since they rarely
give the right kinds of results with regard to intuitively true or correct things
that one can say about fiction.2 Another possible route to take would be to
make use of a free logic within my semantics, which allows that there can be
constant terms that have no interpretation, in the manner of Sainsbury (2005,
2009, 2015) and Rami (2014). However, in order to allow for true sentences
involving empty uses of names, I would have to adopt a positive free logic, in
contrast to the negative free logics preferred by Sainsbury and Rami, though
this would be more complex. It is clear, however, that I have options with
regard to the problem of empty names, as I do with the problems of attitude
and belief reports.
8.4 The Final Summary
Having gestured towards the ways in which my research might be extended
and expanded, my thesis ends. In it, I have offered a novel story of proper
name reference, upon which it is determined, not in virtue of the semantics of
names, but in virtue of pragmatic features of context that are unspecified and
unconstrained by semantics.
2See Sainsbury (2009) for detailed arguments against such positions.
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